State Of Utah v. Lovell

• Decision Date: 27 July 2010
• Docket Number: No. 921900407,No. 20061025,20061025,921900407
• Citation: 2010 UT 48
• Parties: State of Utah,Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Douglas Anderson Lovell,Defendant and Appellant.
• Court: Utah Supreme Court

2010 UT 48

State of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee,

v.Douglas Anderson Lovell, Defendant and Appellant.

No. 20061025

No. 921900407

Supreme Court Of The State Of Utah

FILED: July 27, 2010

Mark L. Shurtleff, Att'y Gen., Laura B. Dupaix, Asst. Att'y Gen., Salt Lake City, for plaintiff

David V. Finlayson, Salt Lake City, for defendant

This opinion is subject to revision before final publication in the Pacific Reporter.

The Honorable Michael D. Lyon

NEHRING, Justice:

INTRODUCTION

¶1 This is Mr. Lovell's third direct appeal of his conviction for the aggravated murder of Joyce Yost. In this appeal, Mr. Lovell challenges the district court's denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. We reverse the holding of the district court and hold that the trial court's failure to strictly comply with Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(e) constituted good cause to allow Mr. Lovell to withdraw his guilty plea.

BACKGROUND

¶2 This case has been before us on two occasions. We previously detailed the facts related to the crime in State v. Lovell (Lovell I), 1999 UT 40, 984 P.2d 382, and the procedural history that resulted in our remand of the case to the districtcourt to consider Mr. Lovell's motion to withdraw his guilty plea in State v. Lovell (Lovell II), 2005 UT 31, 114 P.3d 575. We previously stated, "[w]e do not discount the heinous circumstances of Ms. Yost's death by not repeating the details of the crime in this appeal, but we limit our recitation to the... facts on which the issues of this appeal are centered." Id. ¶ 2. We pause to reiterate this observation here.

¶3 Following the entry of his guilty plea, Mr. Lovell moved to withdraw it. The district court initially held that Mr. Lovell's motion was untimely, but we reversed that holding and remanded the case for consideration of the merits of Mr. Lovell's motion. Id. ¶ 29. In the district court, Mr. Lovell argues his motion was meritorious for at least two reasons. First, he argued that he had good cause to withdraw his plea because the trial court failed to strictly comply with Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(e), ¹ which sets out the requirements for a lawful guilty plea. Mr. Lovell alleged that the trial court fell short of rule 11(e)'s requirements because the trial court failed to inform him that if he pled guilty he would be waiving the following rights: the right to be presumed innocent, the right against self-incrimination, the right to a speedy public trial before an impartial jury, the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses, the right to compel attendance of witnesses, the right to require the prosecution to prove each element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt, the right to a unanimous jury verdict, and the right requiring a jury to find that the death penalty may only be imposed when a jury determines that it is the only justified and appropriate penalty beyond a reasonable doubt. Mr. Lovell also alleged that the trial court failed to strictly comply with rule 11(e) because it did not properly inform him of his right to an appeal, of the time limit for moving to withdraw his guilty plea, and because it did not properly determine what plea agreement was reached by Mr. Lovell and the State. Second, Mr. Lovell claimed that there was good cause for him to withdraw his plea because his trial counsel was ineffective. The State responded to each of Mr. Lovell's claims and urged that there was not good cause to allow Mr. Lovell to withdraw his plea.

¶4 The district court² held that the trial court complied with rule 11(e) and that, even if it did not, the error did not amount to good cause to allow Mr. Lovell to withdraw his plea because Mr. Lovell did not show that but for the error he would not have pled guilty. The district court also rejected all of Mr. Lovell's specific claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. Finally, the district court held that Mr. Lovell's argument that his counsel's failure to conduct a mitigation investigation for the penalty phase was not relevant to the motion to withdraw the plea and declined to address it. We have jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code section 78A-3-102(3)(i), (j) (2008).

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶5 A district court's ruling on a motion to withdraw a guilty plea involves both factual and legal determinations, and thus invites multiple standards of review. See State v. Beckstead, 2006 UT 42, ¶¶ 7-8, 140 P.3d 1288.

We will overturn a [district] court's ruling on a motion to withdraw a guilty plea only when we are convinced that the court has abused its discretion. We will disturb findings of fact made in connection with a ruling on a motion to withdraw a guilty plea only if they are clearly erroneous.

