State v. Abracadabra Bail Bonds
| Decision Date | 07 January 1998 |
| Docket Number | No. 22498,22498 |
| Parties | STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Samuel Rocha, Defendant, and ABRACADABRA BAIL BONDS, Real Party in Interest-Appellant. |
| Court | Idaho Court of Appeals |
Lojek & Strother, Chartered, Boise, for real party in interest-appellant. Jeffrey A. Strother argued.
Alan G. Lance, Attorney General, Craig G. Bledsoe, Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for plaintiff-respondent. Craig G. Bledsoe argued.
In this appeal, Abracadabra Bail Bonds alleges several claims of error by the district court in the proceedings below. First, Abracadabra asserts that the district court erred in denying its motion for exoneration of a bail bond. Second, Abracadabra contends that the district court erred in finding it in contempt and in revoking Abracadabra's privilege to conduct business in the Third Judicial District. Finally, Abracadabra claims that the district court erred in sanctioning Abracadabra's attorney. 1 We affirm the district court's order denying exoneration. We reverse the district court's holding Abracadabra
in contempt, but we decline to address the imposition of sanctions against Abracadabra's attorney below.
A criminal complaint was filed September 26, 1994, charging Samuel Rocha with one count of felony delivery of a controlled substance. Rocha's preliminary hearing was set for October 4, 1994, and bail was set. On September 28, 1994, Rocha was released on a $50,000 bond issued by Abracadabra.
On October 4, 1994, at the time scheduled for the preliminary hearing, the magistrate and counsel for Rocha were advised by the prosecutor that a superseding indictment had been issued on September 29, 1994, charging Rocha with one count of delivery of a controlled substance and one count of trafficking in methamphetamine. The magistrate therefore ordered Rocha's case continued for arraignment before the district court on November 4, 1994.
Rocha was not present at the time scheduled for the preliminary hearing. The magistrate was advised by the deputy court clerk that Rocha was in custody on an unrelated matter and was not transported to court. Therefore, the magistrate did not order forfeiture of the bond. Rocha failed to appear at his arraignment on November 4, 1994. The district court ordered forfeiture of the bond and issued a bench warrant for Rocha's arrest. On November 4, 1994, the deputy court clerk sent notice to Abracadabra indicating that the bond was being forfeited pursuant to I.C. § 19-2927.
On December 6, 1994, Abracadabra moved to exonerate its bond. The district court denied Abracadabra's motion on December 14, 1994. On December 29, 1994, Abracadabra moved for reconsideration. On February 24, 1995, Abracadabra moved to extend the time on the bond forfeiture. In this motion, Abracadabra requested that its December 29, 1994, motion for reconsideration be held in abeyance if the motion for extension was granted. The district court granted this motion, extending the time for forfeiture until May 1, 1995. On May 1, 1995, Abracadabra again moved to extend the time on the bond forfeiture. The district court denied the motion, and the deputy court clerk sent another notice to Abracadabra indicating that the bond was forfeited pursuant to I.C. § 19-2927. On August 2, 1995, Abracadabra moved to exonerate its bond, asserting the same arguments raised in its December 6, 1994, motion for exoneration. The district court scheduled a hearing, but on August 23, 1995, denied Abracadabra's motion without conducting the hearing. The district court also sanctioned Abracadabra's attorney in the amount of $500 for filing a repetitive motion. Abracadabra timely appealed this order.
On August 30, 1995, the state moved for a distribution of the bond forfeiture proceeds. The district court granted the state's motion. When Abracadabra failed to pay the forfeited bond, the state moved for an order to show cause why Abracadabra should not be held in contempt. After a hearing, the district court found Abracadabra in contempt for failing to pay the forfeited bond, and revoked Abracadabra's privilege to do business in the Third Judicial District. The district court also ordered Abracadabra to pay the $50,000 bond plus interest. Abracadabra moved for reconsideration which was denied by the district court. Abracadabra then filed an amended notice of appeal to include this order.
Abracadabra asserts that because the magistrate failed to forfeit the bond when Rocha did not appear at the time of his preliminary hearing on October 4, 1994, the district court was precluded from forfeiting Rocha's bond on November 4, 1994, when Rocha failed to appear for his arraignment. Abracadabra further contends that because it did not timely receive written notice of the forfeiture, which, according to Abracadabra, should have occurred within five days of October 4, 1994, the district court erred in denying Abracadabra's motion to exonerate its bail bond.
