State Of Iowa v. Harkins

• Citation: 786 N.W.2d 498
• Decision Date: 22 July 2009
• Docket Number: No. 07-1561.,07-1561.
• Parties: STATE of Iowa, Plaintiff-Appellee,v.Robert Harry HARKINS, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Court of Appeals of Iowa

786 N.W.2d 498

STATE of Iowa, Plaintiff-Appellee,v.Robert Harry HARKINS, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 07-1561.

Court of Appeals of Iowa.

July 22, 2009.

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Mark C. Smith, State Appellate Defender, and Martha J. Lucey, Assistant State Appellate Defender, for appellant.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Elisabeth S. Reynoldson, Assistant Attorney General, Sterling L. Benz, County Attorney, and Lee W. Beine, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.

Considered by MAHAN, P.J., and MILLER and POTTERFIELD, JJ.

MILLER, J.

Robert Harkins was convicted of third-degree sexual abuse and sentenced to ten years in prison and a special life sentence pursuant to Iowa Code section 903B.1 (Supp.2005). He appeals, contending that section 903B.1 is unconstitutional and asserts an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim. Because we find section 903B.1 is not unconstitutional and Harkins's counsel was not ineffective, we affirm.

I. BACKGROUND FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS.

Following a jury trial, Harkins was convicted of third-degree sexual abuse in violation of Iowa Code section 709.4 (2005) and was sentenced to ten years in prison. Harkins appealed and this court affirmed his conviction. State v. Harkins, No. 06-0660, 2007 WL 914032 (Iowa Ct.App. March 28, 2007). On August 24, 2007, following a hearing, the district court resentenced Harkins to ten years in prison and a special life sentence pursuant to Iowa Code section 903B.1 (Supp.2005). This section provides:

A person convicted of a class “C” felony or greater offense under chapter 709, or a class “C” felony under section 728.12, shall also be sentenced, in addition to any other punishment provided by law, to a special sentence committing the person into the custody of the director of the Iowa department of corrections for the rest of the person's life, with eligibility for parole as provided in chapter 906. The special sentence imposed under this section shall commence upon completion of the sentence imposed under any applicable criminal sentencing provisions for the underlying criminal offense and the person shall begin the sentence under supervision as if on parole. The person shall be placed on the corrections continuum in chapter 901B, and the terms and conditions of the special sentence, including violations, shall be subject to the same set of procedures set out in chapters 901B, 905, 906, and chapter 908, and rules adopted under those chapters for persons on parole. The revocation of release shall not be for a period greater than two years upon any first revocation, and five years upon any second or subsequent revocation. A special sentence shall be considered a category “A” sentence for purposes of calculating earned time under section 903A.2.

Iowa Code § 903B.1.

Harkins appeals and asserts the special sentence is unconstitutional. He argues that section 903B.1 violates the separation of powers doctrine of the Iowa Constitution, the due process clauses of the United States and Iowa Constitutions, and the equal protection clauses of the United States and Iowa Constitutions.¹ He also claims his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the imposition of the special sentence pursuant to section 903B.1 on the ground that it constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the United States Constitution.

II. CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES TO SECTION 903B.1.

We review Harkins's various constitutional challenges to Iowa Code section 903B.1 de novo. State v. Wade, 757 N.W.2d 618, 622 (Iowa 2008). Statutes are cloaked with a presumption of constitutionality. State v. Musser, 721 N.W.2d 734, 741 (Iowa 2006); State v. Seering, 701 N.W.2d 655, 661 (Iowa 2005). To overcome this presumption, Harkins must prove that section 903B.1 is unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt, which can only be accomplished by refuting “every reasonable basis upon which the statute could be found to be constitutional.” Seering, 701 N.W.2d at 661 (citations omitted).

A. Equal Protection and Separation of Powers

Harkins first claims that section 903B.1 violates the equal protection clauses of the United States and Iowa Constitutions and the separation of powers doctrine of the Iowa Constitution. After Harkins appealed, our supreme court decided State v. Wade, 757 N.W.2d 618 (Iowa 2008), in which the same equal protection and separation of powers claims were examined and rejected in the context of Iowa Code section 903B.2. See Wade, 757 N.W.2d at 624, 627. We find Wade controlling as to the equal protection and separation of powers claims in the present case, and thus, those claims must fail. See id.

