State v. Acrey
| Decision Date | 27 February 2003 |
| Docket Number | No. 72259-5.,72259-5. |
| Citation | 148 Wash.2d 738,64 P.3d 594 |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
| Parties | STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Adam Lamour ACREY, Petitioner. |
Nielsen, Broman & Assoc., Christopher Gibson, Seattle, WA, for Petitioner.
Norm Maleng, King County Prosecutor, Daniel Clark, Deputy, Seattle, WA, for Respondent.
Petitioner Adam Lamour Acrey, a juvenile born March 4, 1988, seeks discretionary review of a decision of the Court of Appeals, Division One,2 which affirmed his disposition in the King County Superior Court, Juvenile Division, for possession of cocaine and marijuana in violation of the Uniform Controlled Substances Act under RCW 69.50.401(d) and 69.50.401(e) and an order denying his motion to suppress evidence.
The Court of Appeals concluded that Respondent State of Washington, acting in its community caretaking function, was lawfully entitled to briefly detain Petitioner, a 12-year-old minor, on the streets in a commercial area of Renton shortly after midnight to contact his mother by telephone and that a search of Petitioner's person was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. We granted review. We affirm.
The sole question in this case is whether the Court of Appeals was correct in affirming a decision of the trial court concluding that, under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, the "community caretaking function" exception to the warrant requirement permits police officers to detain a 12-year-old minor on a city street in a commercial area after midnight while they contact his mother after lawfully stopping him and determining he was not involved in criminal activity.
Petitioner Adam Lamour Acrey, a 12-year-old minor, was charged by information in the King County Superior Court, Juvenile Division, on September 20, 2000 with possession of cocaine in violation of the Uniform Controlled Substances Act under RCW 69.50.401(d).3 The information was amended to add a second count charging possession of less than 40 grams of marijuana in violation of RCW 69.50.401(e).4
On October 16, 2000, Petitioner filed a motion to suppress evidence of cocaine and marijuana seized by a Renton police officer, arguing the officer unlawfully detained and searched him.5 During a fact-finding hearing in the Juvenile Court on October 23, 2000 the Honorable Julie Spector denied the motion6 and on November 17, 2000 signed written findings of fact and conclusions of law in compliance with Criminal Rule (CrR) 3.6 and Juvenile Court Rule (JuCR) 7.11(d).
On September 18, 2000, in Renton, Washington, at approximately 12:41 in the morning, Renton Police Officers James D. Gould and Tracy Wilkinson, along with other police officers, responded to an anonymous 911 telephone call reporting juveniles fighting in a commercial area along Rainier Avenue North just south of the 900 block. When Officer Gould arrived in the area he observed five male youths who appeared quite young and fit the description provided by the anonymous caller. He stopped the youths and asked if they had been fighting. They responded they had merely been playing around and were walking to a 7-Eleven convenience store located approximately four to five miles away.
The officers concluded no one had been fighting, no one was injured, and no criminal activity was underway. But since it was after midnight on a week night in a commercial area with no open businesses and no nearby residences, the officers asked for the boys' names and home telephone numbers. They directed the boys to sit on the sidewalk while the officers called their homes.7
Petitioner falsely identified himself as "Jubuare Davison," but did give his correct telephone number and his mother's name, Ms. Jennifer Landgraf. Officer Wilkinson telephoned Ms. Landgraf, who provided Petitioner's correct name and asked the officers to bring him home because she did not have an automobile. Honoring her request, Officer Wilkinson asked Officer Gould to transport Petitioner home.
Before placing Petitioner in his patrol car, following standard police procedure, Officer Gould made a pat-down search of Petitioner for weapons, despite not then believing Petitioner was armed. He felt something at the bottom of Petitioner's pants leg and asked what it was. Petitioner said it was money, but because it did not feel like money, Officer Gould removed a rubber band securing the object to Petitioner's ankle. Coins, paper money, and two baggies of green vegetable matter then fell from Petitioner's pants leg. Officer Gould immediately recognized the vegetable matter as marijuana. He placed Petitioner under arrest. A search incident to the arrest uncovered more packaged marijuana, money, and crack cocaine in Petitioner's pants and right sock.
