State v. A.A. (In re Interest of A.A.)

• Decision Date: 27 February 2020
• Docket Number: Appeal No. 2018AP1497
• Citation: 941 N.W.2d 260,2020 WI App 11,391 Wis.2d 416
• Parties: In the INTEREST OF A.A., a person under the age of 18: State of Wisconsin, Petitioner-Respondent, v. A.A., Respondent-Appellant.
• Court: Wisconsin Court of Appeals

391 Wis.2d 416

941 N.W.2d 260

2020 WI App 11

In the INTEREST OF A.A., a person under the age of 18:State of Wisconsin, Petitioner-Respondent,

v.A.A., Respondent-Appellant.

Appeal No. 2018AP1497

Court of Appeals of Wisconsin.

Oral Argument: August 7, 2019

Opinion Filed: February 27, 2020

On behalf of the respondent-appellant, the cause was submitted on the briefs of and oral argument by Colleen Marion, assistant state public defender, Madison.

On behalf of the petitioner-respondent, the cause was submitted on the brief of Zev Kianovsky, assistant corporation counsel, Dodge County Corporation Counsel of Juneau.

On behalf of the petitioner-respondent, the cause was submitted on the brief of Jacob J. Wittwer, assistant attorney general, and Joshua L. Kaul, attorney general. There was oral argument by Jacob J. Wittwer.

Before Fitzpatrick, P.J., Blanchard, and Kloppenburg, JJ.

BLANCHARD, J.¹

¶1 This case involves the interpretation of the phrase "not more than 10 days" in WIS. STAT. § 938.355(6)(d)1. This provision sets the maximum length for a nonsecure custody sanction that a circuit court may impose on a juvenile who has violated a dispositional order. A.A. challenges one aspect of the order imposing a sanction on him and the circuit court’s subsequent decision reaffirming the length of the sanction. Specifically, he challenges the court’s decisions to extend his placement from January 16, 2018, to January 26, 2018, arguing that the court should have set January 25, 2018, as the end date. That is, A.A. contends that the sanction as ordered exceeded the "not more than 10 days" allowed under § 938.355(6)(d)1. because it included 10 days plus part of an 11th day, when "day" is understood to mean a calendar day. In contrast, the State argues that the length of the sanction was proper because it did not exceed 240 hours (i.e. , 10 consecutive 24-hour periods), because "day" in this context means 24 consecutive hours.

¶2 We agree with A.A. that the word "day" in WIS. STAT. § 938.355(6)(d)1. means a calendar day and not a series of hours. We interpret the statute this way in light of the general common law rule that fractions of days are not recognized when a time period is framed in terms of "days" in the circumstances present here. Under the common law rule, neither a juvenile’s entering custody nor being released are events tied to a particular hour or minute of a day. These events are deemed to have occurred on the first and last days of the sanction.

¶3 We also briefly address the circuit court’s application of WIS. STAT. § 990.001(4) to resolve the issue here and conclude that § 990.001(4) does not apply in this context. Accordingly, we modify the sanctions order so that the end date is shown as January 25, 2018, and affirm the order as modified.²

BACKGROUND

¶4 In December 2017, the circuit court entered an order finding A.A. to be a juvenile in need of protection or services based on habitual truancy. See WIS. STAT. §§ 938.13(6), 938.345(1). This order placed A.A. on supervision for one year and imposed conditions that A.A. had to follow to avoid sanctions. See WIS. STAT. §§ 938.34(2), 938.345(1), 938.355(2)(b)7. A.A. does not challenge this order.

¶5 In January 2018, A.A.’s social worker requested sanctions based on an allegation that A.A. violated supervision rules. See WIS. STAT. § 938.355(6m)(b). The motion requested a sanction of placement in nonsecure custody for 10 days. The court held a hearing on the motion on January 16, 2018.

¶6 Both at the hearing and in subsequent written submissions, the parties contested only one issue, namely how to properly determine the final day of a maximum period of custody. A.A. argued that the circuit court should interpret "days" under WIS. STAT. § 938.355(6)(d)1., consistent with State v. Johnson , 2018 WI App 2, 379 Wis. 2d 684, 906 N.W.2d 704. Johnson holds that any part of a calendar day that a defendant in a criminal case spends in custody counts as a whole day of sentence credit. Id. , ¶8. A.A. argued that, under the logic of Johnson , the sanction here was 11 "days" long, not the maximum of 10 days allowed under § 938.355(6)(d)1. Corporation counsel for Dodge County argued that Johnson is distinguishable, because the instant case does not involve the juvenile equivalent of the criminal sentence credit at issue in Johnson .³

¶7 The circuit court imposed a sanction of nonsecure custody, setting it to begin on January 16 (the day of the hearing) and end on January 26, concluding that this was a proper 10-day sanction. The court agreed with the County that Johnson is distinguishable. The court turned to a different statute and determined that it applies in this context. See WIS. STAT. § 990.001(4) (computation of time limit "for the taking of any proceeding or the doing of an act" excludes the day of the event from which the time limit is measured). The court deemed the release of A.A. from custody within the sanction period to be the "doing of an act" under § 990.001(4), and accordingly in counting the 10 days excluded the first day of the sanction, January 16.

