State Of Ohio v. Donnelly

• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals
• Writing for the Court: PATRICIA ANN BLACKMON, J.
• Citation: State v. Donnelly, 2011 Ohio 1252, No. 95518 (Ohio App. Mar 11, 2011)
• Decision Date: 11 March 2011
• Docket Number: No. 95518,95518
• Parties: STATE OF OHIO, EX REL., MICHAEL JARMAL PRUITT RELATOR v. MICHAEL P. DONNELLY, JUDGE ET AL. RESPONDENT

2011 Ohio 1252

STATE OF OHIO, EX REL., MICHAEL JARMAL PRUITT RELATOR v. MICHAEL P. DONNELLY, JUDGE ET AL. RESPONDENT

No. 95518

Court of Appeals of Ohio

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

RELEASE DATE: March 11, 2011

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

JUDGMENT: COMPLAINT DISMISSED

Writ of Prohibition and Mandamus

Motion No. 437133

Order No. 442600

FOR RELATOR

Michael Jarmal Pruitt

FOR RESPONDENT

William D. Mason

Cuyahoga Cunty Prosecutor

By: James E. Moss

Assistant Prosecuting Attorney

PATRICIA ANN BLACKMON, J.:

{¶ 1} On August 6, 2010, the relator, Michael Jarmal Pruitt, commenced this mandamus and prohibition action against the respondents, Judge Michael Donnelly and Judge Burt Griffin. Pruitt maintains that he did not enter guilty pleas to Count 4 and to the three-year firearm specification that accompanied Count 1 in the underlying case, State ofOhio v. Michael Jarmal Pruitt, Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court Case No. CR-451979 and that, therefore, the respondents lacked jurisdiction to enter convictions and sentences for those charges. Pruitt seeks prohibition to correct the results of these "jurisdictionally unauthorized actions" and mandamus to compel Judge Donnelly to vacate the convictions and sentences for those matters.

{¶ 2} On September 1, 2010, the respondents moved to dismiss on the grounds that Judge Griffin is not a proper party and adequate remedy at law. Pruitt filed a brief in opposition on September 24, 2010. On February 4, 2011, Pruitt moved for summary judgment, and the respondents filed their brief in opposition on February 17, 2011. On February 18, 2011, Pruitt filed an amended motion for summary judgment, which makes the same arguments as in his first motion but adds several paragraphs on the importance of a "patent and unambiguous lack of jurisdiction" in a prohibition case. For the following reasons, this court grants the respondents's motion to dismiss, denies Pruitt's motions for summary judgment, and dismisses the complaint for prohibition and mandamus.

Factual and Procedural Background

{¶ 3} In the underlying case in May 2004, the Grand Jury indicted Pruitt for one count of attempted murder, two counts for felonious assault, all with three-year firearm specifications and notices of prior conviction, and one count of having a weapon underdisability. By October 2004, the State of Ohio and Pruitt had agreed to a plea bargain under which Pruitt would plead guilty to attempted murder with the three-year firearm specification and having a weapon under disability, and the State would nolle the two felonious assault counts.

{¶ 4} The plea hearing occurred on October 13, 2004. Pruitt pleaded guilty to attempted murder. Judge Griffin¹ then asked, "it says that you used a firearm in connection with committing this offense. Do you admit to that?" Pruitt answered, "Yes, sir, your Honor." (Pgs. 21-22 of 10-13-04 Transcript.)² The judge, the prosecutor, and the defense then became distracted by the effect Pruitt's federal conviction for bank robbery would have on sentencing. Thus, Pruitt never explicitly said that he pleads guilty to the three-year firearm specification, and the weapon under disability charge is never mentioned. However, the judge twice stated that he accepted the guilty pleas. (Tr. Pgs 26 and 31.) No one objected to the proceedings. On October 19, 2004, the trial court entered a journal entry stating that Pruitt had pleaded guilty to attempted murder as charged and having a weapon under disability as charged in Count 4. In November, the judge sentenced Pruitt to three years on the firearmspecification to be served consecutively to eight years on the attempted murder charge, and to five years on the weapon under disability charge to be served concurrent to the attempted murder sentence for a total of eight years.

{¶ 5} Pruitt then began a lengthy process of appellate review. In State v. Pruitt, Cuyahoga App. Nos. 86707 and 86986, 2006-Ohio-4106, appeal not allowed 111 Ohio St.3d 1494, 2006-Ohio-6171, 857 N.E.2d 1231, Pruitt obtained a delayed appeal of his convictions and sentences and sought review of the denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea.³ This court rejected Pruitt's assignments of error but sua sponte vacated the sentence for the weapon under disability charge and remanded for resentencing pursuant to State v. Foster, 109 Ohio St.3d 1, 2006-Ohio-856, 845 N.E.2d 470. In State v. Pruitt, Cuyahoga App. No. 89405, 2008-Ohio-231, this court reversed and remanded for resentencing on the weapon under disability charge to properly impose postrelease control. In State v. Pruitt, Cuyahoga App. No. 91205, 2009-Ohio-859, appeal not allowed 122 Ohio St.3d 1481, 2009-Ohio-3625, 910 N.E.2d 479, this court affirmed Pruitt's latest sentence and the denial of another motion to withdraw guilty plea. This court also denied his App.R. 26(B) application to reopen. State v. Pruitt, Cuyahoga App. No. 91205, 2010-Ohio-1573. Despite these multiple appeals and resentencing hearings, Pruitt never raised the issues sub judice.

