State Of Mont. v. James

• Decision Date: 10 August 2010
• Docket Number: No. DA 09-0280.,DA 09-0280.
• Citation: 237 P.3d 672,357 Mont. 193,2010 MT 175
• Parties: STATE of Montana, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Vaughn JAMES, Defendant and Appellant.
• Court: Montana Supreme Court

357 Mont. 193

237 P.3d 672

2010 MT 175

STATE of Montana, Plaintiff and Appellee,

v.Vaughn JAMES, Defendant and Appellant.

No. DA 09-0280.

Supreme Court of Montana.

Argued April 30, 2010.

Submitted May 11, 2010.

Decided Aug. 10, 2010.

For Appellant: Joslyn Hunt, Chief Appellate Defender; Tammy A. Hinderman, Eileen A. Larkin (argued), Assistant Appellate Defenders, Helena, Montana.

For Appellee: Hon. Steve Bullock, Montana Attorney General; Tammy Plubell (argued), Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana, Mitch Young, Lake County Attorney, Poison, Montana.

Chief Justice MIKE McGRATH delivered the Opinion of the Court.

¶ 1 James appeals his convictions for felony criminal endangerment and misdemeanor partner or family member assault, following a jury trial in the Twentieth Judicial District Court. We affirm in part and reverse in part.

¶ 2 James presents the following issues for review:

¶ 3 Issue One: Whether the District Court properly denied James' motion to dismiss the criminal endangerment charge on the ground of double jeopardy.

¶ 4 Issue Two: Whether the District Court properly denied James' motion for a mistrial on the ground that the prosecution had used peremptory challenges to remove tribal members from the jury.

¶ 5 Issue Three: Whether the District Court properly denied James' motion for a new trial based upon the failure to disclose exculpatory evidence.

BACKGROUND

¶ 6 On the night of June 28, 2007, James left the Sitting Duck bar at Woods Bay, Montana, followed by Tracy Shaw who had sometimes been identified as his common law wife. The two were having an argument, and James turned around and struck Shaw in the head causing her to fall to the ground. Patrons of another establishment across the street saw the incident and ran to provide aid to Shaw. She denied that she had been hit or that she was injured, but refused to leave with James. The Good Samaritans noted a “red mark” on Shaw's face.

¶ 7 A Lake County deputy sheriff responding to the incident passed a vehicle fleeing the area at a high rate of speed that matched the description of James' car. The deputy turned around and gave chase. James' vehicle reached speeds at or near 100 miles per hour, and the deputy observed James pass other vehicles at high speed in no-passing areas. James eventually wrecked his car and was taken into custody. The deputy determined that James was a member of the Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes, and turned him over to a Tribal law enforcement officer pursuant to local protocol.

¶ 8 Meanwhile, Shaw was arrested by other officers that same evening for a probation violation. She was photographed and booked into the Lake County jail.

¶ 9 On June 29, 2007, James was charged in Tribal Court with one count of DUI and one count of fleeing from or eluding a peace officer. The fleeing charge was based upon “knowingly fleeing from an Officer who was attempting to stop the vehicle by traveling at a high rate of speed and/or making improper passes.” On July 16, 2007, James was charged in State court with criminal endangerment under § 45-5-207, MCA, based upon “passing in no passing zones and driving his vehicle at speeds up to 100 mph on Highway 35.” The State later filed an amended information charging James with the additional offense of partner-family member assault for striking Shaw.

¶ 10 In December, 2007, James entered a plea agreement to the Tribal Court charges, pursuant to which he pled guilty to the charge of eluding a peace officer, and the court dismissed the DUI charge. The Tribal Court sentenced James to serve 90 days, with 78 days suspended for a year. James was then tried in State court and was convicted of both State charges after a jury trial in November, 2008. On February 26, 2009, the District Court sentenced James as a persistent felony offender to a term of 30 years with 22 years suspended for the criminal endangerment conviction, and to a term of 6 months with all but 116 days suspended, with credit for 116 days served, on the partner-family member assault conviction.

¶ 11 Other facts relevant to this appeal will be discussed below.

DISCUSSION

¶ 12 Issue One: Whether the District Court properly denied James' motion to dismiss on the ground that he had been exposed to double jeopardy. The District Court's decision on a motion to dismiss in a criminal case is an issue of law which this Court reviews de novo. State v. Gazda, 2003 MT 350, ¶ 10, 318 Mont. 516, 82 P.3d 20.

