State Of Fla. v. Walton
| Decision Date | 20 August 2010 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 2D09-750 |
| Parties | STATE OF FLORIDA, Appellant, v. JOHN WALTON, a/k/a JOHN ALFRED WALTON III, Appellee. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Susan D. Dunlevy, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellant.
David R. Parry of Bauer, Crider, Pellegrino & Parry, Jordan Hills Professional Center, Clearwater, for Appellee.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED
Appeal from the Circuit Court for Pinellas County; Philip J. Federico, Judge.
A Ford Escort occupied by John Alfred Walton III and two companions all of whom had been drinking for several hours and exhibited signs of impairment ran a red light and struck a minivan, causing serious bodily injury to a small child in theminivan. In a prosecution for driving under the influence (DUI) with serious bodily injury, the circuit court granted Mr. Walton's motion to suppress his postcrash admissions that he had been driving the Escort on the ground that the State could not establish the corpus delicti of the offense. Mr. Walton argued, and the circuit court agreed, that the State was required to present independent proof of the identity of the Escort's driver. The State appeals the circuit court's order.1
Because the evidence demonstrated that one of the passengers in the minivan was seriously injured by someone who was driving the Escort while his normal faculties were impaired by alcohol, the State is able to establish the corpus delicti of the offense. Under these circumstances, the State is not required to prove the identity of the driver of the Escort as part of the corpus delicti of the offense. Thus the circuit court erred in suppressing Mr. Walton's postcrash admissions on the ground of the State's inability to establish the corpus delicti, and we reverse and remand for further proceedings.
On the morning of October 22, 2006, a purple Ford Escort ran a red light at the intersection of Damascus Road and State Road 60 in Clearwater. When the Escort went through the red light, a minivan travelling through the intersection struck the Escort in the front and rear doors on the driver's side. Two City of Clearwater police officers, David Bruneau and Craig Murray, investigated the crash.
When the officers arrived at the scene, there were three people in or near the Escort: Mr. Walton was standing on the driver's side toward the front; Anthony Godfrey was standing on the passenger's side toward the rear; and Timothy Godfrey, Anthony's brother, was sitting in the front passenger seat. Timothy Godfrey was not wearing a seatbelt. Witnesses reported that after the accident a man wearing a baseball cap got out of the back seat of the Escort and threw a bottle into the bushes. The investigating officers found one empty beer can and one unopened bottle of beer inside the Escort. The unopened bottle of beer was still cool to the touch.
Officer Bruneau spoke with Mr. Walton at the scene and noted a strong odor of alcohol on Mr. Walton's breath and that Mr. Walton's speech was somewhat slurred. Officer Murray similarly stated that when he spoke with Mr. Walton at the scene, Mr. Walton's eyes were bloodshot, his speech was slurred, and he had an odor of alcohol on his breath. Mr. Walton twice told the officers that he was driving the Escort at the time of the crash. The officers arranged for Mr. Walton's blood to be drawn, and the test results showed that he had blood-alcohol levels of.143 and.145.
The officers interviewed Timothy and Anthony Godfrey at a local hospital. Timothy Godfrey told the officers that he, his brother, and Mr. Walton had been drinking all night and into the morning. Timothy Godfrey also said that the three men had "smoked a little bit of pot." Anthony Godfrey stated that when the crash occurred, he was in the back seat with an open bottle of liquor, which he later threw into the bushes. Officer Bruneau detected the odor of alcohol on both of the Godfrey brothers. Neither of the brothers identified who was driving the Escort at the time of the crash.
The primary damage to the Escort was to the front and rear doors on the driver's side; the force of the collision pushed the doors in from six to twelve inches. All three occupants of the Escort sustained injuries. Anthony Godfrey had a laceration to his left arm that required surgery, and he had an injury to his left shoulder. Timothy Godfrey had a suspected closed-head injury. Emergency personnel immobilized him on a backboard at the scene of the crash. But the State did not present any evidence of the location of Timothy Godfrey's head injury or how he may have struck his head. And while Mr. Walton did not have any major complaints at the scene, he went to a hospital the next day to be treated for two broken ribs on his left side. Officer Bruneau testified that Mr. Walton's injuries could have been caused by sitting in the Escort's driver's seat when the accident occurred, and Officer Murray testified that the injuries to Mr. Walton's ribs were consistent with his having been the driver of the Escort.
