State Tax Commission of Arizona v. Board of Supervisors of Yavapai County, Arizona

Decision Date20 February 1934
Docket NumberCivil 3440
Citation43 Ariz. 156,29 P.2d 733
PartiesSTATE TAX COMMISSION OF ARIZONA and M. A. MURPHY, FRANK LUKE and THAD M. MOORE, as Members of the State Tax Commission, Appellants, v. BOARD OF SUPERVISORS OF YAVAPAI COUNTY, ARIZONA, BOARD OF EQUALIZATION OF YAVAPAI COUNTY, ARIZONA, C. W. CARTER, T. B. JONES and WM. BYERS, as Members of and Constituting Said Board of Supervisors and Said Board of Equalization, and CHARLES H. RIEBELING, County Assessor of Yavapai County, Appellees
CourtArizona Supreme Court

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of the County of Yavapai. Richard Lamson, Judge. Judgment reversed and case remanded, with directions.

Mr Arthur T. La Prade, Attorney General and Mr. Charles L Strouss, Assistant Attorney General, for Appellants.

Mr John A. McGuire, County Attorney, Mr. J. F. Moreno, Deputy County Attorney, Messrs. O'Sullivan & Morgan, and Messrs Cornick & Crable, for Appellees.

OPINION

McALISTER, J.

The state tax commission appeals from a judgment of the superior court of Yavapai County denying its application for a writ of mandamus requiring the board of supervisors of that county in their capacity as a board of equalization to comply with an order issued by the plaintiff directing it to raise the valuation of the mining claims of the United Verde Copper Company for the year 1933. The alternative writ was issued and the defendant demurred to the complaint upon various grounds and answered further by setting up certain facts. The plaintiff thereupon replied to the answer by moving to strike portions of it and demurring generally. The court denied the motion to strike and overruled plaintiff's demurrer but sustained the demurrers of the defendant, whereupon the plaintiff announced it would stand upon its pleadings, and judgment for the defendant followed.

In this situation the correctness of the judgment depends wholly upon the sufficiency of the complaint, which alleges in substance as follows: The United Verde Copper Company owns about one hundred thirty-two mining claims in Yavapai county, Arizona, and on May 20, 1933, filed with the assessor of that county a list of its taxable property, except these mining claims, but on August 16, 1933, or two days after the state board of equalization had finished equalizing and adjourned, filed with the county assessor an unsigned and unverified list of these claims. The following day, August 17th, the assessor valued and assessed them at $8,162,043, as nonproducing mining claims. Two days thereafter, or on August 19th, the state tax commission by written order directed the board of supervisors to reconvene as a board of equalization and raise the valuation of these claims to $17,638,043 and to cause the assessment-rolls to be corrected to show this. The board reconvened pursuant to this order but refused to raise the valuation of the mining claims as directed, or at all, but approved and affirmed that made by the assessor.

The defendant demurred to the complaint on the ground that it did not state a cause of action in that section 3061, Revised Code 1928, under which the tax commission acted, does not give it the power to order an increase in the valuation of property without notice to the taxpayer or an opportunity to be heard, but that the power to increase the valuation upon the property of an individual after the adjournment of the state board of equalization rests solely in the county board of equalization, and then only after notice to the taxpayer and a hearing. They objected to the sufficiency of the complaint upon the further ground that section 3061, in so far as it authorizes the tax commission to order the county board of equalization to raise the valuation of property without notice to the taxpayer or a hearing, is unconstitutional and void in that it violates the due process clause of the Constitutions of both the United States and Arizona (Const. Ariz. art. 2, § 4; Const. U.S., Amend. 14). The defendant admitted by way of answer that plaintiff had made the order directing the raise but denied its authority to do so, and averred further that after reconvening the defendant received evidence as to the value of the property but that in the exercise of its discretion it affirmed and approved the valuation fixed by the assessor.

