State of Iowa v. Jones

• Decision Date: 19 March 1904
• Citation: 128 F. 626
• Parties: STATE OF IOWA ex rel. GREGORY v. JONES, Warden.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Iowa

128 F. 626

STATE OF IOWA ex rel. GREGORY v. JONES, Warden.

United States District Court, S.D. Iowa, Western Division.

March 19, 1904

T. H Milner, for relator.

Charles W. Mullan, Atty. Gen., and W. H. Kilpach, Co. Atty., for Warden Jones.

Recently there was filed by the relator a petition asking for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus, to the end that his imprisonment might be inquired into, and that on a hearing he might be discharged from custody of the warden. From the petition the following facts appear: October 22, 1891 Gregory was convicted on indictment for the crime of larceny by the district court of Greene county, Iowa. April 1, 1895 for a like crime, he was convicted by the district court of Adair county, Iowa. September 7, 1896, he was convicted of a like crime by the district court of Harrison county, Iowa. In all those cases he was sentenced to the penitentiary, and he served his respective terms of imprisonment. All of which were prior to the year 1898. In the year 1898 (chapter 109 p. 58, Laws 27th Gen.Assem.) a statute was enacted providing among other things, that whenever a person has been twice convicted of the crime of larceny of property of a value in excess of $20, and shall thereafter be convicted of such crime, he shall be imprisoned for a time not less than 15 years. The statute requires that such prior convictions shall be pleaded, and that the jury shall specially find whether he has been so convicted as alleged. In May, 1900, Gregory was indicted in the district court of Pottawattamie county, Iowa, for the larceny of a mule in October, 1899, of the value of $125. The indictment also recited the three prior convictions. The verdict was that of guilty as charged, and special affirmative findings of the three prior convictions as alleged. And he was sentenced to 20 years' imprisonment, which he is now undergoing, and by reason of which Warden Jones now detains him. Notice having been given to the Attorney General and county attorney, they have filed, for the warden, a demurrer to the petition.

McPHERSON, District Judge (after stating the facts as above).

The validity of the judgment now being enforced against the prisoner, and the statute, as construed by the state court, under which the judgment was pronounced, are assailed for many reasons. Some of these reasons only will be noticed, because, as to all the others, this court has neither the right nor the power to inquire into them.

It has been held over and over again that the writ of habeas corpus cannot be used as an appellate proceeding by which the irregularities or errors, real or supposed, of some other court, can be reviewed. Such matters can only be determined on appeal or by writ of error. And if there be no appeal, the rulings and the judgment of the trial court are a finality. And if the case is carried up, and the judgment affirmed, the conclusions of the appellate court put the matters forever at rest. So that many of the contentions of counsel for the prisoner on the present hearing are given no consideration.

Although not pleaded, yet, as a fact, it can be stated that there was an appeal from the judgment in question to the Iowa Supreme Court. See State v. Gregory, 90 N.W. 1131. And the fact that the Iowa Supreme Court disposed of the case in an opinion of seven lines, and that the case was not even argued, in no manner can call for the judgment of a federal court on the questions which might have been argued, or which might have been discussed by the Iowa Supreme Court. Ever since Iowa has been a state, the maximum punishment for grand larceny has been five years' imprisonment. And prior to 1898 Iowa had no habitual criminal law. And prior to 1898 the three prior judgments had been pronounced against the prisoner, and prior to that year he had fully served the several terms of imprisonment provided for by the three several prior judgments. The contention of the prisoner is that the statute of 1898, as construed and enforced against him, is an ex post facto law. The entire strength of the argument is that the last fifteen years of the imprisonment imposed upon him were because of crimes committed prior to the enactment of the statute of 1898. And while it is not material, he seeks to strengthen his claim that not only were his three crimes committed prior to the enactment of that statute, but that he had wholly served the terms of imprisonment imposed for those three crimes before the action of the Legislature of 1898. Prior to the argument of the case at bar, and before reading the decisions of the courts upon the question, it seemed quite plausible that Gregory, under the judgment now a-sailed, is being imprisoned for five years or less for the stealing of the mule in Pottawattamie county in 1899, and for fifteen years or more for his larcenies prior to 1898. But plausible as this statement is, it is only plausible, and not a correct statement. It is unsound. Const.U.S. art. 1, § 9, provides that Congress shall not enact an ex post facto law, and by section 10 of the same article it is provided 'no state shall * * * pass any ex post facto law. ' And what is an ex post facto law? In fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch, 87, 3 L.Ed. 162, Chief Justice Marshall said: 'An ex post facto law is one which renders an act punishable in a manner in which it was not punishable when it was committed. ' A better, or more accurate definition has not been given. From this definition it is seen that the punishment provided for when the crime was committed is the punishment that must be imposed. If no punishment was then provided for, none can be imposed by subsequent legislation. If punishment was then provided for, subsequent legislation cannot be enacted, increasing the punishment, and such legislation can only refer to subsequent crimes. The punishment can be lessened, but never increased, as against any one, for a crime already committed. No more beneficent provision is found in the Constitution for the protection of the individual, and it must be and will be enforced on behalf of the bad citizen or criminal as well as for the good citizen.

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