All three occupants of the minivan along with the Godfrey brothers were transported to a local hospital for treatment after the accident. A small child who was in the minivan sustained a deep laceration to his forehead. Based on the investigation into the circumstances of the crash, the State charged Mr. Walton with two offenses: count one, DUI with serious bodily injury, a violation of section 316.193(3)(c)(2), Florida Statutes (2006), and count two, driving while license suspended or revoked, a violation of section 322.34(2)(a), Florida Statutes (2006).
Mr. Walton filed a motion to suppress his statements that he was driving the Escort at the time of the crash.2 He alleged that "[t]here were no witnesses at thescene who were able to identify the driver of the purple Escort" and that "[a]t the time Officer Bruneau spoke with Mr. Walton, and at all times material to this prosecution, no sufficient Corpus Delecti [sic] existed to support the admissibility of any statements purportedly made by [Mr.] Walton." At the hearing on the motion to suppress, defense counsel argued that the State could not establish the corpus delicti of the DUI offense because, apart from Mr. Walton's statements, the evidence was insufficient to establish whether Mr. Walton or Timothy Godfrey was driving the Escort at the time of the crash.3
The State argued that the evidence supported a finding that Mr. Walton was the driver. In support of this view of the evidence, the State noted that the broken ribs on Mr. Walton's left side were the type of injury that the Escort's driver would have sustained when the driver's side door caved into the passenger compartment from the force of the collision. The circuit court disagreed and took a different view of the evidence. As the circuit court saw the facts, it was impossible to conclude whether Mr. Walton or Timothy Godfrey was the driver.
The State also argued that the evidence reflected that both Mr. Walton and Timothy Godfrey were intoxicated and that "whichever one of them is the driver ofthe vehicle was intoxicated[;]... therefore, the elements of the crime have been established and corpus delicti has been satisfied." The State asserted that "[t]he case law doesn't say that the identity of the defendant is part of corpus delicti."
The circuit court ruled that this court's decision in State v. Colorado, 890 So. 2d 468 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004), required the State to show that Mr. Walton was the driver of the Escort independently of his postcrash admissions to the officers in order to establish the corpus delicti for the DUI offense. At the hearing, the circuit judge said:
I'm reading from Colorado which says the defendant's admission he was the driver of the vehicle was not admissible, where the State could not prove without such statements he was driving at the time he allegedly committed the offenses charged. So apparently, at least to some extent, you have to I guess maybe by a preponderance or more likely than not suggested [in]dependent of the statements that that person is driving the car. And that's what I'm reading them to say in Colorado....
....
... It's not as simple as saying somebody was driving. It's one of two guys, so that's enough to give to a jury. It's not that simple if you read what they are saying in Colorado and then the concurring opinion [by Judge Altenbernd] goes on to say in a different state where it has different rules, they would be ruled on differently in that case.
Based on its conclusion that the State was required to establish the identity of the driver of the Escort as part of the corpus delicti, the circuit court granted Mr. Walton's motion to suppress. This appeal followed.
On appeal, the State argues that the circuit court erred in granting Mr. Walton's motion for two separate reasons. First, "there was circumstantial evidencethat [Mr. Walton] was the driver." Second, "as to the DUI count, the corpus delicti that a drunk driver was involved was established by evidence that all occupants of the car that caused the accident had been drinking."4 Based on our disposition of the case, we need not address the State's first argument. Turning to the State's second argument, we disagree with the circuit court's reading of Colorado and conclude that the circuit court's ruling that the State was required to establish Mr. Walton's identity as the driver of the Escort under the facts of this case is inconsistent with established precedent.
In State v. Allen, 335 So. 2d 823 (Fla. 1976), the Supreme Court of Florida addressed the application of the corpus delicti rule in the context of a conviction for DUI manslaughter which had been reversed by the...
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