State v. Adams

Citation3 Ohio App.3d 50,443 N.E.2d 1047
Parties, 3 O.B.R. 57 The STATE of Ohio, Appellee, v. ADAMS, Appellant.
Decision Date12 August 1982
CourtUnited States Court of Appeals (Ohio)

Syllabus by the Court

1. The statutory presumption in R.C. 2913.11(B), that an offender is presumed to know a check will be dishonored if he has no account with the drawee bank or if the account contains insufficient funds, may be included in the trial court's instructions to the jury.

2. The statutory presumption in R.C. 2913.11(B) is neither arbitrary nor irrational and does not violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

3. The trial court must adequately instruct the jury on the nature and effect of the rebuttable presumption in a criminal case and the failure to do so is reversible error. (Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 99 S.Ct. 2450, 61 L.Ed.2d 39, followed.)

Michael Miller, Pros. Atty., Alan C. Travis and Karen L. Martin, Columbus, for appellee.

James Kura, County Public Defender, and Gloria Eyerly, Columbus, for appellant.

STRAUSBAUGH, Judge.

This is an appeal by defendant from a conviction in the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas for the offense of passing bad checks, under R.C. 2913.11.

The record indicates that at the beginning of the trial the parties stipulated that state's exhibit 1, check No. 278, was written by defendant on the Columbus Municipal Employees Credit Union, dated and presented to Lazarus Department Store on December 24, 1980. Ceil Shaffer, Lazarus Security Department, testified that she received a check from the return check department of Lazarus on March 11, 1981; that she sent a notice of dishonor, by certified letter, to defendant notifying him that the check had been dishonored and that he had ten days to resolve the matter. The return receipt card signed by defendant was dated March 13, 1981. On March 21, Shaffer called defendant who stated that he did not have the money and to go ahead and file suit, and she suggested that he return the jewelry. Defendant stated that he could not return the jewelry and that he did not have the money to cover the check because he was paying on his Lazarus charge account. On March 27, 1981, Miss Shaffer filed a felony charge. On April 16, 1981, she received two money orders from defendant totaling $250 in envelopes postmarked April 8, 1981. A third money order receipt for $75, dated April 18, 1981 and payable to Lazarus, was produced but Miss Shaffer said, as far as she knew, the third money order had not been received by Lazarus. She stated that the charges would not have been brought against the defendant if he had paid sooner, and that she was not empowered to add the check to his balance on his Lazarus charge account as he had suggested.

Delores Coons, Security Department of the Columbus Municipal Credit Union, testified that a share draft account is similar to a checking account at a bank; that, if the share draft account is overdrafted, funds, if available, could be transferred from the customer's savings account but otherwise payment of the check is stopped; that the credit union has authority to close an account after three overdraft reports have been made; that the first letter notifying defendant of the overdrafts was sent November 3, 1980; that the last two letters were sent December 1, 1980, when the account was closed; that she sent defendant a notice by regular mail that his account had been closed due to three or more overdrafts; and that, on December 8, 1980, a deposit of $240 was made in defendant's checking account.

She further testified that the credit union's statement ending November 30, 1980 reflected eleven bad checks and a share balance of minus $858.79, the amount of the checks not honored in defendant's account. She stated that defendant did not contact her about the letters or the closing of his account, and that the defendant did not have a share draft account at the credit union on December 24, 1980, when he wrote the Lazarus check.

Following the resting by the state of its case, the defendant testified on his own behalf stating that he was twenty-nine years old; that he had lived at 915 Atcheson for two and one-half years; that he lived there with his former wife, a fire fighter, when he opened the account at the credit union; that eight or nine checks bounced around October or November; and that he started sending money orders to cover the checks after he found out about December 28 that his share in the draft account had been closed. He stated that he did not recall receiving notice that his account had been closed and that, when he purchased the necklace at Lazarus on December 24, 1980, he was unaware his account was closed and denied any intent to defraud. He stated that he had prior convictions for aggravated menacing, petty theft, mail theft and unauthorized use of property. He said that he received the notice of dishonor from Lazarus and sent two money orders, dated March 24 and March 28, to them but that they were returned for insufficient postage and that he mailed them again in different envelopes; that the money order dated March 24 was mailed on that day, eleven days after he received the notice of dishonor; and that his wife wrote three of the bad checks in November, and that he wrote the other eight.