Id. ¶ 7. However, "the 'ultimate question of whether the [trial] court strictly complied with constitutional and procedural requirements for entry of a guilty plea is a question of law that is reviewed for correctness.'" Id. ¶ 8 (quoting State v. Hittle, 2004 UT 46, ¶ 4, 94 P.3d 268). In these cases, the correctness standard often displaces the abuse of discretion standard because a strict compliance violation will almost certainly constitute an abuse of discretion. See id.

ANALYSIS

¶6 On appeal, Mr. Lovell challenges the district court's determination that the trial court strictly complied with rule 11(e). He also takes issue with the district court's holding that even if the trial court failed to strictly comply with rule 11(e), Mr. Lovell must show that he would not have pled guilty absent the trial court's errors in order for there to be good cause for the plea to be withdrawn. Next, Mr. Lovell argues that the district court plainly erred in denying his motion to withdraw his plea because it was taken in violation of his due process rights under the Utah and United States Constitutions. Finally, Mr. Lovell asserts that the district court erred when it found that his trial counsel was not ineffective during the plea process.

¶7 Because we find the trial court's failure to strictly comply with rule 11(e) and its determination that Mr. Lovell lacked good cause to withdraw his guilty plea to be the dispositive inquiries in this case, we limit our opinion to the resolution of these issues, and decline to address Mr. Lovell's other claims. See State v. Ott, 2010 UT 1, ¶ 13, _ P.3d _(citing State v. Carter, 776 P.2d 886, 889 (Utah 1989) (noting courts should "focus judicial resources and energy on those critical or outcome-determinative issues" raised in the case)).

I. THE TRIAL COURT FELL SHORT IN PERFORMING ITS DUTY TO STRICTLY COMPLY WITH RULE 11(e)

¶8 We begin our discussion of the issues raised by Mr. Lovell with an analysis of whether the trial court strictly complied with Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(e) when it accepted Mr. Lovell's guilty plea.

¶9 The district court held that although nowhere in the plea colloquy or in the plea statement did the trial court expressly mention the right to the presumption of innocence and the right to a speedy, public trial before an impartial jury, the trial court nevertheless strictly complied with rule 11(e) because Mr. Lovell was informed of the omitted rights by virtue of his "personal experience with the criminal justice system and the overall context in which the plea was taken." Because Mr. Lovell continuously made timely objections to the State's reliance on his past experience with the criminal justice system to show strict compliance, we find that the issue of whether the trial court strictly complied with rule 11(e) was properlypreserved.³ See Brookside Mobile Home Park Ltd. v. Peebles, 2002 UT 48, ¶¶ 14-15, 48 P.3d 968 ("[I]n order to preserve an issue for appeal[,] the issue must be presented to the trial court in such a way that the trial court has an opportunity to rule on that issue.").

¶10 Finding the issue was properly preserved, we proceed to review the district court's reliance on Mr. Lovell's past trial experience to determine whether the trial court complied with the requirements set forth in rule 11(e).

A. A Defendant's Past Trial Experience Cannot Support a Finding of Strict Compliance With Rule 11(e)

¶11 The version of Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(e) in effect when Mr. Lovell entered his plea states that a judge may not accept a guilty plea until the court has found

(1) if the defendant is not represented by counsel, he or she has knowingly waived the right to counsel and does not desire counsel;

(2) the plea is voluntarily made;

(3) the defendant knows of the right to the presumption of innocence, the right against

compulsory self-incrimination, the right to a speedy public trial before an impartial jury, the right to confront and cross-examine in open court the prosecution witnesses, the right to compel the attendance of defense witnesses, and that by entering the plea, these rights are waived;

(4) the defendant understands the nature and elements of the offense to which the plea is entered, that upon trial the prosecution would have the burden of proving each of those elements beyond a reasonable doubt, and that the plea is an admission of all those elements;

(5) the defendant knows the minimum and maximum sentence, and if applicable, the minimum mandatory nature of the minimum sentence, that may be imposed for each offense to which a plea is entered, including the possibility of the imposition of consecutive sentences;

(6) if the tendered plea is a result of a prior plea discussion and plea agreement, and if so, what agreement has been reached;

(7) the defendant has been advised of the time limits for filing any motion to withdraw the plea; and

(8) the defendant has been advised that the right of appeal is limited.

Utah R. Crim. P. 11(e).

¶12 In State v. Gibbons, we held that "[b]ecause of the importance of compliance with Rule 11(e)... the law places the burden of establishing compliance with those requirements on the trial judge." 740 P.2d 1309, 1313 (Utah 1987). The trial judge must "fulfill the... requirements imposed by [rule 11(e)] on...