State v. Adams
| Decision Date | 27 July 2020 |
| Docket Number | No. 2 CA-CR 2018-0319,2 CA-CR 2018-0319 |
| Parties | THE STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee, v. LAMONT MAPP ADAMS, Appellant. |
| Court | Arizona Court of Appeals |
THIS DECISION DOES NOT CREATE LEGAL PRECEDENT AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED BY APPLICABLE RULES.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
See Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 111(c)(1); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 31.19(e).
Appeal from the Superior Court in Pima County
The Honorable Danelle B. Liwski, Judge
AFFIRMED
Mark Brnovich, Arizona Attorney General
Michael T. O'Toole, Chief Counsel
By Heather A. Mosher, Assistant Attorney General, Tucson
Counsel for Appellee
By Robb P. Holmes, Assistant Legal Defender, Tucson
Counsel for Appellant
MEMORANDUM DECISIONPresiding Judge Eppich authored the decision of the Court, in which Judge Espinosa and Judge Eckerstrom concurred.
¶1 Lamont Mapp Adams appeals from his conviction for first-degree murder. He contends his conviction should be reversed because: (1) the trial court erroneously precluded third-party culpability evidence, (2) the prosecutor committed misconduct by referring to excluded evidence in his closing remarks, (3) the court gave an improper premeditation jury instruction, and (4) the state presented insufficient evidence to prove premeditation. We affirm.
¶2 We view the facts in the light most favorable to upholding Adams' conviction. See State v. Murray, 247 Ariz. 447, ¶ 2 (App. 2019). On Thanksgiving morning in 2017, Adams asked J.R. to say hello to his girlfriend who was waiting for him in a car in the parking lot of an apartment complex. While the three of them were talking, J.R.'s boyfriend, C.S., arrived. J.R. invited C.S. to come over but C.S. demanded that she come to him instead; J.R. went over to talk to C.S. because she noticed he was very upset.
¶3 Adams intervened and confronted C.S. after he saw C.S. poke at J.R. and attempt to grab her in an aggressive manner. C.S. responded by telling Adams, Adams went to the trunk of the car and retrieved a gun. Tensions rose and J.R. was able to slip away after C.S. tried to reach for her again. Adams then ordered J.R. to get into the car with his girlfriend. After C.S. approached the car, Adams' girlfriend put the car in reverse to get out of the parking lot. Adams entered the car but before getting far, he got out of the car and returned to confront C.S. in the street.
¶4 C.S. told Adams to approach him so he could beat him up, and the two confronted each other at close range. Although Adams was fumbling with the gun, C.S. did not appear to be taking him seriously because he was taunting Adams and laughing at him. Adams said the gun was not working because the clip was in backwards. After furtherconfrontation, C.S. sustained a bullet wound that killed him. No witness testified to seeing the shooting.
¶5 After a six-day jury trial, Adams was found guilty of first-degree murder. The trial court sentenced him to natural life in prison, and Adams appealed. We have jurisdiction under A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21(A)(1), 13-4031, and 13-4033(A)(1).
¶6 Adams argues the trial court violated his constitutional right to present a complete defense by precluding third-party culpability evidence. We review the admissibility of proffered third-party culpability evidence for an abuse of discretion, State v. Escalante-Orozco, 241 Ariz. 254, ¶ 62 (2017), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Escalante, 245 Ariz. 135 (2018), but we review alleged constitutional violations de novo, State v. Foshay, 239 Ariz. 271, ¶ 34 (App. 2016).
¶7 A criminal defendant has the constitutional right to present a complete defense, Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319, 331 (2006), and in general "may present evidence that a third party committed the crime for which he is charged," State v. Blakley, 204 Ariz. 429, ¶ 63 (2003). However, "a defendant may not, in the guise of a third-party culpability defense, simply 'throw strands of speculation on the wall and see if any of them will stick.'" State v. Machado, 226 Ariz. 281, n.2 (2011) ). Rules 401 through 403 of the Arizona Rules of Evidence govern the admission of third-party culpability evidence. Id. ¶ 16. Such evidence must first be relevant, that is, it must "tend to create a reasonable doubt as to the defendant's guilt." State v. Gibson, 202 Ariz. 321, ¶ 16 (2002) (emphasis omitted). If the evidence is relevant, it is admissible unless otherwise precluded by the federal or state constitution or by applicable statutes or rules. Ariz. R. Evid. 402. And, the trial court has discretion to exclude relevant third-party culpability evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of "unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence." Ariz. R. Evid. 403. When examining evidence of third-party culpability under Rule 403, we, as does the trial court, view the evidence in the light most favorable to the proponent and maximize its probative value while minimizing its prejudicial effect. State v. Bigger, 227 Ariz. 196, ¶ 42 (App. 2011).
