State v. Adams

• Decision Date: 02 June 2009
• Docket Number: No. 34220.,34220.
• Citation: 216 P.3d 146,147 Idaho 857
• Parties: STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Clayton ADAMS, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Idaho Court of Appeals

216 P.3d 146

147 Idaho 857

STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Clayton ADAMS, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 34220.

Court of Appeals of Idaho.

June 2, 2009.

Review Denied August 20, 2009.

Molly J. Huskey, State Appellate Public Defender; Jason C. Pintler, Deputy Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant. Jason C. Pintler argued.

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; John C. McKinney, Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for respondent. John C. McKinney argued.

LANSING, Chief Judge.

Clayton Adams appeals from his convictions for second degree murder and aggravated battery, asserting that two fundamental errors deprived him of a fair trial. He argues that the district court erred by failing to sua sponte dismiss a juror for cause because she was biased and that the prosecutor committed misconduct during closing argument. He also asserts that his sentences are excessive. We affirm.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURE

Three friends, Tyler Gorley, Stephen Maylin and Mikeal Campbell, were leaving a Caldwell bar at closing time when they ran into Adams and his friend, Sergio Madrigal, outside the entrance. Campbell spoke to Adams, whom he knew, and the group decided to go to a private party at another location, with the intent to buy beer and drop off Maylin at his home along the way. The five men got into Adams' car. According to the State's evidence at Adams' subsequent trial, the following events then unfolded. En route, Adams asked for beer and gas money from Gorley, Maylin and Campbell, and when he was told that they had no money, Adams became enraged. Adams told the men that he had a knife and a gun and that someone was going to get hurt if he was not given money. In an apparent attempt to scare the men into compliance, Adams started driving recklessly, speeding and running stop lights and stop signs. Gorley, Maylin and Campbell demanded to be let out of the car, but Adams initially refused to stop. Eventually, Adams slammed on his brakes in the middle of a rural road, and the three men got out of the car to escape from him. Campbell was successful in doing so but the other two men were not. As Maylin was exiting by the left-rear passenger door, he was met by Adams, who stabbed Maylin once in the side before Maylin got away. Adams then stabbed Gorley five times, killing him. Adams then got back in his car and drove away, with Madrigal still a passenger. The two men then bought beer, unsuccessfully looked for the party and then drove to Adams' home where he was arrested.

Adams was charged with first degree premeditated murder, or in the alternative, first degree felony murder, three counts of attempted robbery, and one count of aggravated battery. The jury acquitted on the first degree murder charges and the attempted robbery charges, but found Adams guilty of the lesser offense of second degree murder and of aggravated battery. The district court imposed a unified life sentence with twenty-five years determinate for second degree murder and a consecutive ten-year sentence with three years determinate for aggravated battery.

Adams appeals from his convictions and asserts two trial errors—that the district court should have sua sponte dismissed a juror for cause when Adams did not challenge the juror for cause and that the prosecutor committed misconduct during closing argument. Adams also asserts that the district court abused its discretion by imposing unreasonably severe sentences.

II. ANALYSIS

A. The Juror

During voir dire by the prosecutor, potential Juror 608 revealed that she had previously served on a jury in a criminal case. She described her experience as follows:

I was disappointed. At the end, the prosecutor said if you have questions, you know, stay in the room and we'll come in and answer. And I didn't like that, as jurors, we weren't given what I thought was all of the information, you know, that the courts are very selective about what jurors can hear. It's like we want you to sit up there, we want you to rule or do whatever it is you do, but we're only going to give you this little piece, and then you have to make your decision with that. I wanted—the things that he told us afterwards about the case that he could not present, I didn't understand the reasons why they couldn't, so I didn't care for that.

....

I didn't like having to—it was like every three minutes a word would be mentioned, and it's, oh, juror, leave, come back in five minutes, three minutes. Later a word is mentioned. Oh, jury's got to leave. It was like, you know, either stop saying the word or tell us what you're not telling us.

On later voir dire by defense counsel, the following exchange occurred:

DEFENSE COUNSEL: You know, there might be an occasion, an instance or an occasion where we might have to take up some legal issues, and we might have to do that in the absence of the jury.

JUROR NO. 608: Yes

DEFENSE COUNSEL: That we might have to excuse the jury. Will you promise me that you will not hold that against either myself or the State if that happens in this case?

