State on Petition of Shevin ex rel. Lawson v. Page
| Decision Date | 30 June 1971 |
| Docket Number | No. 41170,41170 |
| Parties | STATE of Florida on the Petition of Robert L. SHEVIN, Attorney General ex rel. William LAWSON, Petitioners, v. William R. PAGE, individually and as a member of the South Broward Transit Authority District, Respondent. |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., Herbert T. Schwartz, Deputy Atty. Gen., M. Stephen Turner, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Harry M. Rosen, Hollywood, for petitioners.
Harvey Ford, Hollywood, for respondent.
Upon petition of the Attorney General of Florida, the Honorable Robert L. Shevin, this Court issued a writ of quo warranto requiring respondent, William R. Page, to show cause why he should not be required to surrender the office he claims to relator, William Lawson.
Jurisdiction is conferred by Article V, Section 4(2) of the Constitution of the State of Florida, F.S.A., and Florida Appellate Rule 4.5, subd. e, 32 F.S.A. No questions of fact requiring the taking of testimony were raised.
Chapter 67--1187, Special Acts of Florida, 1967, created the South Broward Transit Authority District, and Section 3 thereof as amended by Chapter 70--620, Special Acts of 1970, empowered the Governor of the State to appoint a member to said District from each of five subdistricts.
Relator William Lawson, a resident of Subdistrict 4, was commissioned as member of said South Broward Transit Authority District by the Honorable Reubin O'D. Askew, Governor of the State of Florida, on May 5, 1971, for a term until July 2, 1974.
Respondent, William R. Page, also a resident of Subdistrict 4, presently occupies the office of member of South Broward Transit Authority District by virtue of appointment by the Honorable Claude R. Kirk, Jr., immediate past Governor of the State of Florida.
Relator states that respondent's appointment to the office is incomplete and invalid. On December 8, 1970, Governor Kirk informed the Secretary of State in writing of his intention to appoint respondent and instructed him to prepare the necessary papers. Governor Kirk, however, failed to sign a commission in favor of respondent prior to the expiration of his term of office as Governor. Thereafter, on April 13, 1971, Governor Reubin O'D. Askew, the successor of Governor Kirk, instructed the Secretary of State to cancel respondent's appointment.
Article IV, Section 1(a) of the Constitution of the State of Florida vests the Governor with the 'supreme executive power' and requires him to 'commission all officers of the state and counties.' Florida Statute 113.051 (1969), F.S.A., requires:
'All grants and commissions shall be in the name and under the authority of the State of Florida, sealed with the great seal of the state, signed by the governor and countersigned by the secretary of state.'
A member of the South Broward Transit Authority District is an officer of the counties as contemplated by Article IV, Section 1(a) of the Constitution.
Relator correctly states that the written intention of appointment of respondent by Governor Kirk dated December 8, 1970, was not a 'commission' as contemplated by Article IV, Section 1 of the Constitution or as defined by Florida Statute 113.051, F.S.A. By failing to execute a commission in favor of respondent, Governor Kirk failed to appoint him to the office of member of the South Broward Transit Authority District.
The record indicates that respondent acted in good faith and attempted to qualify for the office as required by law. He submitted a bond to the office of the Clerk of Circuit Court which was complete on its face except no date of execution was shown. The Clerk failed to transmit same to the Governor and on January 4, 1971, while the Honorable Claude R. Kirk, Jr., was still Governor, the respondent submitted same to the office of the Secretary of State but the papers were not processed for the Governor's signature on a commission because the Clerk of Circuit Court still had not approved same as required by law.
We fully appreciate the frustration and inconvenience caused to respondent, but must make an objective determination of whether the situation here meets the requirement of law for valid appointment to office. In this case the Governor had the sole power to appoint any qualified person pursuant to law and could only remove him for cause after completion of appointment. 1
Chapter 67--1187, Special Acts of Florida, as amended by Chapter 70--620, Special Acts of Florida, gives the Governor unfettered authority to appoint members of the South Broward Transit Authority District; accordingly, signing a commission for such office involves his executive discretion and judgment and serves to complete and effect the appointment.
Where, as in this case, no election by the voters or approval by the State Senate are required, a simple statement or letter of intent from the Governor saying he was appointing a...
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Thompson v. Desantis
...has not yet received a commission for her to assume office that has been attested by the Secretary of State. In State ex rel. Lawson v. Page , 250 So. 2d 257, 258 (Fla. 1971), this Court held that "[w]here, as in this case, no election by the voters or approval by the State Senate are requi......