State Of North Carolina v. Denton
| Decision Date | 21 September 2010 |
| Docket Number | No. 07 CRS 21994,No. 08 CRS 22550,NO. COA09-1322,COA09-1322,07 CRS 21994,08 CRS 22550 |
| Court | North Carolina Court of Appeals |
| Parties | STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. JONATHAN GLENDALE DENTON Defendant |
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by E. Burke Hanwood, Special Deputy Attorney General, for the State.
William B. Gibson, for defendant.
Appeal by Defendant from judgment entered 1 May 2009 by Judge Forrest D. Bridges in Mecklenburg County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 9 March 2010.
Defendant Jonathan Denton appeals from a judgment entered by the trial court based on a jury verdict convicting Defendant of possession of cocaine and Defendant's plea of guilty to having attained the status of an habitual felon in which the trial court sentenced Defendant to a minimum of 136 months and a maximum of 173 months imprisonment in the custody of the North Carolina Department of Correction. After careful consideration of Defendant's challenges to the trial court's judgment in light of the record andthe applicable law, we find no error in the proceedings leading to the entry of the trial court's judgment.
On 20 March 2007, Officers James McCarthy and Dacron Neely of the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department were "looking for several individuals," including Defendant, who had outstanding arrest warrants. Officers McCarthy and Neely drove to the Brookhill apartment complex, where Officer Neely saw Defendant sitting in a lawn chair in a common area. Officers McCarthy and Neely arrested Defendant on the outstanding warrants. During the arrest process, Defendant volunteered that there was marijuana in his sock. As a result, Officer McCarthy searched Defendant and found a small bag of marijuana in his right sock, a plastic bag containing "three small rocks" of crack cocaine in his left sock, and $693 in cash. Defendant never told Officers McCarthy and Neely that he possessed cocaine.
Defendant testified that he was 41 years old, owned a tire business, and worked at a Charlotte restaurant. Defendant admitted that he had been a drug addict "all [his] life" and that he used marijuana, cocaine, and alcohol. Defendant had grown up "on the streets." Defendant was familiar with the "arrest process" because he'd "been arrested so many times from back when I was in a foster home, from the Willie M program all the way through." However, after his 20 March 2007 arrest, Defendant stopped using drugs and began working steadily. Defendant described himself as a "recovering addict" and stated that he was in "a program" for the purpose of helping him stop taking drugs.
In March, 2007, Defendant was staying at the Brookhill apartment complex. Defendant knew that there were outstanding warrants for his arrest, a fact that made him scared because he had "been to prison so many times." On the night of 19 March 2007 Defendant hid in his apartment, smoked crack with a friend, and got so high that he could not remember what happened. Defendant and his friend stayed up all night smoking crack cocaine.
On 2 0 March 2 0 07, Defendant smoked marijuana in the common area. When Defendant saw the law enforcement officers approaching him, he put his marijuana in his sock. Although Defendant usually did not keep drugs in his sock, he was "paranoid" that day and he hid it. At the time that he was arrested, Defendant told Officer McCarthy about the marijuana in his sock because he did not "want anymore trouble." When asked if he had told the officer about the crack in his sock Defendant testified:
No, because I didn't know. I didn't know at that time about no crack. I knew I had smoked it that day. That's all I knew; I didn't know I had smoked it all, that's what I knew.
According to Defendant, people who use crack cocaine often become "paranoid" and hide things, including drugs. As a general proposition, a person smoking crack would hide things "anywhere that we can just because you're paranoid." Defendant did not recall hiding crack on 19 March 2007 or remember if he had crack cocaine left over on 20 March 2007. Although Defendant did notremember where or if he hid cocaine, he testified that it was common for people to hide drugs in their shoes.
According to Defendant, Officer McCarthy took his "rent money." Defendant expressed "concern[] about my money because I knew how long it took to get the money." However, when asked about the $693 that was in his possession at the time of his arrest on cross-examination, Defendant testified that he had been collecting money for the man who was washing cars at the Brookhill apartments and that the money belonged to this man, whose name he did not know. Defendant explained that he had said the money was his "rent money" in order to get the police to return it to him.
