State Of West Va. v. Beckner

• Decision Date: 23 March 1937
• Docket Number: (No. 8488)
• Citation: 118 W.Va. 430
• Parties: State of West Virginia v. Willie Beckner
• Court: West Virginia Supreme Court

118 W.Va. 430

State of West Virginia

v.Willie Beckner

(No. 8488)

Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.

Submitted February 24, 1937.

Decided March 23, 1937.

1. New Trial

On a motion for a new trial on the ground of after discovered evidence, any showing in support thereof must dis- close, not only diligence to discover such evidence before trial, but that the same is calculated to produce, and would support, a different verdict from that returned by the jury.

2.Criminal Law

In a criminal case, affidavits showing that the accused was of a weak mentality, but which, taken as a whole, fail to show that he did not know right from wrong, with respect to the offense charged against him, are not sufficient to warrant the granting of a new trial on the ground of after discovered evidence, bearing on the alleged insanity of the accused.

3.Evidence

Testimony tending to show the insanity of the accused, at the time of the commission of the offense charged against him, is admissible under a plea of not guilty.

Error to Circuit Court, Kanawha County. Willie Beckner was convicted of first-degree murder, and he brings error.

Affirmed.

M. F. Matheny, for plaintiff in error. Clarence W. Meadows, Attorney General, and Kenneth E. Hines, Assistant Attorney General, for the State.

Fox, Judge:

The defendant, Willie Beckner, was indicted in the Intermediate Court of Kanawha County, charged with the murder of J. S. Page, locally known as Cy Page. On this charge he was tried, a verdict of guilty of murder in the first degree, without further finding, returned by the jury, and a sentence of death was pronounced. A motion to set aside the verdict and grant a new trial, interposed prior to the sentence, was overruled. Later, during the term at which the trial and conviction were had, the defendant appeared, by his counsel, and again moved that the judgment imposing sentence be set aside, and that a new trial be granted him, on the grounds of after discovered evidence bearing upon his alleged mental state at the time of the commission of the crime.

This motion was likewise overruled, and to the action of the court, on said motions, the defendant prosecutes this writ of error.

In view of the importance of this case, it seems appropriate that a complete statement of the nature of the crime and all steps leading up to the trial and conviction be made.

J. S. Page, an aged resident of a remote section of Kanawha County, was killed on the 6th day of May, 1936. Shortly after the killing, suspicion was directed toward the defendant, and he was placed in custody. On the 9th day of May, 1936, he made a statement, in writing, admitting that he shot Page, and detailed the circumstances under which the crime was committed; this statement was signed by him, and was sworn to before a notary public; later, on the 11th day of May, 1936, he made a further statement, with regard to the crime, in the form of answers to questions which were propounded to him by an official of the prosecuting attorney's office, and in the presence of a member of the Department of Public Safety; this statement was taken down by a notary public, signed by the defendant, and sworn to by him. In both of these statements the defendant states that they were voluntarily made without promises or threats.

The indictment in the case was returned on the 13th day of June, 1936. Two days thereafter, the defendant was arraigned, two reputable and capable members of the bar were assigned as his counsel to defend him, and his case was set to be tried on June 23rd, following. On the day fixed for the trial, an able attorney appeared in court and announced that he had been requested by counsel formerly assigned to represent the defendant in the case, and the court permitted the substitution of counsel to be made. There is nothing in the record showing whether counsel first assigned, or either of them, had made any investigation of the case. After new counsel had been assigned, an opportunity was given him to confer with the defendant and his father, and he did so, for a period of about one hour. During this conference, coun- sel was furnished with the two statements made by the defendant, and after the conference was completed, he returned into court and discussed the matter of trial with the prosecuting attorney and with the court. At this conference with the prosecuting attorney and the court, the matter of having the question of the sanity of the defendant submitted to a jury was discussed, and the prosecuting attorney at that time stated that if such a question were raised, he would want time for preparation on that point. Upon being asked by the court whether he had any evidence to sustain a plea of insanity, counsel for the defendant replied that he knew of no evidence he could introduce to sustain such plea, and thereupon the court stated that if he had no available evidence at hand, he saw no reason for delaying the case. There was no request for a continuance, on the part of the defendant, or his counsel, and the trial immediately followed, resulting in the conviction and sentence as stated above.

The evidence introduced at the trial of the case developed that Page lived alone on a farm and that the defendant conceived the idea that he had money in his possession. On the day of the murder, the defendant left his home about eight or eight-thirty in the morning and went to the Page home, and found him absent. Page came to his house about the middle of the day, and then went back to his work which was some distance from the house occupied by him. Some time after the noon hour, the defendant broke into the Page house, thinking he would find money there. After he entered the house, he made a search but was unable to find any money, but did find a single barrel shot-gun and two shells which he carried away with him. He then went to a point near the place where Page was at work, and remained there until five or six o'clock in the evening, when Page stopped work and started home. When he passed near where the defendant was stationed, he was shot by him with the shot-gun he had stolen earlier in the day, and the defendant then ran away, went around the hill a distance and threw away the gun with which he had perpetrated the crime. Shortly after this, the defendant passed near the house of Leonard Martin and made some statement to Martin to the effect that he was "dodging the law". A short time thereafter, he went back to Martin and told him that "Cy Page was over there in the field and 'he is shot and dead or about dead' ". A man by the name of Wilkerson was called and Wilkerson, the defendant, and perhaps others went to where Page was lying; he was picked up, the defendant helping, and moved from the place where he was found to a point from whence he was finally brought to a hospital in Charleston, where he died the next day. All of these facts appear from the two statements made by the defendant and are corroborated by a number of witnesses who saw the defendant on the day of the murder. There are no disputes as to the facts in the case and no extenuating circumstances shown. The evidence clearly shows the commission of a deliberate and premeditated killing, and that the motive which prompted the act was robbery.

There were no objections in the trial to the admission of any testimony; no objections to the instructions given by the court; and counsel for the defendant, as appears from the record, was accorded every consideration in preparing himself for trial, after he appeared in court; and, indeed, there is no complaint as to the fairness of the trial, or the correctness of the jury's verdict, on the evidence presented.

The defendant bases his motion for a new trial solely on the ground that after the trial of the case and after the sentence, his counsel first learned that there was some question as to the mental capacity of the defendant. Counsel, in his affidavit, and in presenting his motion for a new trial, states that a number of people living in the vicinity where the crime was committed, and where the defendant lived, communicated to him their belief that the defendant was not of sound mind. Counsel, in addition to filing his own affidavit, and in a diligent effort to represent his client, secured a number of affidavits, all bearing upon the mental responsibility of the accused. Reading these affidavits and accepting what they contain as true, we find that the defendant had a "savage and ungovernable temper and. at other times he was meek and lowly and in an attitude of sorrow"; that "he was of unsound mind and low mentality and at various times wholly unable to govern his actions"; that "he seemed weary, restless and sorrowful"; that "his mind never fully developed"; that "he was a person of unsound mind and wholly incapable of transacting the affairs of life in a sensible, ordinary way"; that "he was afraid to go out in the dark"; that "he was afraid something would get him"; that "he had the mind of a very small child"; and one affiant says that "he has the mind of a very small child and does not seem at times to know right from wrong". The parents of the defendant filed an affidavit to the effect that he was "of a weak mentality and unsound mind and that while he had grown to the age of 29 years, his mind never developed to a greater degree than that of a small child". But it must be borne in mind that the father of defendant was present at the trial of the case, and must have had knowledge of his son's condition at that time. These affidavits do no more than tend to establish...