B. Due Process

Harkins next challenges section 903B.1 on both procedural and substantive due process grounds. See U.S. Const. amend. XIV; Iowa Const. art. I, § 9.² First, we examine Harkins's procedural due process claims. “A person is entitled to procedural due process when state action threatens to deprive the person of a protected liberty interest.” Seering, 701 N.W.2d at 665. Protected liberty interests have their source in the United States Constitution and “include such things as freedom from bodily restraint, the right to contract, the right to marry and raise children, and the right to worship according to the dictates of a person's conscience.” State v. Willard, 756 N.W.2d 207, 214 (Iowa 2008). “We consider the type of process due and determine whether the procedures provided in the statute adequately comply with the process requirements.” State v. Hernandez-Lopez, 639 N.W.2d 226, 240 (Iowa 2002).

In order to determine what process is due, we balance three factors: (1) the private interest that will be affected by government action; (2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation of this interest by the current procedures used and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and (3) the government's interest in the regulation, including the burdens imposed by additional or different procedures. Seering, 701 N.W.2d at 665; Hernandez-Lopez, 639 N.W.2d at 241. “At the very least, procedural due process requires notice and opportunity to be heard in a proceeding that is adequate to safeguard the right for which the constitutional protection is invoked.” Seering, 701 N.W.2d at 665-66 (citations omitted). However, a particular procedure does not violate due process just because another method may seem fairer or wiser. Id. at 666.

Harkins was found guilty by a jury, and following a sentencing hearing the section 903B.1 sentence was imposed. He does not assert a procedural due process claim stemming from the imposition of the section 903B.1 sentence. Rather, he claims that if he violates the rules of parole and his release is revoked, the statute contemplates additional proceedings that are not specified. The State argues that because Harkins has not violated any terms of his extended parole, this issue is not ripe for review, and even if it were ripe, “section 903B.1 specifically affords the defendant the procedural safeguards contained in Iowa Code chapters 901B, 905, 906, and 908, as well as rules adopted under those chapters for persons on parole.”

“A case is ripe for adjudication when it presents an actual, present controversy, as opposed to one that is merely hypothetical or speculative.” Wade, 757 N.W.2d at 627; State v. Bullock, 638 N.W.2d 728, 734 (Iowa 2002). The basic rationale for the ripeness doctrine is “to protect [administrative] agencies from judicial interference until an administrative decision has been formalized and its effects felt in a concrete way by the challenging parties.” Bullock, 638 N.W.2d at 734 (citations omitted). This rationale is especially applicable in the present case because “[t]o the extent there are consequences extending from a parole violation, such decisions are executive or administrative decisions.” Wade, 757 N.W.2d at 628. Because Harkins's argument is based upon a possible future violation of parole and consequences from that violation, we conclude this issue is not ripe. See id. at 627-28 (holding that a constitutional challenge to Iowa Code section 903B.2 that was based upon future parole violations was not ripe).

Next, we examine Harkins's substantive due process claims. In a substantive due process examination, first we determine the “nature of the individual right involved.” Seering, 701 N.W.2d at 662. If a fundamental right is involved, we apply strict scrutiny analysis. Id. “[O]nly fundamental rights and liberties which are deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition and implicit in the concept of ordered liberty qualify for such protection.” Id. at 664 (citations and quotations omitted); see State v. Groves, 742 N.W.2d 90, 93 (Iowa 2007) (“Strict scrutiny requires us to determine whether the statute is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.”). On the other hand, if a fundamental right is not involved, we apply a rational basis analysis. Seering, 701 N.W.2d at 664-65.

Harkins does not indicate whether he believes a strict scrutiny or a rational basis analysis applies, but argues in part that the “government intrusions [are] based upon ... the unpopularity of the class.” ³ The State responds that the section 903B.1 special sentence does not violate a fundamental right.

A person convicted of a crime that subjects the person to imprisonment has no fundamental liberty interest in freedom from extended supervision. See Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 224, 96 S.Ct. 2532, 2538, 49 L.Ed.2d 451, 459 (1976).

[G]iven a valid conviction, the criminal defendant has been constitutionally deprived of his liberty to the extent that the State may confine him and subject him to the rules of its prison system so long as the conditions of confinement do not otherwise violate the Constitution.

Id. Section 903B.1 commits a convicted person into the custody of the director of the Iowa Department of Corrections, where “the person shall begin the sentence under...