State of Minn. v. Snell, 920212
Decision Date | 14 December 1992 |
Docket Number | No. 920212,920212 |
Citation | 493 N.W.2d 656 |
Parties | STATE OF MINNESOTA, County of Douglas, Karen J. Haugen, and J.N.H., a minor child, by and through her guardian, Bonnie Johnson, Plaintiffs and Appellees, v. Bradley John SNELL, Defendant and Appellant. Civ. |
Court | North Dakota Supreme Court |
Neil T. Gillund, Asst. State's Atty., Fargo, for plaintiffs and appellees.
Neil W. Fleming of Fleming, DuBois & Trenbeath, Cavalier, for defendant and appellant.
Bradley Snell appealed from an amended judgment of the district court which increased his child support obligation from $125 per month to $362 per month. We affirm.
In 1986, a paternity action was commenced by the State of Minnesota on behalf of Karen Haugen which alleged that Bradley Snell was the father of Karen's daughter, Jocelyn, born in 1982. Pursuant to the Revised Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act, codified in North Dakota as Chapter 14-12.1, NDCC, the action was transferred to Cass County North Dakota, Bradley's domicile. Bradley and Karen never married or cohabited, nor did Bradley hold Jocelyn out as his own daughter, visit her, or acknowledge his paternity. Blood tests were taken, and it was determined that Bradley was the likely father of Jocelyn. To avoid extending the litigation, Bradley stipulated to entry of judgment. The stipulation included Bradley's signed acknowledgment of paternity and his agreement to pay $125 per month in child support until Jocelyn reached eighteen, married, or became emancipated. The stipulation was accepted by the court and formed the basis of its judgment which was entered on November 12, 1986.
In 1991, the local Regional Child Support Enforcement Unit brought a motion to amend the child support judgment to increase Bradley's support obligation based upon his increase in salary. The court held that it had "continuing jurisdiction to modify support in paternity matters" and thereby increased Bradley's support payments to $362 per month to conform with the child support guidelines as promulgated by the North Dakota Department of Human Services.
Bradley presents two issues for our consideration: (1) whether the district court had jurisdiction to amend the original judgment and to increase the amount of child support, and (2) if the district court had jurisdiction to modify the original judgment, whether it properly applied the child support guidelines.
Courts which award periodic child support retain the authority to modify the amount to be paid when there has been a showing that the circumstances of the parties have materially changed. NDCC Sec. 14-17-17; Clutter v. McIntosh, 484 N.W.2d 846 (N.D.1992); Sweeney v. Hoff, 478 N.W.2d 9 (N.D.1991). With regard to Bradley's contention that the court does not have jurisdiction to modify the amount of child support which he agreed to in the stipulation, it is settled that a court has continuing jurisdiction to modify child support even if the amount is set by stipulation. Spilovoy v. Spilovoy, 488 N.W.2d 873 (N.D.1992); Puklich v. Puklich, 463 N.W.2d 651 (N.D.1990); McDonough v. McDonough, 458 N.W.2d 344 (N.D.Ct.App.1990); Tiokasin v. Haas, 370 N.W.2d 559 (N.D.1985); Malaterre v. Malaterre, 293 N.W.2d 139 (N.D.1980); see also Ebertz v. Ebertz, 338 N.W.2d 651 (N.D.1983) [ ]. We take a dim view of agreements purporting to sign away the rights of a child in support settings--not from a contractual background, but from a public policy one. McDonough, supra; Tiokasin, supra.
Bradley contends that section 14-17-17, NDCC, 1 of North Dakota's adaptation of the Uniform Parentage Act--the provision allowing modification of child support orders--applies only to paternity actions that are formally tried and in which the court finds a duty to support. Bradley admitted paternity in a compromised settlement agreement which was stipulated to and which the court used as the basis for its original judgment. Because the case was not formally tried, Bradley contends that the court lacked jurisdiction to modify the support judgment.
We find nothing in the express wording of section 14-17-17, NDCC, which requires a formal determination of paternity in order that the judgment be determinative for all purposes, nor do we find any justification for an implication of formality. Since we have a policy to encourage settlements and to discourage litigation, Hastings Pork v. Johanneson, 335 N.W.2d 802 (N.D.1983), requiring, as Bradley suggests, a formal proceeding as the basis of all judgments and orders would be contrary to this policy. To infer that "judgment or order" as used in the statute requires a formal determination would make stipulations and compromise agreements not only toothless, but irrelevant.
We recognize the logic of Bradley's argument that he stipulated to paternity because the stipulation correspondingly limited his financial obligation for child support and that once the limitation on his financial obligation is removed he should, in fairness, equity and application of principles of contract law, be freed from his admission to paternity. Those views are encompassed in a dissenting opinion in Gerhardt v. Estate of Moore, 150 Wis.2d 563, 441 N.W.2d 734 (1989). The rationale in the dissent is distinguishable from this case. In Gerhardt, the putative father made a lump-sum payment, relying on a provision in Wisconsin law similar to section 14-17-17, NDCC, which provides that a judgment for payment of a lump sum or purchase of an annuity may specify that the judgment may not be modified or revoked. This statute was later found unconstitutional 2 but the majority opinion refused to disturb the admission of paternity, notwithstanding the fact child support would be increased.
Here, Bradley did not rely on a specific statute. Section 14-17-17(2), NDCC, lists two circumstances under which a court cannot modify a support obligation, i.e., where the putative father makes a lump-sum payment or purchases an annuity. By forbidding modification in the instance where the judgment provides for lump-sum payment or purchase of an annuity, the statute necessarily envisions modification of all other awards, including those previously stipulated. It is a general principle of statutory interpretation that the mention of one thing implies the exclusion of the other. See, e.g., In Re Township 143 North, Range 55 West, Cass County, 183 N.W.2d 520 (N.D.1971). Unlike the father (Moore) in Gerhardt, Bradley could not have relied on this section for his position that the support judgment could not be modified.
Finally, unlike Gerhardt in which no blood tests were apparently taken, here blood tests were taken which indicated Bradley was the likely father. Although the stipulation avoided a contested trial of the issue of Bradley's parenthood, we are aware that the blood test results may have been part of the reason Bradley entered into the stipulation.
Bradley also argues that a decision to permit modification of the support payments in the stipulated settlement, but at the same time deny the putative father the right to contest paternity, will discourage the settlement of law suits. We agree that settlement of disputes should be encouraged whenever possible and that the judicial process should be conducted to accomplish this purpose. Aaker v. Aaker, 338 N.W.2d 645 (N.D.1983). We do not intend to depart from that general principle. But, as the Wisconsin court in Gerhardt observed in striking down the statute which prohibited modifications of judgments which ordered lump-sum payments or the purchase of an annuity to encourage settlement of paternity cases:
Due to the nature of domestic relations, we do not analyze transactions and compromises between the parties in a cold contractual frame--public policy plays a large role in determining the factors of which parties may contract in domestic relations settings. For instance, in discussing the statutory predecessor of the Uniform Parentage Act, this Court observed that the object of a paternity proceeding was not to...
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