State v. Abbott
| Decision Date | 18 November 1976 |
| Docket Number | No. 76-96-M,76-96-M |
| Citation | 366 A.2d 1132,117 R.I. 214 |
| Parties | STATE v. John M. ABBOTT and Richard E. Freeman. P. |
| Court | Rhode Island Supreme Court |
On April 13, 1976, an order was entered in this proceeding which read: 'The defendants' motion for release on bail pending appeal is denied.' State v. Abbott, R.I., 355 A.2d 410 (1976). Thereafter, the defendants filed a habeas corpus petition in the District Court of the United States for the District of Rhode Island, in which they alleged that our one-sentence denial of their bail request violated their due process rights. On November 8, 1976, the District Court granted the writ but stayed its enforcement for 10 days pending our response bail or furnish the rationale for our denial. or furnish the rationale for our denial. We will not grant bail, but we do welcome this unique opportunity to set forth the facts which prompted us to say 'No' to the defendants' bail request.
Abbott and Freeman were indicted in September 1969 on charges of rape, kidnapping, sodomy, and robbery, and as the District Court has so aptly observed, the travel of the case became 'complicated.' We would go one step further and say that there have been times following the return of these indictments when the defense, prosecution, and, yes, even the judiciary have been immersed in a procedural quagmire.
In February 1973 defendants appeared before a justice of the Superior Court, and as a result of some plea bargaining the robbery charge was reduced to larceny. The defendants then pleaded 'nolo' to all charges because the bargain called for the deferral of sentencing on the rape and kidnapping charges, the imposition of a 7-year suspended sentence on the sodomy charges, and the serving by each defendant of a 2-to 3-year prison sentence for the larceny. Subsequent events caused the sentencing justice to nullify the bargain. He ordered a withdrawal of the nolo pleas and a restoration of the not guilty pleas. The defendants sought an immediate review of this action in this court by certiorari. We denied their petition. State v. Freeman, 111 R.I. 937, 307 A.2d 542 (1973).
In October 1973 defendants went to trial, and the jury returned guilty verdicts on the rape and kidnapping charges and not guilty verdicts on the sodomy and larceny charges. The trial justice imposed a 10-year sentence on the rape charges and deferred sentencing on the kidnapping charge. Abbott and Freeman appealed their rape convictions to this court. The trial justice denied their request for bail pending our consideration of their appeals.
The defendants then invoked the provisions of our Rule 9 and came before us on May 10, 1974, and sought release on bail pending our review of the judgments of conviction entered in the Superior Court. We granted the motions of Abbott and Freeman and released them on bail. Later, in State v. Abbott, 113 R.I. 430, 432, 322 A.2d 33, 35 (1974), we first alluded to our holding in Quattrocchi v. Langlois, 100 R.I. 741, 219 A.2d 570 (1966), where we stated that post conviction bail was not a constitutional right but a statutory matter 1 that is directed to the sound judicial discretion of the trial court. We then referred to the 'natural reluctance to incarcerate a person prior to final conviction * * *' and went on to delineate some of the elements that should be considered by a trial court as it considers a defendant's request to be released on bail during the pendency of an appeal.
In mid-January 1976 we decided defendants' appeal. State v. Freeman, 115 R.I. 523, 351 A.2d 824 (1976). Two justices of this court were of the opinion that the sentencing justice erred when he revoked the plea bargaining and reinstated the not guilty pleas. A third justice, in voting to overturn the rape convictions, rested his opinion on the grounds that once defendants' nolo pleas were accepted by the sentencing justice, jeopardy attached and the subsequent trial had violated the constitutional bar against double jeopardy. The two remaining members of this court were of the opinion that the sentencing justice should not be faulted for the actions he had taken.
The remand in the rape cases reads: 'The defendants' appeals are sustained, the judgment of conviction as to each defendant is vacated, the sentence imposed is set aside and the cause is remitted to the Superior Court with directions that sentence be imposed on each defendant in accordance with the commitment made as to sentence as a result of the plea bargaining agreement.' State v. Freeman, 115 R.I. 523, 535, 351 A.2d 824, 830 (1976). 2 The cases were remanded to the Superior Court, and on March 8, 1976, defendants presented themselves for sentencing. They appeared before the same justice who in February of 1973 had expressed his willingness to go along with the bargain that had been worked out by defendants' counsel and the prosecution. The justice, in following the dictate of our remand as he saw it, adhered to his earlier commitment in all its respects. He reinstated all of the nolo pleas, deferred sentencing on the rape and kidnapping charges, imposed a 7-year suspended sentence on the sodomy charges, and an immediate 2-to 3-year prison term for defendants' involvement with the larceny.
The defendants quite understandably offered no objection to the sentencing justice's deferral of the rape sentences, but they took vehement issue with reinstatement of the sodomy and larceny facets of the original package. The sentencing justice rejected defendants' objection to the reimposition of the suspended sentences and the 2-to 3-year prison sentences, and he denied their request for bail pending their appeal to this court. Thereupon, they came to this court seeking a stay and bail. We denied the request for a stay and heard oral argument on the bail request. Our denial of bail caused defendants to seek habeas corpus in the District Court.
In the District Court defendants argued that our 1976 denial of their request for bail was 'as arbitrary and capricious an action as could be postulated' because they were the same two people who were...
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State v. Feng, 77-274-M
...Feng applied to this court for bail. He urged us to consider the implications of our observation in State v. Abbott, 117 R.I. 214, 220, 366 A.2d 1132, 1135 (1976) (Abbott II) that "(T)his court has never granted bail to an individual who has sought what for all intents and purposes is post ......
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State v. Abbott
...appeal from the Superior Court denial of postconviction relief under G.L.1956 (1969 Reenactment) §§ 10-9.1-2 and 10-9.1-9. State v. Abbott, R.I., 366 A.2d 1132 (1976). The facts of this case are complicated and are set forth herein with minimum embellishment. The defendants were indicted in......
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State v. Donald Plotnick, 85-LW-3192
... ... has had further review denied both by the highest court of ... the State and the Supreme Court of the United States, should ... at that time begin service of his sentence." ... See, ... also, State v. Abbott (1976), 117 R.I. 214, ... 366 A.2d 1132 ... The ... further suspension of execution of appellant's sentence ... is precluded not only by the Ohio Rules of Criminal ... Procedure, but also by applicable sections of the Ohio ... Revised Code, which are ... ...
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State v. Giorgi
...never granted bail to an individual who has sought what for all intents and purposes is post conviction relief." State v. Abbott and Freeman, R.I., 366 A.2d 1132, 1135 (1976). Accordingly, the motion of the defendant for release on bail pending appeal is ...