Defendant admitted that he had been a "wild" young man who "took to the streets" and recalled the following convictions:
... [S]tolen goods was my first charge[.]... The first time I went through prison was when... I got a common law robbery.... After.. that I got a common law robbery, after that I got some other charges like possession, possession with intent to sell and deliver[.]... There's so many of them because I was getting them back to back[.]
Defendant also admitted that he had been convicted of possessing drug paraphernalia and possession of cocaine with intent to sell and deliver cocaine.
On 20 March 2007, a warrant for arrest was issued charging Defendant with possession of cocaine. On 7 April 2008, the Mecklenburg County grand jury returned bills of indictment charging Defendant with possession of cocaine and having attained the status of an habitual felon. On 15 December 2008, the Mecklenburg Countygrand jury returned a superceding indictment charging Defendant with being an habitual felon.
The charges against Defendant came on for trial before the trial court and a jury at the 27 April 2009 criminal session of Mecklenburg County Superior Court. After both parties presented evidence, the jury convicted Defendant of possession of cocaine. Following the acceptance of the jury's verdict, the trial court convened a sentencing hearing. Defendant admitted to having attained the status of an habitual felon. In addition, he stipulated that he had eighteen prior record points and should be sentenced as a Level 5 offender. Based upon the jury's verdict and Defendant's admissions, the trial court sentenced Defendant to a minimum of 136 months and a maximum of 173 months imprisonment in the custody of the North Carolina Department of Correction. Defendant noted an appeal to this Court from the trial court's judgment.
First, Defendant argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion to exclude evidence of several criminal convictions that were more than ten years old. According to Defendant, the trial court failed to adhere to the requirements of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8C1, Rule 609, in admitting evidence of these older convictions. Although we conclude that the trial court erred by failing to make the findings required by N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 609(b), we also believe that the trial court's error was harmless.
According to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 609 (2009):
"Like other evidentiary rules that control the introduction of evidence of prior conduct reflecting upon a witness' truthfulness, N.C. [Gen. Stat.] § 8C-1, Rule 608 (1988), or upon motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistaken, or accident, N.C. [Gen. Stat.] § 8C-1, Rule 404(b) (1988), N.C. [Gen. Stat.] § 8C-1, Rule 609(b) requires the trial court to engage in a balancing of the probative value of the evidence against its prejudicial effect." State v. Carter, 326 N.C. 243, 249-50, 388 S.E.2d 111, 116 (1990). "In conducting this critical balancing process it is important to remember that the only legitimate purpose for introducing evidence of past convictions is to impeach the witness's credibility." State v. Ross, 329 N.C. 108, 119, 405 S.E.2d 158, 165 (1991) (citing State v. Tucker, 317 N.C. 532, 543, 346 S.E.2d 417, 423 (1986)). "To enable the reviewing court to determine whether the trial court properly allowed admission of the old conviction evidence, the trial court's findings must set out the 'specific facts andcircumstances which demonstrate the probative value outweighs the prejudicial effect' of the evidence in question." State v. Shelly, 176 N.C. App. 575, 581, 627 S.E.2d 287, 294 (2006) (quoting State v. Hensley, 77 N.C. App. 192, 195, 334 S.E.2d 783, 785 (1985)), disc, reviewdenied, 315 N.C. 393, 338 S.E.2d 882 (1986). Accordingly, "[f]or the trial court to merely state that the probative value of a prior conviction outweighs its prejudicial effect in the interests of justice is insufficient under Rule 609(b)." Id. (citing Ross, 329 N.C. 108, 405 S.E.2d at 15.
[This Court has] identified the following considerations as factors to be addressed by the trial court when determining if conviction evidence more than ten years old should be admitted: (a) the impeachment value of the prior crime, (b) the remoteness of the prior crime, and (c) the centrality of the defendant's credibility. It logically follows that findings on each of these factors should...
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