The juvenile court, Judge Julie Spector, found that the officers had reasonable cause to stop Petitioner to investigate a fight and had lawful grounds to extend the stop to call Petitioner's mother as part of their community caretaking function.8 The court also ruled that the police officers were permitted to pat-down search Petitioner out of concern for safety before placing him in the patrol vehicle and that removing the objects from Petitioner's ankle was within the proper scope of that search.
After admitting the evidence, including the evidence obtained incident to the arrest, the trial court held a disposition hearing on November 17, 2000.9 The court found Petitioner "guilty" of both counts of violation of the Uniform Controlled Substances Act. The court imposed a disposition of 2 months of community supervision and 8 hours of community service. Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals, Division One. The Court of Appeals, the Honorable Anne L. Ellington writing, affirmed Petitioner's disposition and the order denying his motion to suppress the cocaine and marijuana evidence.10 Petitioner claimed the drugs were the fruit of an illegal search and seizure. The court disagreed and concluded that (1) the initial detaining of Petitioner was reasonable under Terry v. Ohio,11 (2) the continued detaining of Petitioner while the officers telephoned his mother was reasonable under the "community caretaking function" exception to the warrant requirement, and (3) the protective pat-down search of Petitioner before the officers placed him in the patrol vehicle for transportation home as requested by his mother was reasonable under State v. Wheeler.12
Petitioner sought review by this court. In his petition and his supplemental brief, Petitioner raised only the issue of the validity of his detention by police officers while they telephoned his mother.13 Review was granted on September 6, 2002.
Petitioner filed a motion to suppress the cocaine and marijuana evidence in the King County Superior Court, Juvenile Division. The court denied the motion and on November 17, 2000 signed findings of fact and conclusions of law in compliance with Criminal Rule (CrR) 3.6 and Juvenile Court Rule (JuCR) 7.11(d). In reviewing findings of fact on a motion to suppress, this court "`will review only those facts to which error has been assigned.'"14 Petitioner has not assigned error to the findings of fact. We therefore treat them as verities.15 This court reviews "conclusions of law in an order pertaining to suppression of evidence de novo."16
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees the "right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures."17 Generally, under the Fourth Amendment, a police officer's seizure of either evidence of a crime in a constitutionally protected area or seizure of a crime suspect must be supported by a judicial warrant based on probable cause.18 A warrantless seizure is therefore presumed unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.19 Nevertheless, it is also well-settled that this presumption of unreasonableness may be rebutted by a showing that a specific exception to the warrant requirement applies in the case under consideration.20 "The State bears the burden of showing a seizure without a warrant falls within one of these exceptions."21
Respondent State of Washington argues, and Petitioner concedes,22 that the initial approach and warrantless detention of Petitioner was permissible as an investigative stop under Terry v. Ohio.23 Respondent also asserts the continued warrantless detention of Petitioner after police officers determined Petitioner was not involved in any criminal activity was permissible under the "community caretaking function" exception to the warrant requirement.
Among those categorical exceptions to the warrant requirement in which it is predetermined that a warrantless seizure is reasonable are brief investigative stops, also referred to as "stop and frisk" searches or "Terry stops." A police officer may conduct an investigative stop based upon less evidence than is needed for probable cause to make an arrest.24 A brief investigative stop is permissible whenever the police officer has a reasonable suspicion, grounded in specific and articulable facts, that the person stopped has been or is about to be involved in a crime.25
In evaluating the reasonableness of an investigative stop, courts consider the totality of the circumstances, including the officer's training and experience, the location of the stop, and the conduct of the person detained.26 Other factors that may be considered in determining whether a stop was reasonable include "the purpose of the stop, the amount of physical intrusion upon the suspect's liberty, and the length of time the suspect is detained."27
A lawful Terry stop is limited in scope and duration to fulfilling the investigative purpose of the stop.28 If the results of...
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...than the Fourth Amendment, our state constitution generally requires a stronger showing by the State.") (citing State v. Acrey, 148 Wash.2d 738, 746-47, 64 P.3d 594 (2003) ).12 See United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 201-02, 122 S. Ct. 2105, 153 L. Ed. 2d 242 (2002) (explaining the Four......
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