By way of reply the plaintiff moved to strike that portion of the answer dealing with what occurred before the county board of equalization as immaterial, its contention being that it was the duty of the board to comply with the order of the commission, and demurred generally to the answer.

As stated above the trial court denied the motion to strike and overruled the demurrer to the answer but sustained the demurrer interposed to the complaint, and while the reasons for this action are not specially stated it is clear from the record that the court was of the view that the provisions of section 3061, the section upon which the commission relied as conferring upon it the power to require the county board of equalization to reconvene and raise the valuation of the property of an individual taxpayer to a definite sum, do not authorize such action, or, if they do, that it is violative of the due process clause of both the state and federal Constitutions. Hence, the two principal questions raised by the appeal are, first, whether this section confers the power to make such an order, and, second, if it does, whether it violates the fundamental law of the state and nation in the particulars mentioned. The pertinent parts of it read as follows:

"The commission shall appraise and assess all patented and unpatented producing mines, within the state, and on or before the second Monday of July transmit to the several boards of supervisors the assessed valuation thereof. The boards shall enter on the roll all assessments transmitted to them by the commission. The commission or its agents may enter upon, examine and appraise any and all properties within this state. It may require any county board of equalization, at any time after its adjournment, to reconvene and make such orders as it shall direct, may order such board to raise or lower the valuation of any property of any person, or the valuation of any class of property, and may order or direct such board or any assessor to value property, or classes of property in such way as to the commission may seem just and necessary, to the end that all property shall be valued and assessed equitably and at its full cash value."

The portion the commission particularly relies on for its authority is the last sentence and it is apparent from the mere reading of it that it is sufficiently broad, literally construed, to justify that body's position. However, it is only a part of one of the many provisions of the statute providing a set-up for the assessment of property and it must be interpreted in the light of these sections. If any one of these, or all of them treated as a whole, indicate that it was not intended that it should be given a literal construction it may be necessary to limit its meaning. A statement of the gist of these various sections will aid in determining the matter.They provide in substance as follows:

Between the first Monday in January and the twentieth day of May of each year the taxpayer shall deliver to the assessor a list of his property subject to taxation signed and sworn to and between the first Monday in January and the first day of May the assessor must assess all property and by the 20th of May complete the assessment-roll and deliver it to the clerk of the board of supervisors. Sections 3074, 3075, 3076 and 3085, Rev. Code 1928.

On the first day of June the board of supervisors meets as a county board of equalization and may during that meeting change any valuation whether fixed by the assessor or the owner, and when its work is completed, which must be not later than June 10th, it adjourns to meet the first Monday in July. During the June and July meetings it shall require the assessor to place on the roll and assess any property subject to taxation not already there, or in his absence do so itself. Sections 3086 and 3089.

If the board increases the valuation of any property above that fixed by the assessor it must give notice to the taxpayer by publication and by mail in order that he may appear and protest at the July meeting, if he so desires. Section 3087. At that session it shall consider the various assessments specified in the notice and permit any taxpayer to object and offer evidence as to his assessment. Its decision as to valuation is final and shall not be questioned thereafter in any proceeding, unless an appeal to the superior court from the amount of the assessment fixed by the board on his property is taken by the taxpayer on or before September 15th following, but as a condition precedent to the taking of such action he is required to pay the county treasurer the full amount of the tax and at the same time file with that officer a protest stating the reasons why the assessment is excessive. Sections 3088 and 3090.

Upon adjournment of the county board of equalization it is the duty of the clerk to make in duplicate an abstract of the assessment-roll and transmit one copy to the state board of equalization which meets annually on the first Monday in August for the purpose of equalization, and adjourns on the second Monday after transmitting to the board of supervisors of each county the changes it has made and the rate of taxes to be paid for state purposes. It has the power to equalize assessments on all property and to raise or lower valuations by classes in the different counties, or to increase the valuation on the property of an individual taxpayer by giving notice of its intention to do so and of the time...

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