State of Fla., Dept. of Transp. v. Gary

• Decision Date: 07 October 1987
• Docket Number: No. 87-538,87-538
• Citation: 513 So.2d 1338,12 Fla. L. Weekly 2376
• Parties: 12 Fla. L. Weekly 2376 STATE of FLORIDA, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, Petitioner, v. William L. GARY, Circuit Judge, Second Judicial Circuit, and Wilkinson & Jenkins Construction Co., Inc., Respondents.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

Page 1338

513 So.2d 1338

12 Fla. L. Weekly 2376

STATE of FLORIDA, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, Petitioner, v. William L. GARY, Circuit Judge, Second Judicial Circuit, and Wilkinson & Jenkins Construction Co., Inc., Respondents.

No. 87-538.

District Court of Appeal of Florida First District.

Oct. 7, 1987.

Rehearing Denied Nov. 13, 1987.

Thomas H. Bateman, III, Gen. Counsel, and Franz Eric Dorn, Dept. of Transp., Tallahassee, for petitioner.

Patricia H. Malono and Joseph W. Lawrence, II, of Cummings & Lawrence P.A., Tallahassee, and Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., and Walter Meginnis, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, for respondents.

WIGGINTON, Judge.

The Department of Transportation (DOT) petitions for a writ of prohibition or, in the alternative, writ of certiorari seeking review of an interlocutory order entered by respondent Circuit Judge William L. Gary granting the motion to stay administrative proceedings filed by respondent Wilkinson & Jenkins Construction Co., Inc. (Wilkinson & Jenkins). After reviewing the petition and Wilkinson & Jenkins' response to this Court's order to show cause, and after hearing oral argument in the case, we deem the proper avenue for relief is by way of DOT's petition for writ of certiorari and hold that the trial court departed from the essential requirements of law by staying the administrative proceedings. ¹

The controversy began on April 16, 1987, when DOT issued its final notice of intent to suspend Wilkinson & Jenkins' certificate of qualification due to unsatisfactory work progress on a state road project in Palm Beach County. On April 28, 1987, Wilkinson & Jenkins requested a hearing on DOT's proposed determination of delinquency pursuant to section 337.16(1)(b), Florida Statutes. The hearing was ultimately set for June 8, 1987.

However, on May 27, Wilkinson & Jenkins filed a complaint and demand for jury trial in the Second Judicial Circuit seeking compensatory damages and a declaratory judgment based on an alleged breach of contract by DOT arising from the same Palm Beach County road project. The essence of the complaint alleged that DOT delayed the project causing damages to Wilkinson & Jenkins. On the same day, Wilkinson & Jenkins filed in the circuit court and with the administrative hearing officer motions for stay of the administrative proceedings. In the motions, Wilkinson & Jenkins alleged that the circuit court had exclusive jurisdiction of the breach of contract action and that the administrative delinquency proceeding would cover some of the same issues as would be determined in the civil action. Consequently, Wilkinson & Jenkins maintained that the prosecution of the administrative hearing would collaterally estop the relitigation in the circuit court of those factual issues and would result, therefore, in a loss of Wilkinson & Jenkins' right to a jury trial. Additionally, Wilkinson & Jenkins argued that the hearing officer's determination of crucial factual and legal issues, using a standard of proof and procedures different from those applied in the circuit court, would preclude the court from exercising its primary and exclusive jurisdiction over the breach of contract suit.

DOT responded by arguing that the administrative proceeding was filed first and would provide an adequate remedy to Wilkinson & Jenkins. Also, DOT argued that the circuit court did not have the exclusive jurisdiction of the matters raised in the administrative proceeding, and that pertinent statutes and administrative rules afforded Wilkinson & Jenkins the right to have an administrative hearing.

On June 3, 1987, the hearing officer issued an order denying the motion for stay. However, on June 4, the circuit court granted the motion to stay based on the finding that the parties' proceeding forward with the administrative hearing would deny Wilkinson & Jenkins "their right to a jury trial in its breach of contract action."

After giving due consideration to all the arguments presented by the parties, it is apparent that the fundamental underpinning of the circuit court's order is the presumption that the hearing officer's findings of fact would be conclusive in the civil proceeding due to the application of the principle of collateral estoppel. It is true that collateral estoppel has been used to bar relitigation of issues in a civil proceeding after they have once been...