State v. Adams

• Decision Date: 02 March 1917
• Docket Number: 13545.
• Citation: 95 Wash. 189,163 P. 403
• Parties: STATE v. ADAMS.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

163 P. 403

95 Wash. 189

STATE v. ADAMS.

No. 13545.

Supreme Court of Washington

March 2, 1917

Department 1. Appeal from Superior Court, King County; John S. Jurey Judge.

Frank Adams was convicted of causing and contributing to dependency of a female child under 18 years of age, and he appeals. Affirmed.

Wm. R Bell, of Seattle, for appellant.

Alfred H. Lundin, Frank P. Helsell, and John D. Carmody, all of Seattle, for the State.

WEBSTER J.

Appellant Frank Adams, was charged jointly with Josie Lytle with the commission of the crime of encouraging, causing, and contributing to the dependency of a female child under the age of 18 years, and, from a judgment of conviction, prosecutes this appeal.

When the state called its first witness, appellant objected to the introduction of any evidence upon the ground that the information failed to state facts sufficient to constitute a crime. The court overruled the objection, and this ruling is assigned for error. The charging part of the information, omitting the name of the prosecutrix, is as follows:

'They, said Josie Lytle and Frank Adams, and each of them, in the county of King, state of Washington, on the 19th day of July, 1915, did then and there willfully and unlawfully encourage, cause and contribute to the dependency of one * * * a female child of the age of sixteen years, by putting said * * * in danger of growing up to lead an idle, dissolute and immoral life, in this, that said Josie Lytle and Frank Adams, and each of them, did cause and encourage said * * * to resort to a drinking saloon in the city of Seattle and known as 'Overland Café,' and then and there did cause and encourage said * * * to drink intoxicating liquors, and did then and there encourage and solicit said * * * to resort to a room in a hotel known as the 'Detroit Hotel' in said city of Seattle, with the said Josie Lytle and Frank Adams, and each of them, for immoral purposes.'

The applicable provisions of section 17, c. 160, Session Laws 1913, p. 531 (3 Rem. & Bal. Code, § 1987-17), upon which the information is predicated, reads as follows:

'In all cases where any child shall be dependent or delinquent under the terms of this act, the parent or parents, legal guardian or person having custody of such child, or any other person who shall by any act or omission, encourage, cause or contribute to the dependency or delinquency of such child shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.'

Appellant insists that under this statute the state must allege and prove two elements, namely: (1) That the child in question was impressed with the character of dependency as defined by the juvenile court law prior to the commission by the defendant of the acts charged in the information; and (2) that the acts charged to have been committed by the defendant contributed to that already existing state or condition of dependency.

The state contends that it is a crime under this statute to be the initial cause of a child's dependency, and that in such case it is not necessary either to allege or prove that the child was dependent prior to the commission of the acts with which the accused is charged. It must be conceded that the statute is unfortunately worded, and that a literal and narrow interpretation of the language employed lends support to appellant's view; but in construing the section we must not lose sight of the fact that it is a part of the juvenile court law, and the beneficent purposes of that law must constantly be kept in mind.

While the case before us involves a charge of a crime, and the statute is to be construed with all the strictness of a criminal law, yet in arriving at a proper construction we are not required to close our eyes to the broad underlying policy and the dominant purpose of the whole law of which the section under consideration is a part. It should require cogent and compelling reasons to induce us to convict the Legislature of enacting a law for the protection of children after they have reached a state of dependency or delinquency as defined by the act, but of wholly neglecting to provide protection for children who have not reached that state or condition. To sustain appellant's contention it would be necessary to hold that the Legislature, by the enactment under consideration, had made it criminal for one to commit an act or series of acts which would contribute toward making a bad child worse, but that it did not make punishable the same act or acts when they caused a good child to become bad.

It is inconceivable that the Legislature intended, by section 17, to render dispunishable one who causes a female juvenile to depart from the path of rectitude and virtue, but intended to make it criminal for one subsequently to contribute to the continuance of the deplorable condition of the child which had been brought about by the initial wrongful act. To so construe the section would be to read out of it the word 'cause,' which is perhaps the strongest word in the section. If the state of dependency of the child must exist prior to the commission of the acts with which the defendant is charged, how can such acts be said to cause that dependency? It is difficult to conceive how a subsequent act can be the cause of a pre-existing condition.

It seems clear to us from the language of the section, viewed in the light of the wholesome and beneficent purpose of the whole enactment, that it was the intention of the Legislature to place before the children of the state a strong shield of protection by declaring that no one shall do any act which shall place a child in danger of growing up to lead an idle, dissolute, or immoral life, or who shall cause or encourage a child to do any act, the commission of which would render the child either dependent or delinquent, as defined by the act.

It is not so much the purpose of section 17 to punish crime as it is to protect children, and it is manifest that its purpose is to prevent children from becoming delinquent or dependent as well as to assist in reclaiming children after they have reached that condition. The fundamental idea of the juvenile court law is to protect...