State Of West Va. v. Robinson.

• Decision Date: 02 August 1882
• Citation: 20 W.Va. 713
• Court: West Virginia Supreme Court
• Parties: State of West Virginia v. Robinson.

20 W.Va. 713

State of West Virginia

v.Robinson.

Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.

Submitted June 24, 1882

Decided August 2o, 1882.

1. If permanent insanity is produced by habitual drunkenness, then like insanity produced by any other cause it excuses an act, which otherwise would be criminal, (p. 740.)

2. When insanity is relied on as a defense to a charge of crime, it must be proved to the satisfaction of the jury, in order to entitle the accused to an acquittal on that ground. If upon the whole,-evidence the jury believe, that the prisoner was insane, when he committed the deed, they will acquit him on that ground, but not on the fanciful ground, that, though they believe he was then sane, yet, as there may be a reasonable doubt of such 'e sanity, he is therefore entitled to an acquittal, (p. 740)

3. A person, who is intoxicated, may yet be capable of deliberation and premeditation; and if the jury believe from all the evidence in the case, that the jDrisoner willfully, maliciously, deliberately and premeditatedly killed the deceased, they should find him guilty of murder in the first degree, although he was intoxicated at the time of the killing, (p. 740.)

4. A person, who has formed a willful, deliberate and premeditated design to kill another, and in pursuance of such design voluntarily makes himself drunk for the purpose of nerving his animal courage for the accomplishment of the design, and then meets the subject of his malice, when he is so drunk as not then to be able to deliberate on and premeditate the murder, and kills the person, it is murder in the first degree, (p. 741.)

5. A person, whether he be an habitual drinker or not, cannot voluntarily make himself so drunk as to become on that account irresponsible for his conduct during such drunkenness. He may be perfectly unconscious of what he does; and yet he is responsible. He may be incapable of express malice; but the law implies malice in such a case from the nature of the instrument used, the absence of provocation and other circumstances, under which the act is done. (p. 741.)

6. If a person kills another without provocation and through reckless wickedness of heart, but at the time of so doing his condition from intoxication is such as to render him incapable of doing a willful, deliberate and premeditated act, he is guilty of murder in the second degree, (p. 741.)

7. Where a statute establishes degrees of the crime of murder, and provides, that "all willful, deliberate and premeditated, killing shall be murder in the first degree, 77 evidence, that the accused was intoxicated at the time of the killing, is competent for the consideration of the jury upon the question, whether the accused was in such a condition of mind as to be capable of deliberation and premeditation, (p. 741.)

8. As between the two offenses of murder in the second degree and manslaughter the drunkenness of the offender can form no legitimate matter of enquiry; the killing being voluntary, the offense is necessarily murder in the second degree, unless the provocation was of such a character, as would at common law reduce the crime to manslaughter; for which latter offense a drunken man is equally responsible as a sober one. (p. 741.)

9. An act done in accordance with a purpose previously formed is not necessarily an act done in pur suet nee of such previously formed purpose, (p. 742.)

10. If a man is temporarily insane from the effect of intoxication, then existing, of course it is impossible for him while in such a mental condition to deliberate and preniedidate; and being in such a condition of mind, not having formed a previous purpose to kill his victim and in pursuance of such purpose, made himself voluntarily drunk to accomplish his design, he could not be convicted of murder in the first degree, (p. 742.)

11. An instruction, which assumes an important and material fact as true, which is not conceded in the case, should not be given to the jury. (p. 748.)

12. In a criminal case an instruction is not erroneous, which instructs the jury: "If they believe from the evidence &c., 77 and omits to add, "beyond a reasonable doubt, 77 because, when such instruction is given, it is intended and understood, that before the jury can convict, they must believe the material facts "beyond a reasonable doubt, 77 and if the defendant wants the very words inserted in the instruction, he must ask to have it done, or ask for a general instruction on the subject, (p. 743.) 18. An instruction, which is confused in its language, contradictory in its terms and unintelligible, is calculated to mislead the jury and should not be given, (p. 743.)

