State v. Abrego
| Decision Date | 01 December 2021 |
| Docket Number | 21-KA-166 |
| Citation | 334 So.3d 883 |
| Parties | STATE of Louisiana v. Candido Beltran ABREGO |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Louisiana — District of US |
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE, STATE OF LOUISIANA, Honorable Paul D. Connick, Jr., Metairie, LA, Thomas J. Butler, Matthew R. Clauss, Joshua K. Vanderhooft
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT, CANDIDO BELTRAN ABREGO, A. Bruce Netterville
Panel composed of Judges Fredericka Homberg Wicker, Robert A. Chaisson, and Stephen J. Windhorst
Defendant, Candido Beltran Abrego, appeals his conviction and sentence for possession with intent to distribute cocaine. He specifically challenges the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress evidence and denial of his "Opposition to State's Motion to Seal and Request for Full Disclosure." In addition, defendant complains about the imposition of a duplication of records cost. For the reasons that follow, we find that defendant's arguments are either without merit or not properly before this Court for review. As such, we affirm defendant's conviction and sentence.
On July 30, 2019, the Jefferson Parish District Attorney filed a bill of information charging defendant with possession with intent to distribute cocaine weighing twenty-eight grams or greater, in violation of La. R.S. 40:967(A). Defendant pled not guilty at his arraignment. Thereafter, he filed various pre-trial motions, including motions to suppress evidence and statement. Following a hearing, the trial court denied defendant's motions to suppress.
On November 9, 2020, defendant withdrew his plea of not guilty and, after being advised of his rights, pled guilty as charged. In accordance with the plea agreement, the trial court sentenced defendant to five years imprisonment at hard labor, suspended the sentence, and placed defendant on active probation for three years subject to various conditions. Defendant now appeals.
In his first assignment of error, defendant asserts that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence. He contends that the information provided to the police by the two informants was insufficient to justify the stop of defendant's vehicle and that all evidence seized as a result of that illegal stop should be suppressed.
At the September 2, 2020 suppression hearing, Agent John Wiebelt of the Jefferson Parish Sheriff's Office testified regarding the circumstances surrounding the stop and subsequent arrest of defendant on May 6, 2019. Agent Wiebelt recounted that in April of 2019, while participating in a joint narcotics operation with the Homeland Security Investigations Team, the agents received information that defendant was distributing quantities of cocaine from a residence located at 1930 South I-10 Service Road in Metairie. The agents were also advised that defendant drove a Chevrolet Silverado with a specific license plate number. During the course of this investigation, Agent Wiebelt established that defendant "had ties" to that residence and that the identified vehicle was registered to him. Further, Agent Wiebelt relayed that during the agents’ surveillance, they saw defendant "freely come and go" between the residence on the I-10 Service Road and another residence west of that house located at 535 Hesper Avenue in Metairie.
According to Agent Wiebelt, on May 6, 2019, he received information from a different source that defendant would be departing his home between 8:00 p.m. and 8:30 p.m. with the specific intent to distribute a quantity of cocaine to someone. Pursuant to that information, Agent Wiebelt and other officers set up surveillance on defendant's residence. The officers observed defendant go back and forth between the two residences in question, exit the residence at 1930 South I-10 Service Road between 8:00 p.m. and 8:30 p.m., enter his vehicle, and depart that location.
Shortly thereafter, the officers conducted a stop of defendant's vehicle using a "box maneuver."1 During his testimony, Agent Wiebelt acknowledged that he did not see defendant commit any traffic violation but decided to conduct an "investigatory stop based on the information [he] had received and his actions corroborating that." Once the vehicle was stopped, Agent Wiebelt asked defendant and the other two occupants to exit the vehicle. After they complied with his request, Agent Wiebelt observed, from his position standing by the open doorway to the vehicle, "a cup in the cup holder on the console, no lid, and had a quantity of cocaine in it in a bag."
At that point, a canine trained in the detection of narcotics arrived and "hit" on the vehicle. As a result, the possible cocaine was seized from the vehicle, and Agent Wiebelt performed a preliminary field test on the substance. Following a positive result for the presence of cocaine, Agent Wiebelt arrested defendant and conducted a search of his person incident to arrest. During this search, Agent Wiebelt located an additional quantity of cocaine, currency, and a cell phone, all of which were seized.