¶ 13 Montana law provides:

When conduct constitutes an offense within the jurisdiction of any state or federal court, a prosecution in any jurisdiction is a bar to a subsequent prosecution in this state if: (1) the first prosecution resulted in an acquittal or in a conviction and the subsequent prosecution is based on an offense arising out of the same transaction.

Section 46-11-504, MCA. “Same transaction” is defined by statute as “conduct consisting of a series of acts or omissions that are motivated by: (a) a purpose to accomplish a criminal objective and that are necessary or incidental to the accomplishment of that objective.” Section 46-1-202(23), MCA. Section 46-11-504, MCA, provides greater protection against double jeopardy than the “elements” test applied under Federal law. Gazda, ¶ 12.

¶ 14 The question here is whether the Tribal and State charges arose out of the “same transaction” for purposes of § 46-1-202(23), MCA. The District Court denied James' motion to dismiss on the ground that the Tribal Court charge of fleeing or eluding a police officer did not require proof of creating a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury that was necessary to support the State's charge of criminal endangerment.

¶ 15 We conclude that the District Court's conclusion was incorrect. Both charges were based upon exactly the same conduct by James-driving the car dangerously and at a high rate of speed. His criminal objective was the same with regard to either offense-he intended to drive as fast and as recklessly as required to elude the pursuing officer and avoid apprehension. The conclusion that the two charged offenses arose from the same transaction is not affected by the fact that the offenses have different elements. State v. Neufeld, 2009 MT 235, ¶¶ 19-20, 351 Mont. 389, 212 P.3d 1063. James' criminal objective-driving at high speed to elude capture-was the same as to each charge.

¶ 16 In Gazda, by contrast, the Federal charge of being a felon in possession of a firearm did not involve the same criminal objective as the State charge of deliberate homicide. Therefore, this Court held that the conviction on the Federal charge did not preclude State prosecution for the homicide. Gazda, ¶ 22. See also Neufeld (guilt on Federal charges of sexual exploitation of children barred State prosecution for sexual intercourse without consent); State v. Cech, 2007 MT 184, 338 Mont. 330, 167 P.3d 389 (conviction in another state of possession of a car originally stolen in Montana precluded subsequent Montana charge of obtaining unauthorized control over the same vehicle). By contrast, in State v. Tadewaldt, 277 Mont. 261, 922 P.2d 463 (1996), the defendant was charged with DUI and convicted in municipal court. He was later charged in State court with possession of dangerous drugs found during a search of his vehicle at the time of the DUI. This Court affirmed the State court conviction because ingesting unknown intoxicants that led to the DUI offense, and possessing the drugs that led to the possession charge were separate events. The two offenses had different criminal objectives and therefore arose from separate transactions; maintaining both charges did not violate the defendant's protection against double jeopardy.

¶ 17 Therefore, James' conviction for criminal endangerment was barred by § 46-11-504, MCA. His conviction is reversed and the case is remanded to the District Court with instructions to dismiss the charge. ¹

¶ 18 Issue Two: Whether the District Court properly denied James' motion for mistrial based upon the contention that the prosecution's use of a peremptory challenge was improperly based upon race. In this context, this Court defers to the trial court's findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous, and reviews the district court's application of the law de novo. State v. Ford, 2001 MT 230, ¶ 7, 306 Mont. 517, 39 P.3d 108. Because we have reversed James' conviction for criminal endangerment, this issue now pertains only to the remaining conviction for partner-family member assault.

¶ 19 During voir dire, prospective juror Mackey disclosed that there was a class required for his job scheduled for all the next week and that he absolutely could not miss attending. He stated that as long as the trial did not go into the next week, he would be “on board” to serve as a juror. Prospective juror Rogers at that point volunteered that she also was taking a course for her job and was missing classes and mid-term tests at that very moment. She said that serving as a juror would be a “time constraint” for her but that she was willing to serve.

¶ 20 After the prosecution completed voir dire, defense counsel asked the panel if any were tribal members. Prospective jurors Rogers and Durglo ² responded affirmatively. Defense counsel then asked whether “Mr. James being Native” concerned them:

Mr. Larrivee: ... What it comes down to, though, is are your feelings such that if you are sitting over there, that your feelings are so strong that, yeah, I really couldn't be fair about that.

Mr. Durglo: I think so. It would probably sway me the way I think because our own tribal system we got our own court system, why he's not in our court system instead of-

Mr. Larrivee: Actually it's going to come out that he was in your court system.... I want to be able to tell you that, yes, that's an element of this case and, yes, there was more that occurred in Tribal Court.

Mr. Durglo: Yeah. It would probably sway me because...