¶8 There is no dispute that A.A.’s period of nonsecure placement began and ended as ordered by the circuit court.⁴ The parties agree that the record does not establish the time of day on January 16 that A.A. began serving the sanction, nor the time of day when he was released on January 26.

¶9 A.A. appeals, challenging only the final date shown on the sanctions order.

DISCUSSION

¶10 We first address the parties’ dispute over the meaning of "not more than 10 days" in WIS. STAT. § 938.355(6)(d)1., and then address the potential applicability of WIS. STAT. § 990.001(4) in this context.

¶11 The interpretation and application of statutes to an undisputed set of facts present questions of law, which we review independently. See State v. Dylan S. , 2012 WI App 25, ¶16, 339 Wis. 2d 442, 813 N.W.2d 229.

Meaning Of "Days" Under WIS. STAT. § 938.355(6)(d)1.

¶12 To summarize more fully, A.A. interprets the phrase "not more than 10 days" in WIS. STAT. § 938.355(6)(d)1. to mean that the juvenile spends not more than 10 calendar days serving a nonsecure sanction when any part of a calendar day served counts as a full day. Under A.A.’s calendar-day interpretation, the calendar day on which a juvenile begins serving the sanction and the calendar day on which he or she is released from custody are each counted as one "day," whether the time served on each calendar day is two minutes or 23 hours. Under this interpretation, to avoid exceeding the "not more than 10 days" limitation, the sanction must end before midnight on the 10th calendar day of custody, which is the beginning of what would be the 11th calendar day.

¶13 The State argues that "not more than 10 days" means not more than 10 successive intervals of 24 hours. Under this interpretation, a sanction under WIS. STAT. § 938.355(6)(d)1. could last up to 240 hours. Thus, when a 10-day sanction is imposed, the juvenile must be released no later than the same time of day at which the sanction began on the 11th calendar day.

¶14 We apply the following general rules of statutory interpretation. "Statutory language is given its common, ordinary, and accepted meaning, except that technical or specially-defined words or phrases are given their technical or special definitional meaning." State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane Cty. , 2004 WI 58, ¶45, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110. "[S]tatutory language is interpreted in the context in which it is used; not in isolation but as part of a whole; in relation to the language of surrounding or closely-related statutes; and reasonably, to avoid absurd or unreasonable results." Id. , ¶46. If this interpretation approach " ‘yields a plain, clear statutory meaning, then’ " the statute is not ambiguous. Id. (quoted source omitted). However, "a statute is ambiguous if it is capable of being understood by reasonably well-informed persons in two or more senses." Id. , ¶47.

¶15 Of special note here are the following additional rules of statutory interpretation. The legislature is "presumed to act with full knowledge of existing case law when it enacts a statute" and "[a] statute must be interpreted in light of the common law and the scheme of jurisprudence existing at the time of its enactment." Strenke v. Hogner , 2005 WI 25, ¶28, 279 Wis. 2d 52, 694 N.W.2d 296. Statutes are not interpreted in a way that would alter a proposition established in the common law—as would happen if the statute here were interpreted to create an exception to a time convention in the common law—" ‘unless the legislative purpose to do so is clearly expressed in the language of the statute.’ " See MBS-Certified Public Accountants, LLC v. Wisconsin Bell, Inc. , 2012 WI 15, ¶67, 338 Wis. 2d 647, 809 N.W.2d 857 (quoted source omitted); see also id. , ¶¶67, 70-71 (" ‘It is axiomatic that a statute does not abrogate a rule of common law unless the abrogation is clearly expressed and leaves no doubt of the legislature’s intent’ "; a common law rule that undermines a "statute’s manifest purpose ... ‘leaves no doubt of the legislature’s intent’ " to abrogate the common law rule. (quoted source omitted)).

¶16 With these standards in mind, we now provide additional background regarding WIS. STAT. § 938.355(6)(d)1. Section § 938.355 concerns disposition orders that circuit courts issue when a juvenile is found to be in need of protection or services. See § 938.355(1) ; see also WIS. STAT. §§ 938.34, 938.345(1). Such an order must contain "[a] statement of the conditions with which the juvenile is required to comply" while subject to the order. Sec. 938.355(2)(b)7. Subsections § 938.355(6), (6g), and (6m) define the court’s power to impose sanctions on a juvenile who is found to have violated a condition. See State v. Aaron D. , 214 Wis. 2d 56, 61-64, 571 N.W.2d 399 (Ct. App. 1997) (discussing each variety of sanctions). With respect to § 938.355(6), we have described the legislature...