¶8 Before trial, the state filed a motion to preclude some evidence of third-party culpability as "hearsay and speculation," as well as evidence about the victim's past, including allegations that the victim was in a gang and sold drugs. Adams filed a consolidated response to these two motions and narrowed his third-party culpability defense to implicate only J.R. and A.W. Adams alleged that A.W., an acquaintance of C.S., purportedly used to belong to the same gang as C.S., lived in the apartment complex where the shooting occurred, correctly identified to police the caliber of the bullet that had wounded C.S., and had admitted taking C.S.'s backpack after the shooting. At a hearing on these motions, Adams clarified that he sought to introduce, among other things, the following third-party culpability evidence: (1) A.W.'s criminal history, (2) A.W.'s close relationship with C.S. due to an alleged gang affiliation, and (3) specific instances of conduct between J.R. and C.S. We address each in turn.
¶9 At the pretrial hearing, Adams told the court he sought to introduce A.W.'s 2006 felony conviction for armed robbery and various misdemeanor assault convictions to show A.W. had a propensity for violence.1 The state argued that even if this evidence had some probative value it was substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect. The court precluded Adams from asking propensity questions related to A.W.'s prior convictions but allowed Adams to impeach A.W.'s credibility with any prior felony convictions within the past ten years. Adams now argues the trial court abused its discretion by limiting A.W.'s criminal history becauseit showed A.W.'s "capacity for violence" and was therefore relevant to a third-party culpability defense.2
¶10 Although we agree that prior offenses showing an alternate suspect's capacity for violence might be relevant, see Machado, 226 Ariz. 281, ¶¶ 1-7, the trial court did not abuse its discretion here. A.W.'s convictions occurred many years before the murder, and nothing in the record suggests the circumstances of the previous offenses were similar to the shooting in this case or that they were otherwise linked to it. See Blakley, 204 Ariz. 429, ¶¶ 63, 68 ( no abuse of discretion in excluding third-party culpability evidence where third party's prior offenses were not similar to the crime defendant was alleged to have committed). And A.W.'s felony convictions for armed robbery (whether for one count or two counts charged in the same indictment), offenses that can be committed using a simulated weapon and without discharging a firearm, see A.R.S. § 13-1904(A), do not concretely demonstrate such a capacity. Adams has provided no record nor argument explaining any further relevant details about those incidents. Viewed in the light most favorable to Adams, the facts surrounding these prior convictions had little if any tendency to create a reasonable doubt as to his guilt. See Bigger, 227 Ariz. 196, ¶ 43 (). In any event, any relevance was so tenuous and speculative that the evidence was properly excluded under Rule 403. See State v. Dann, 205 Ariz. 557, ¶ 36 (2003) ().
¶11 At the pretrial hearing, Adams also argued that A.W. and C.S.'s prior gang affiliation was relevant to his third-party culpability defense because it showed how close A.W. and C.S. were.3 Adams reasoned this close relationship would show that A.W.'s behavior on theday of the shooting was abnormal because A.W. took C.S.'s backpack after seeing C.S. was shot, did not stay to render aid to C.S., and told police he knew the caliber of the gun used to shoot C.S. In response, the state argued the purported gang affiliation was just a rumor and that this evidence was irrelevant to a third-party culpability defense. The court ruled that Adams could introduce evidence of A.W.'s long-term friendship with C.S. but he could not address a possible gang affiliation because it was irrelevant. Adams now argues the trial court abused its discretion by precluding him from introducing evidence of A.W.'s prior gang membership because this evidence was relevant to show that A.W.'s conduct on the...
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