JUROR NO. 608: Do I promise? No.

DEFENSE COUNSEL: You cannot promise that?

JUROR NO. 608: (Shakes head.)

DEFENSE COUNSEL: Okay. At least will you be willing to promise me that you will not be willing to hold that against Mr. Adams, the individual I'm trying to help over here?

THE COURT: Counsel, with all due respect, I'm not going to allow you to require her to promise.

DEFENSE COUNSEL: Okay. Will you be willing to do your best to make sure if that happens in this case, you do not hold that against Mr. Adams, the individual I'm trying to help in this case?

JUROR NO. 608: Yes, I will do my best.

DEFENSE COUNSEL: You will do your best. That's all we can ask for.

Defense counsel did not move to exclude the juror for cause or use a peremptory challenge to remove her from the panel, and she ultimately served as a juror in the trial. Adams now contends that the district court should have sua sponte removed the juror for cause because she exhibited bias and that the court's failure to do so amounts to fundamental error.

Our appellate courts normally require that an issue be raised in the trial court before it may be asserted as error on appeal. State v. Haggard, 94 Idaho 249, 251, 486 P.2d 260, 262 (1971). Therefore, the failure to "exhaust the means available to exclude unacceptable jurors" ordinarily precludes consideration on appeal of a subsequent claim of error in seating the juror. State v. Johnson, 145 Idaho 970, 979, 188 P.3d 912, 921 (2008). An exception to that rule arises in criminal cases when a fundamental error is shown. Id. Our Supreme Court has defined fundamental error as follows:

Error that is fundamental must be such error as goes to the foundation or basis of a defendant's rights or must go to the foundation of the case or take from the defendant a right which was essential to his defense and which no court could or ought to permit him to waive. Each case will of necessity, under such a rule, stand on its own merits. Out of the facts in each case will arise the law.

Id. (quoting State v. Lewis, 126 Idaho 77, 80, 878 P.2d 776, 779 (1994)). Fundamental error has also been described as "error which `so profoundly distorts the trial that it produces manifest injustice and deprives the accused of his constitutional right to due process.'" State v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267, 281, 77 P.3d 956, 970 (2003) (quoting State v. Mauro, 121 Idaho 178, 180, 824 P.2d 109, 111 (1991)).

Appellate review of a claimed error to which no objection was made in the trial court on the basis that it constituted fundamental error is the exception, not the rule, and the fundamental error doctrine is not a mechanism for criminal defendants to obtain judicial review of every plausible claim of trial error. The contemporaneous objection requirement exists for a number of reasons. Among these, it gives the trial court the opportunity to consider and resolve disputes at the time when the error can be prevented or cured, or any prejudice attendant to an error can be lessened. It also prevents a defendant from "sandbagging" by remaining silent about a recognized error and belatedly raising the error only if the case does not conclude in his favor. See Puckett v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 129 S.Ct. 1423, 1428-29, 173 L.Ed.2d 266 (2009) (discussing the scope of the federal "plain-error" rule, Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b)).

Appellate courts should be particularly careful in applying the fundamental error doctrine to what may be a matter of legitimate strategic or tactical choices by defense counsel, which generally cannot be discerned from the record on appeal. See Mintun v. State, 144 Idaho 656, 662, 168 P.3d 40, 46 (Ct.App.2007). Decisions whether to challenge a potential juror for cause fall within that category. In assessing whether to challenge a particular juror, attorneys must not only weigh the perceived negative features against the favorable features of that particular juror, they must also consider whether eliminating the juror could result in an even less acceptable individual moving into that position on the jury panel. Here, the absence of a challenge to Juror 608 may have been a tactical decision by defense counsel, because although Juror 608 gave some problematical answers in voir dire, other factors may have led defense counsel to believe that she was, on balance, a person that he wanted on the jury or that she was more acceptable than another who might be substituted for her. After his conviction, and in hindsight, Adams now contends that the trial court should have intervened sua sponte to exclude the juror for cause. We are of the view that trial courts should not be required or encouraged, in any but the most extreme circumstances to interfere with legitimate tactics of counsel by excusing for cause a juror who has not been challenged by either party. Therefore, we will not find fundamental error in such trial court...