A bail bond agreement is a suretyship contract between the state on one side and an accused and his or her surety on the other side, whereby the surety guarantees the appearance of an accused. United States v. Vaccaro, 51 F.3d 189, 193 (9th Cir.1995); State v. Ericksons, 106 N.M. 567, 746 P.2d 1099, 1099 (1987); 8 C.J.S. Bail § 4 (1988); 8 AM. JUR. 2D Bail and Recognizance § 1 (1980); see also People v. Tyler, 797 P.2d 22, 24-25 (Colo.1990). The extent of the surety's undertaking is determined by the bond agreement and is subject to the rules of contract law and suretyship. Vaccaro, 51 F.3d at 193; Tyler, 797 P.2d at 24; Ericksons, 746 P.2d at 1099-100. Because it is a contract, existing law becomes part of the contract, as though the contract contains an express provision to that effect. Robinson v. Joint Sch. Dist. # 150, 100 Idaho 263, 265, 596 P.2d 436, 438 (1979) (); Rodriquez v. People, 191 Colo. 540, 554 P.2d 291, 293 (1976) ().
Idaho Code Section 19-2927 and Idaho Criminal Rule 46 govern bail forfeiture and exoneration. Idaho Code Section 19-2927, prior to its 1996 amendment, stated, in part:
If, without sufficient excuse, the defendant neglects to appear for arraignment or for trial or judgment, or upon any other occasion when his presence in court may be lawfully required, or to surrender himself in execution of the judgment, the court must direct the fact to be entered upon its minutes and the undertaking of bail, or the money deposited instead of bail, as the case may be, is thereupon declared forfeited. The clerk shall mail written notice within five (5) days of the forfeiture for failure to appear to the last known address of the person posting the undertaking of bail. A failure to give timely notice shall exonerate the bail or undertaking. If at any time within ninety (90) days after such entry in the minutes, the defendant appears and satisfactorily excuses his neglect, the court may direct the forfeiture of the undertaking or the deposit to be discharged upon such terms as may be just.
If within ninety (90) days of the date of forfeiture, a person, other than the defendant, who has provided bail for the defendant, brings the defendant before the court, the court shall direct that the forfeiture of the undertaking or deposit be discharged.
Idaho Criminal Rule 46, prior to its 1995 and 1996 revisions, stated, in part:
(e) Forfeiture and enforcement of bail bond. The court which set the amount of a bail bond may order the forfeiture and enforcement of the bail bond in any of the following manners:
(1) In the event th[at] a person fails to appear before the court at the time required as a condition to bail, and the court finds that said failure to appear is without sufficient excuse, or where no evidence is presented which would provide sufficient excuse[, t]he court may ex parte forfeit the bail or bail bond and may issue a bench warrant or the court may ex parte forfeit the bail or bail bond and delay the issuance of a bench warrant for 90 days.
....
(g) Exoneration of bail. When the conditions of bail have been satisfied, or if the clerk fails to mail a written notice to the person posting the undertaking of the bail within five (5) days of the order of forfeiture, the court shall then discharge the bail, exonerate sureties, and release any cash bonds or property deposited with the court. If the defendant appears or is brought before the court within ninety (90) days after the order forfeiting bail, the court shall rescind the order of forfeiture and shall exonerate the bond.
As provided in I.C. § 19-2927 and Rule 46(e)(1), the trial court's decision to forfeit a defendant's bail depends on whether there was a sufficient excuse for the defendant's failure to appear. Whether a sufficient excuse has been presented is within the sound discretion of the trial court. State v. Fry, 128 Idaho 50, 54, 910 P.2d 164, 168 (Ct.App.1994). When a trial court's discretionary decision in a criminal case is reviewed on appeal, the appellate court conducts a multi-tiered inquiry to determine: (1) whether the lower court correctly perceived the issue as A similar issue was recently presented before the California Court of Appeals in County of Los Angeles v. Ranger Ins. Co., 48 Cal.App.4th 992, 56 Cal.Rptr.2d 25 (1996). 2 In Ranger, Mohammed Habibullah had been charged with several sex-related offenses and was released on an appearance bond secured by Ranger Insurance Company. At the time of his trial, Habibullah failed to appear. Several of his relatives advised the trial court that Habibullah had died and presented his death certificate to the trial court. The trial court did not forfeit Habibullah's bail, but continued the matter to determine whether Habibullah was, in fact, dead....
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