After closing argument, the jury was charged and began deliberating. Later, the jury requested that the law of the case be re-read to them as there was some confusion. That portion of the charge relating to the law was read and the jury again retired. The jury returned a verdict of guilty from which defendant appeals.

Defendant brings four assignments of error:

"1. The trial court erred in instructing the jury on the statutory presumptions found in Revised Code Section 2913.11 because the presumptions had been rebutted by the defendant, and under Ohio law the presumptions disappeared from the case, and the court should not have mentioned them to the jury.

"2. The trial court erred in instructing the jury on the statutory presumptions in Revised Code Section 2913.11 because they are arbitrary and irrational and therefore a violation of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.

"3. The trial court erred in instructing the jury on the presumptions found in Revised Code Section 2913.11 in that the instructions shifted the burden of proof to the defendant in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's due process requirement that the state must prove every element of a criminal offense beyond a reasonable doubt.

"4. The trial court erred in overruling appellant's motions for acquittal."

At the outset of the trial, the trial court gave the jury instructions, which included instructions on presumption, as follows:

"Now, in this particular case, as I have said before, the Defendant is charged with passing bad checks. Before you can find the Defendant guilty, you must find beyond a reasonable doubt that on or about the 24th day of December, 1980, in Franklin County, the Defendant with the purpose to defraud, issued or caused to be issued a check, knowing that it would be dishonored or that its payment, therefore, would be refused. Knowledge by the Defendant that the check would be dishonored or its payment refused is an essential element of the charge.

"You may infer and indeed there is a presumption that the Defendant knew that the check would be dishonored. If you find, having considered all of the evidence, and find beyond a reasonable doubt that one, the Defendant had no account with the drawee of the check; in this particular case, it is the credit union, you say?

"MR. BOSLEY: Columbus Municipal Credit Union.

"THE COURT: Columbus Municipal Credit Union, either at the time of the issuance of the date set forth in the check, whichever is the latter, or that the check was properly refused payment for in such funds upon presentment within 30 days after issue, or the date set forth in it, whichever was the latter, and that the obligation was not paid or satisfied within ten days after notice of dishonor was received by the Defendant."

Later, during the instructions to the jury following the presentation of evidence and the arguments of counsel, the court included the following instructions in its charge:

"Now, in this particular case, the Defendant is charged with passing a bad check. Before you can find the Defendant guilty, you must find beyond a reasonable doubt that on or about the 24th day of December, 1980, in Franklin County, the Defendant with the purpose to defraud issued or caused to be issued a check knowing that it would be dishonored or its payment refused.

"Knowledge by the Defendant that the check would be dishonored or its payment refused is an essential element of the charge.

"You may infer that the Defendant knew that the check would be dishonored if, after you have considered all of the evidence, you find beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant had no account with the drawee, in this particular case, it was the credit union, and for the life of me, I can't remember the name of the credit union.

"MR. WILLIAMS: Columbus Municipal Employee Federal Credit Union.

"THE COURT: Thank you very much.

"Again, I'll repeat it. If, after you have considered all of the evidence, you find beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant had no account with the Columbus Municipal Credit Union, either at the time of the issue or the date set forth in the check, whichever was the latter, or secondly, that the check was properly refused payment for insufficient funds upon presentment, within 30 days after issue or the date set forth in it, whichever was the latter, and the obligation was not paid or satisfied within ten days after the Notice of Dishonor was received by the Defendant.

"That the Defendant may be presumed to know that a check will be dishonored if it is demonstrated beyond a reasonable doubt he has no account...

To continue reading

Request your trial

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT