State Of West Va. v. Crummit, (No. 9123)
| Decision Date | 04 February 1941 |
| Docket Number | (No. 9123) |
| Court | West Virginia Supreme Court |
| Parties | State of West Virginia v. George Crummit andHarold Goodwin |
In a criminal trial it lies within the sound discretion of the trial judge to determine whether a witness, not a convict, shall be required to answer a question as to whether the witness has or has not formerly been confined in a penitentiary.
The repetition of an improper question containing a statement of fact, an objection to which is sustained in each instance, does not constitute reversible error, unless the record plainly shows an abuse of the trial court's discretion.
Error to Circuit Court, Harrison County.
George Crummit and Harold Goodwin were convicted of entering a store, without breaking, and carrying away money, and they bring error.
Affirmed.
Lloyd H. Young and John C. Southern, for plaintiffs in error.
Clarence W. Meadows, Attorney General, and Kenneth E. Hines, Assistant Attorney General, for defendant in error.
Kenna, President:
This writ of error was granted to an order of the Circuit Court of Harrison County refusing a writ of error to a judgment of the Criminal Court of that county sentencing George Crummit and Harold Goodwin to confinement in the penitentiary for entering, without breaking, the store of G. C. Murphy Company on Main Street in Clarksburg and carrying away money of the value of $180.00 in August, 1938. Orval Nicholson, a co-indictee, having confessed, testified for the State at the trial of his two accomplices. The petition sets forth fifteen assigned grounds of error, all of which have been examined, but since only two were argued and briefed, this opinion will be confined to the errors submitted, both of which are confined to the personal privilege of a witness, one for the State and another for the defense, to refrain from answering questions that tend to degrade or incriminate the witness involved.
A resume of the State's testimony shows that on the afternoon of August 10, 1938, Crummit, Goodwin and Nicholson met and discussed a plan to enter the G. C. Murphy store that night, Nicholson being familiar therewith due to having delivered goods there. They agreed that Nicholson should enter the store late that afternoon, conceal himself, and after the store was closed should remove bags of money that the manager customarily hid behind pillows on the shelving upon one of the upper floors. Crummit and Goodwin were to go into an alley behind the store building, and Nicholson was to toss the sacks to them from a window fronting upon the alleyway. The scheme transpired as planned and around ten-thirty in the evening Nicholson left his hiding place and, first looking out of the window in order to ascertain that Crummit and Goodwin were actually in the alley, found three sacks of money, tossed them from the window, and later that night met the other two at the rooming house where Crummit resided where they divided equally, in round figures, $180.00 in paper and silver money. We believe that it is unnecessary to go more into detail concerning the testimony, other than to say that both the accused categorically denied every material phase of Nicholson's testimony, stating that they were not present when the offense was committed.
Nicholson was placed upon the witness stand by the prosecuting attorney. The trial judge, on his own volition and before the witness was interrogated, instructed him that he need not respond There was no objection to the court's statement at the time, but upon cross-examination, the witness was asked by the attorney for the defense if he had told the prosecuting attorney about being in the penitentiary "down in Kentucky." Thereupon, the prosecuting attorney stated that he thought the witness was privileged not to answer, and the court informed the witness that he might answer or not, as he wished, the defendants saving their exception. Similar inquiries were made at several different times during the cross-examination of the witness with the same result, witness' privilege not to reply being claimed and sustained by the trial court.
While it is true that the trial judge in instructing the witness concerning his privilege not to reply to questions having a tendency to degrade or incriminate him, overstated the legal principle...
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State v. McAboy, 13687
...a prior conviction may be shown to impeach his credibility. State v. Justice, 135 W.Va. 852, 65 S.E.2d 743 (1951); State v. Crummit, 123 W.Va. 36, 13 S.E.2d 757 (1941); State v. Price, 113 W.Va. 326, 167 S.E. 862 The difference between the two rules is measured by the ultimate penalty arisi......
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State v. Davis
...14; State v. Justice, 135 W.Va. 852, 863, 65 S.E.2d 743, 749 (1951); Syl. pt. 3, State v. Lucas, supra note 3; Syl. pt. 1, State v. Crummit, 123 W.Va. 36, 13 S.E.2d 757 (1941); State v. Price, 113 W.Va. 326, 334, 167 S.E. 862, 866 (1933); State v. Worthington, 109 W.Va. 449, 450, 155 S.E. 3......
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State v. Haverty
...(if it) is of opinion that the ends of justice may be promoted by compelling such testimony or evidence." 6 In State v. Crummit, 123 W.Va. 36, 13 S.E.2d 757 (1941), we "Questions relating to a previous conviction and to a satisfied sentence we do not regard as incriminating. If they were, t......
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State v. Burton
...of a witness' credibility by a prior criminal conviction. State v. Justice, 135 W.Va. 852, 65 S.E.2d 743 (1951); State v. Crummit, 123 W.Va. 36, 13 S.E.2d 757 (1941); State v. Price, 113 W.Va. 326, 167 S.E. 862 (1933). This matter might be resolved by concluding that the trial court did not......