14. While the Appellate Court cannot reverse a judgment in a criminal case, because the bill of exceptions shows, that an erroneous instruction has been given at the instance of the prisoner, which is mischievous in its character, yet the court may properly point out such error, so that it may be avoided upon the second trial and in other cases, (p. 744.)

15. A mere separation of the jury will not entitle the person to a new trial; but where there has been an improper separation of the jury during the trial, if the verdict is against the prisoner, he is entitled to the benefit of the presumption, that such separation has been prejudicial to him, and the burden of proof is upon the prosecution to show beyond a reasonable doubt, that the prisoner has suffered no injury by reason of the separation. If the prosecution fails to do this, the verdict will be set aside, (p. 755.)

16. The same rule should be applied, to all cases of misconduct or irregularity by the jury during the trial, which is of such a character as to raise a presumption, that the prisoner was prejudiced thereby, (p. 755.)

17. The testimony of the jurors may be received to disprove or explain any such separation, misconduct or irregularity, but their testimony will not be received to show, by what motives they wrere actuated, or that any admitted fact, misconduct or irregularity had no influence or effect upon their minds in producing the verdict. In any case where proper at all the testimony of jurors should be received with great caution. (p. 756.)

18. Where two of the jury trying a felony-case were taken in charge of an officer to the foot of the stairs in a hotel, where the jury were staying, and then the officer left them and they went into a water-closet, and a stranger had just gone into the closet before them and, afterwards another stranger went into the same water-closet, and the officer's back was turned on them, when the stranger went into the closet, and the two jurors remained in the closet some lime in the absence of the officer with the strangers, this is such a separation of the jury, as will entitle the prisoner to have the verdict set aside and a new trial granted, though there be no evidence, that conversation was had between the strangers and the two jurors while in the closet, about the case then on trial. And the presumption, that the prisoner was prejudiced by such separation of the jury, is not rebutted by the several affidavits of all the jurors and the officers having them in charge made before the affidavit of such separation, that there was no separation of the jury during the trial and no opportunity offered any one to tamper with the jury. (p. 75!).)

19. A motion made, before the court adjourned, based on an affidavit of such separation, filed after sentence passed on the prisoner, a sufficient reason being shown for not filing it sooner, to set aside the judgment and sentence and grant prisoner a new trial is not too late. (p. 760)

20. It is a sufficient reason for not filing the affidavit sooner, that affiant was keeping out of the way to prevent his affidavit of such separation being taken, and it could not by reasonable diligence be sooner procured, (p. 760.)

21. The reception of sealed letters by jurors during the trial of a felony, and especially a capital case, renders the verdict vicious; and it should be set aside and a new trial granted the prisoner, who has been convicted, although the jurors in the absence of the letters swear, that none of such letters so received in any manner related to the case on trial, (p. 761.)

22. Before letters addressed to members of a jury, while trying a felony case, are received by them, they should first be inspected by the court, so that the court can know, that no influence calculated to prejudice the prisoner was in that way brought to bear upon the jury. (p. 7(52.)

23. The mere reading of newspapers by members of a jury, while trying a felony case, will not vitiate a verdict rendered against a prisoner, unless such newspapers contain matter calculated to influence the minds of the jury against the jmsoner to his prejudice, (p. 762.)

24. A newspaper containing an account of a horrible murder in no way connected with the case on trial read by the jury, while trying a murder case, is not calculated to prejudice the minds of the jury against the prisoner. (p 762.)

25. But where the jury were trying a prisoner for murder, and the defense was insanity superinduced by long continued habits of intoxication, and while trying the case the jury were permitted to read newspaper accounts of the trial of Guiteau for the murder of President Garfield, then in progress, in which the only defense was insanity, which accounts contained the expert testimony of Dr. Gray on the subject of insanity generally, and in which testimony he ridiculed the idea, that any such thing as "moral insanity" existed and termed "dypsomania' "drunkenness," under the circumstances of the case the reading of such newspaper accounts was calculated to influence the minds of the jury against the prisoner and to his prejudice, and for this reason the verdict should be set aside and a new trial granted, (p. 763.)

26. Before a jury trying a felony case should receive newspapers, such newspapers should be inspected by the court, and all...