{¶ 6} Finally, on March 16, 2010, Pruitt filed a "Civ.R. 60(B) motion for relief from judgment, or in the alternative, Crim.R. 47 motion to vacate void judgment" in which he raised for the first time the issues that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to convict and sentence him on the three-year firearm specification and the weapon under disability charge because he did not actually plead guilty to those charges. The trial court denied the motion on July 6, 2010, and Pruitt appealed on July 22. State v. Pruitt, Cuyahoga App. Nos. 95456 and 95457, currently pending before this court.

{¶ 7} On February 10, 2011, the State of Ohio moved to dismiss Count 4, the weapon under disability charge. The trial court granted that motion on February 16, 2011. The docket of the underlying case also reveals that on February 22, 2011, Pruitt filed his motion concurring with the State's motion to dismiss Count 4.

Legal Analysis

{¶ 8} The principles governing prohibition are well established. Its requisites are (1) the respondent against whom it is sought is about to exercise judicial power, (2) the exercise of such power is unauthorized by law, and (3) there is no adequate remedy at law. State ex rel. Largent v. Fisher (1989), 43 Ohio St.3d 160, 540 N.E.2d 239. Furthermore, if a petitioner had an adequate remedy, relief in prohibition is precluded, even if the remedy was not used. State ex rel. Lesher v. Kainrad (1981), 65 Ohio St.2d 68, 417 N.E.2d 1382, certiorari denied(1981), 454 U.S. 854, 102 S.Ct. 300, 70 L.Ed.2d 147; Cf. State ex rel. Sibarco Corp. v. City of Berea (1966), 7 Ohio St.2d 85, 218 N.E.2d 428, certiorari denied (1967), 386 U.S. 957, 87 S.Ct. 1022, 18 L.Ed.2d 104. Prohibition will not lie unless it clearly appears that the court has no jurisdiction of the cause which it is attempting to adjudicate or the court is about to exceed its jurisdiction. State ex rel. Ellis v. McCabe (1941), 138 Ohio St. 417, 35 N.E.2d 571, paragraph three of the syllabus. "The writ will not issue to prevent an erroneous judgment, or to serve the purpose of appeal, or to correct mistakes of the lower court in deciding questions within its jurisdiction." State ex rel. Sparto v. Juvenile Court of Darke County (1950), 153 Ohio St. 64, 65, 90 N.E.2d 598. Furthermore, it should be used with great caution and not issue in a doubtful case. State ex rel. Merion v. Tuscarawas Cty. Court of Common Pleas (1940), 137 Ohio St. 273, 28 N.E.2d 273, and Reiss v. Columbus Municipal Court (App. 1956), 76 Ohio Law Abs. 141, 145 N.E.2d 447. Nevertheless, when a court is patently and unambiguously without jurisdiction to act whatsoever, the availability or adequacy of a remedy is immaterial to the issuance of a writ of prohibition. State ex rel. Tilford v. Crush (1988), 39 Ohio St.3d 174, 529 N.E.2d 1245, and State ex rel. Csank v. Jaffe (1995), 107 Ohio App.3d 387, 668 N.E.2d 996. However, absent such a patent and unambiguous lack of jurisdiction, a court having general jurisdiction of the subject matter of an action has authority to determine its own jurisdiction. A party challenging the court'sjurisdiction has an adequate remedy at law via appeal from the court's holding that it has jurisdiction. State ex rel. Rootstown Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Portage County Court of Common Pleas (1997), 78 Ohio St.3d 489, 678 N.E.2d 1365, and State ex rel. Bradford v. Trumbull Cty. Court, 64 Ohio St.3d 502, 1992-Ohio-116, 597 N.E.2d 116. Moreover, the court has discretion in issuing the writ of prohibition. State ex rel. Gilligan v. Hoddinott (1973), 36 Ohio St.2d 127, 304 N.E.2d 382.

{¶ 9} Similarly, the requisites for mandamus are well established: (1) the relator must have a clear legal right to the requested relief, (2) the respondent must have a clear legal duty to perform the requested relief, and (3) there must be no adequate remedy at law. Additionally, although mandamus may be used to compel a court to exercise judgment or to discharge a function, it may not control judicial discretion, even if that discretion is grossly abused. State ex rel. Ney v. Niehaus (1987), 33 Ohio St.3d 118, 515 N.E.2d 914. Furthermore, mandamus is not a substitute for appeal. State ex rel. Keenan v. Calabrese (1994), 69 Ohio St.3d 176, 631 N.E.2d 119; State ex rel. Daggett v. Gessaman (1973), 34 Ohio St.2d 55, 295 N.E.2d 659; and State ex rel. Pressley v. Industrial Commission of Ohio (1967), 11 Ohio St.2d 141, 228 N.E.2d 631, paragraph three of the syllabus. Thus, mandamus does not lie to correct errors and procedural irregularities in the course of a case. State ex rel. Jerninghan v. Gaughan (Sept. 26, 1994), Cuyahoga App. No. 67787.Furthermore, if the relator had an adequate remedy, regardless of whether it was used, relief in mandamus is precluded. State ex rel. Tran v. McGrath, 78 Ohio St.3d 45, 1997-Ohio-245, 676 N.E.2d 108, and State ex rel. Boardwalk Shopping Center, Inc. v. Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga...