State Of Ohio v. Donnelly
| Decision Date | 11 March 2011 |
| Docket Number | No. 95518,95518 |
| Parties | STATE OF OHIO, EX REL., MICHAEL JARMAL PRUITT RELATOR v. MICHAEL P. DONNELLY, JUDGE ET AL. RESPONDENT |
| Court | Ohio Court of Appeals |
2011 Ohio 1252
STATE OF OHIO, EX REL., MICHAEL JARMAL PRUITT RELATOR
v.
MICHAEL P. DONNELLY, JUDGE ET AL. RESPONDENT
No. 95518
Court of Appeals of Ohio
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
RELEASE DATE: March 11, 2011
Page 2
FOR RELATOR
Michael Jarmal Pruitt
FOR RESPONDENT
William D. Mason
Cuyahoga Cunty Prosecutor
By: James E. Moss
Assistant Prosecuting Attorney
PATRICIA ANN BLACKMON, J.:
{¶ 1} On August 6, 2010, the relator, Michael Jarmal Pruitt, commenced this mandamus and prohibition action against the respondents, Judge Michael Donnelly and Judge Burt Griffin. Pruitt maintains that he did not enter guilty pleas to Count 4 and to the three-year firearm specification that accompanied Count 1 in the underlying case, State of
Page 3
Ohio v. Michael Jarmal Pruitt, Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court Case No. CR-451979 and that, therefore, the respondents lacked jurisdiction to enter convictions and sentences for those charges. Pruitt seeks prohibition to correct the results of these "jurisdictionally unauthorized actions" and mandamus to compel Judge Donnelly to vacate the convictions and sentences for those matters.
{¶ 2} On September 1, 2010, the respondents moved to dismiss on the grounds that Judge Griffin is not a proper party and adequate remedy at law. Pruitt filed a brief in opposition on September 24, 2010. On February 4, 2011, Pruitt moved for summary judgment, and the respondents filed their brief in opposition on February 17, 2011. On February 18, 2011, Pruitt filed an amended motion for summary judgment, which makes the same arguments as in his first motion but adds several paragraphs on the importance of a "patent and unambiguous lack of jurisdiction" in a prohibition case. For the following reasons, this court grants the respondents's motion to dismiss, denies Pruitt's motions for summary judgment, and dismisses the complaint for prohibition and mandamus.
{¶ 3} In the underlying case in May 2004, the Grand Jury indicted Pruitt for one count of attempted murder, two counts for felonious assault, all with three-year firearm specifications and notices of prior conviction, and one count of having a weapon under
Page 4
disability. By October 2004, the State of Ohio and Pruitt had agreed to a plea bargain under which Pruitt would plead guilty to attempted murder with the three-year firearm specification and having a weapon under disability, and the State would nolle the two felonious assault counts.
{¶ 4} The plea hearing occurred on October 13, 2004. Pruitt pleaded guilty to attempted murder. Judge Griffin1 then asked, "it says that you used a firearm in connection with committing this offense. Do you admit to that?" Pruitt answered, "Yes, sir, your Honor." (Pgs. 21-22 of 10-13-04 Transcript.)2 The judge, the prosecutor, and the defense then became distracted by the effect Pruitt's federal conviction for bank robbery would have on sentencing. Thus, Pruitt never explicitly said that he pleads guilty to the three-year firearm specification, and the weapon under disability charge is never mentioned. However, the judge twice stated that he accepted the guilty pleas. (Tr. Pgs 26 and 31.) No one objected to the proceedings. On October 19, 2004, the trial court entered a journal entry stating that Pruitt had pleaded guilty to attempted murder as charged and having a weapon under disability as charged in Count 4. In November, the judge sentenced Pruitt to three years on the firearm
Page 5
specification to be served consecutively to eight years on the attempted murder charge, and to five years on the weapon under disability charge to be served concurrent to the attempted murder sentence for a total of eight years.
{¶ 5} Pruitt then began a lengthy process of appellate review. In State v. Pruitt, Cuyahoga App. Nos. 86707 and 86986, 2006-Ohio-4106, appeal not allowed 111 Ohio St.3d 1494, 2006-Ohio-6171, 857 N.E.2d 1231, Pruitt obtained a delayed appeal of his convictions and sentences and sought review of the denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea.3 This court rejected Pruitt's assignments of error but sua sponte vacated the sentence for the weapon under disability charge and remanded for resentencing pursuant to State v. Foster, 109 Ohio St.3d 1, 2006-Ohio-856, 845 N.E.2d 470. In State v. Pruitt, Cuyahoga App. No. 89405, 2008-Ohio-231, this court reversed and remanded for resentencing on the weapon under disability charge to properly impose postrelease control. In State v. Pruitt, Cuyahoga App. No. 91205, 2009-Ohio-859, appeal not allowed 122 Ohio St.3d 1481, 2009-Ohio-3625, 910 N.E.2d 479, this court affirmed Pruitt's latest sentence and the denial of another motion to withdraw guilty plea. This court also denied his App.R. 26(B) application to reopen. State v. Pruitt, Cuyahoga App. No. 91205, 2010-Ohio-1573. Despite these multiple appeals and resentencing hearings, Pruitt never raised the issues sub judice.
Page 6
{¶ 6} Finally, on March 16, 2010, Pruitt filed a "Civ.R. 60(B) motion for relief from judgment, or in the alternative, Crim.R. 47 motion to vacate void judgment" in which he raised for the first time the issues that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to convict and sentence him on the three-year firearm specification and the weapon under disability charge because he did not actually plead guilty to those charges. The trial court denied the motion on July 6, 2010, and Pruitt appealed on July 22. State v. Pruitt, Cuyahoga App. Nos. 95456 and 95457, currently pending before this court.
{¶ 7} On February 10, 2011, the State of Ohio moved to dismiss Count 4, the weapon under disability charge. The trial court granted that motion on February 16, 2011. The docket of the underlying case also reveals that on February 22, 2011, Pruitt filed his motion concurring with the State's motion to dismiss Count 4.
{¶ 8} The principles governing prohibition are well established. Its requisites are (1) the respondent against whom it is sought is about to exercise judicial power, (2) the exercise of such power is unauthorized by law, and (3) there is no adequate remedy at law. State ex rel. Largent v. Fisher (1989), 43 Ohio St.3d 160, 540 N.E.2d 239. Furthermore, if a petitioner had an adequate remedy, relief in prohibition is precluded, even if the remedy was not used. State ex rel. Lesher v. Kainrad (1981), 65 Ohio St.2d 68, 417 N.E.2d 1382, certiorari denied
Page 7
(1981), 454 U.S. 854, 102 S.Ct. 300, 70 L.Ed.2d 147; Cf. State ex rel. Sibarco Corp. v. City of Berea (1966), 7 Ohio St.2d 85, 218...
To continue reading
Request your trial