State v. Adams
| Decision Date | 30 June 1950 |
| Citation | 257 Wis. 433,43 N.W.2d 446 |
| Parties | STATE, v. ADAMS. |
| Court | Wisconsin Supreme Court |
Bassuener, Humke, Poole & Axel, Sheboygan, for appellant.
Thomas E. Fairchild, Atty. Gen., William A. Platz, Asst. Atty. Gen., Fred G. Dicke, Dist. Atty., Manitowoc, for respondent.
Defendant was charged with the violation of sec. 351.22, Stats. (abortion), and sec. 340.095 (). Four counts under the repeater statutes were also included in the information. For the consideration of the issues raised by him it is not necessary to set out in detail a statement of the facts.
Upon his direct examination defendant testified to four previous convictions. Upon his cross-examination he was again asked by the district attorney as to each of the convictions. The district attorney's question in each case included a reference to the nature of the offense--abortion. The court overruled an objection in each case and defendant was permitted to answer.
Defendant contends that the court erred in so ruling. His objection is based upon the ground that nothing more than the mere fact of a conviction may be shown, and that it was error to permit the district attorney to include in the inquiry a reference to the nature of the offense which resulted in the convictions.
This court has consistently held that proof of a former conviction of a defendant in a criminal action may be received but that nothing except the mere fact of conviction may be shown. Paulson v. State, 118 Wis. 89, 94 N.W. 771; Rice v. State, 195 Wis. 181, 217 N.W. 697; Smith v. State, 195 Wis. 555, 218 N.W. 822. Such testimony has been permitted solely for the purpose of going to the credibility of the witness. In Rice v. State, supra, an effort was made by the district attorney to go beyond the mere proof of the conviction and to show the nature of the offense upon which it was had. The court held that to inject proof beyond the mere fact of conviction was highly prejudicial. In Paulson v. State, supra, the court said: 'From the time when advancing civilization began to recognize that the purpose and end of a criminal trial is as much to discharge the innocent accused as to punish the guilty, it has been held that evidence against him should be confined to the very offense charged, and that neither general bad character nor commission of other specific disconnected acts, whether criminal or merely meretricious, could be proved against him.' [118 Wis. 89, 94 N.W. 774.]
When the defendant admitted upon his direct examination that he had been previously convicted the entire purpose of the rule permitting proof of previous convictions had been accomplished and there was no occasion or need for either the defendant or the district attorney to go into further detail. 'Proof of a fact is dispensed with when its existence is admitted.' Meyers v. State, 193 Wis. 126, 213 N.W. 645. The purpose of the rule is not to prejudice the minds of the jury by showing that the defendant had been guilty of another crime, particularly, as in this case, the same crime for which he was on trial.
The state contends that sec. 325.19, Stats., permits such additional inquiry. The statute provides: 'A person who has been convicted of a criminal offense is, notwithstanding, a competent witness, but the conviction may be proved to affect his credibility, either by the record or by his own cross-examination, upon which he must answer any question relevant to that inquiry, and the party cross-examining him is not concluded by his answer.'
If the statute must be construed so as to require the defendant to answer as to the nature of the offense with which he had been charged such authority extends only when the evidence of a previous conviction has been brought out upon the cross-examination of the defendant or by the record. Where the defendant himself testifies upon his direct examination to previous convictions the statute is not applicable.
The many cases decided by this court holding that the state may not go beyond the proof of the mere conviction, and the fact that all of the cases decided by this court have been considered since enactment of the statute compel us to conclude that we may not go further than to permit inquiry into relevant matters only when the fact of the former conviction has been brought out in the manner described in the statute.
The state relies upon State v. Roberson, 254 Wis. 595, 36 N.W.2d 677. It...
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State v. Dorcey
...neither can the commencement. Commencement and termination must be determined by the particular facts in each case. State v. Adams, 257 Wis. 433, 43 N.W.2d 446 (1950). A conspiracy commences with an agreement between 2 or more persons to direct their conduct toward the realization of a crim......
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Bergeron v. State, 76-534-CR
...law of conspiracy permits the acts and declarations of co-conspirators to bind the other members of the criminal plan. State v. Adams, 257 Wis. 433, 43 N.W.2d 446 (1950) and Schultz v. State, 133 Wis. 215, 225, 113 N.W. 428 (1907). The defendant contends the facts in his case are analogous ......
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