Agent Wiebelt then obtained search warrants for the two Metairie residences associated with defendant. He and other officers executed the warrants and found items of evidentiary value in both homes. Defendant was thereafter transported to the investigation bureau, and after being advised of and waiving his Miranda2 rights, he provided a recorded statement, in which he claimed ownership of the seized cocaine and paraphernalia.
During the course of his examination, Agent Wiebelt answered affirmatively when asked whether the first informant had given him or another officer information in the past that led to the arrest and/or conviction of other persons. However, he acknowledged that he did not have personal knowledge of those arrests and/or convictions. Agent Wiebelt further stated that he worked with several other officers and agents in this investigation and that they shared information regarding the reliability of the informant. During his testimony, Agent Wiebelt asserted that he did not know the first informant's motivation or whether he had been paid for his information.
With regard to the other source, Agent Wiebelt testified that the second informant had not given him information in the past that led to the arrest and/or conviction of other persons, and he did not know if that informant had provided such information to other officers. Further, Agent Wiebelt stated that he did not know if the second informant was motivated by the promise of money or assistance in criminal cases.
Agent Jose Garcia, a deportation officer with Immigration and Customs Enforcement, also testified at the suppression hearing about his involvement in the case, which consisted of translating defendant's interview with Agent Wiebelt. Agent Garcia stated that he translated defendant's Miranda rights into Spanish, that defendant initialed next to each right on the form and signed the form, indicating that he understood his rights and wished to waive them. Further, Agent Garcia maintained that neither he nor Agent Wiebelt forced, coerced, threatened, or induced defendant to waive his rights.3
Following argument of the State and defense counsel, the court deferred ruling and gave both parties time to submit memorandum. Thereafter, the trial court denied defendant's motions to suppress evidence and statement. Defendant now challenges the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress evidence.
On appeal, defendant contends that the information provided to the police by the two informants was insufficient to justify the stop of defendant's vehicle and that all evidence seized as a result of that illegal stop should be suppressed. He points out that the information provided by the informants was not corroborated, that the officers did not observe defendant commit a traffic violation or any other illegal activity prior to the stop, and that the officer who testified at the suppression hearing could not provide any information as to the informants’ veracity, reliability, or basis of knowledge.
In response, the State asserts that the police had sufficient reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigatory stop of defendant and his vehicle. The State notes that the confidential informant's tip, along with the anonymous source's tip, provided the agents with the requisite reasonable suspicion to conduct the stop because the confidential informant was reliable, the agents substantially corroborated the two tips, and the anonymous source's tip contained predictive information regarding defendant's future behavior.
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article 1, § 5 of the Louisiana Constitution protect individuals against unreasonable searches and seizures. However, the right of law enforcement officers to stop and interrogate those reasonably suspected of engaging in criminal activity is recognized by La. C.Cr.P. art. 215.1, as well as by state and federal jurisprudence. Terry v. Ohio , 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968) ; State v. Belton , 441 So.2d 1195 (La. 1983), cert. denied , 466 U.S. 953, 104 S.Ct. 2158, 80 L.Ed.2d 543 (1984). The Terry standard, as codified in La. C.Cr.P. art. 215.1, authorizes police officers to stop a person in a public place whom they reasonably suspect is committing, has committed, or is about to commit an offense and demand that the person identify himself and explain his actions. State v. Molette , 11-384 (La. App. 5 Cir. 11/29/11), 79 So.3d 484, 489. Reasonable suspicion, which is something less than probable cause to arrest, requires that police officers have sufficient knowledge of facts and circumstances to justify an infringement of the individual's right to be free from government interference. Absent reasonable suspicion, an investigatory stop is illegal, and the evidence seized as a result is inadmissible. State v. Leonard , 11-363 (La. App. 5 Cir. 11/15/11), 80 So.3d 535, 542, writ denied , 12-14 (La. 8/22/12), 97 So.3d...
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State v. Gilbert
...art. 215.1, as well as by state and federal jurisprudence. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968); State v. Abrego, 334 So.3d at 888. Terry standard, as codified in La. C.Cr.P. art. 215.1, authorizes police officers to stop a person in a public place whom they reaso......