State v. Garcia-Rodriguez, Docket No. 42730
| Decision Date | 09 June 2016 |
| Docket Number | 2016 Opinion No. 35,Docket No. 42730 |
| Parties | STATE OF IDAHO, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. VICTOR GARCIA-RODRIGUEZ, Defendant-Respondent. |
| Court | Idaho Court of Appeals |
Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk
Appeal from the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District, State of Idaho, Jerome County. Hon. Robert J. Elgee, District Judge.
Order granting motion to suppress, vacated and case remanded.
Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Kenneth K. Jorgensen, Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for appellant. Kenneth K. Jorgensen argued.
Sara B. Thomas, State Appellate Public Defender; Maya P. Waldron, Deputy Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for respondent. Maya P. Waldron argued.
The State appeals from the district court's order granting Victor Garcia-Rodriguez's motion to suppress. For the reasons set forth below, we vacate and remand.
A police officer, following Garcia-Rodriguez as he exited a highway off-ramp, observed that his tires crossed the fog line for several seconds. The officer also observed that Garcia-Rodriguez activated his right and then left turn signals, deactivated his left turn signal, and then reactivated it to signal his left turn. The officer turned on his overhead lights and parked behind Garcia-Rodriguez as he pulled into a gas station parking space. The officer noticed a rental car sticker in the window of Garcia-Rodriguez's vehicle. Garcia-Rodriguez indicated to the officer that he did not speak English. He produced a Mexican consulate card, stated he did not have a driver's license, and he could not locate registration or proof of insurance. He said the car belonged to a friend named Bill.
Dispatch could find no information on Garcia-Rodriguez. With the help of a gas station employee, the officer explained why he stopped Garcia-Rodriguez and asked for consent to search the vehicle. Garcia-Rodriguez consented to the search and said he was on his way to purchase a vehicle. In the center console, the officer found a zippered bag that contained approximately $10,000, in a variety of denominations, bundled with rubber bands. The officer restrained Garcia-Rodriguez in handcuffs, told him he was not under arrest, requested additional officers, and put Garcia-Rodriguez in the patrol vehicle. A rental agreement for the vehicle was located indicating it was rented by a Bill Walker and prohibiting other drivers.
A Spanish-speaking officer arrived, gave Garcia-Rodriguez Miranda1 warnings, and learned that he was in the country illegally. Over an hour after the stop occurred, the officer arrested Garcia-Rodriguez for driving without a driver's license, searched him incident to the arrest, and found methamphetamine in his pocket.
The State charged Garcia-Rodriguez with trafficking in methamphetamine, Idaho Code § 37-2732B(a)(4)(A), and possession of paraphernalia, I.C. § 37-2734A. Garcia-Rodriguez filed a motion to suppress the methamphetamine found in his pocket. He claimed that the officer had no legal basis to stop him, unlawfully detained him, and had no right to arrest him for driving without a license. The district court granted the motion. The State timely appeals.
The State argues the district court erred in holding Garcia-Rodriguez's traffic stop, arrest, search incident to arrest, and detention were unlawful. The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, we accept the trial court's findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but we freely review the application of constitutional principles to the facts as found. State v. Atkinson, 128 Idaho 559, 561, 916 P.2d 1284, 1286 (Ct. App. 1996). At a suppression hearing, the power to assess the credibility of witnesses, resolve factual conflicts, weigh evidence, and draw factual inferences is vested in the trial court. State v. Valdez-Molina, 127 Idaho 102, 106, 897 P.2d 993, 997 (1995); State v. Schevers, 132 Idaho 786, 789, 979 P.2d 659, 662 (Ct. App. 1999).
The State argues the district court erred in holding Garcia-Rodriguez's traffic stop was unlawful. A traffic stop by an officer constitutes a seizure of the vehicle's occupants and implicates the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979); Atkinson, 128 Idaho at 561, 916 P.2d at 1286. Under the Fourth Amendment, an officer may stop a vehicle to investigate possible criminal behavior if there is a reasonable and articulable suspicion that the vehicle is being driven contrary to traffic laws. United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981); State v. Flowers, 131 Idaho 205, 208, 953 P.2d 645, 648 (Ct. App. 1998). The reasonableness of the suspicion must be evaluated upon the totality of the circumstances at the time of the stop. State v. Ferreira, 133 Idaho 474, 483, 988 P.2d 700, 709 (Ct. App. 1999). The reasonable suspicion standard requires less than probable cause but more than mere speculation or instinct on the part of the officer. Id. An officer may draw reasonable inferences from the facts in his or her possession, and those inferences may be drawn from the officer's experience and law enforcement training. State v. Montague, 114 Idaho 319, 321, 756 P.2d 1083, 1085 (Ct. App. 1988).
The district court held Garcia-Rodriguez's "single incident of crossing the fog line" did not provide the officer with reasonable suspicion that Garcia-Rodriguez was driving the vehicle contrary to traffic laws. In contrast, the State argues the officer had reasonable suspicion that Garcia-Rodriguez violated I.C. § 49-630(1) when Garcia-Rodriguez crossed the fog line. The State relies on this Court's decision in State v. Slater, 136 Idaho 293, 32 P.3d 685 (Ct. App. 2001). In Slater, the defendant's tires crossed the fog line on a highway on-ramp. We stated:
Idaho Code § 49-630(1) requires that a vehicle be driven on the right half of the roadway, except in certain circumstances that are not applicable in this case. The "roadway" means that portion of a highway that is "improved, designed or ordinarily used for vehicular travel." [I.C. § 49-119(19)]. It does not include "sidewalks, shoulders, berms [or] rights-of-way." Id. Accordingly, when [the officer] observed [the defendant's] tires cross the fog line, albeit fleetingly, [the officer] now possessed the requisite reasonable suspicion that [the defendant] had violated I.C. § 49-630[(1)] by driving on the shoulder of the highway, rather than on the "roadway."
Id. at 298, 32 P.3d at 690. The State asserts this case is factually indistinguishable from Slater, and because we found the officer in Slater had reasonable suspicion, the defendant there violated I.C. § 49-630(1), we must find the officer here had reasonable suspicion that Garcia-Rodriguez violated I.C. § 49-630(1).
Garcia-Rodriguez argues the plain language of I.C. § 49-630(1) applies only to highways with two or more lanes. According to Garcia-Rodriguez, implicit in the requirement that drivers operate their vehicles "on the right half of the road way is the existence of a left half of the roadway--in other words, there must be two or more lanes running in opposite directions for I.C. § 49-630(1) to apply." Because Garcia-Rodriguez crossed the fog line "on a single-lane, one-way off-ramp," he asserts I.C. § 49-630(1) does not apply and the officer did not have reasonable suspicion that Garcia-Rodriguez was driving his vehicle contrary to traffic laws. We disagree.
In Slater, we stated that none of the exceptions of I.C. § 49-630(1) applied to highway on-ramps. Thus, in Slater we considered whether I.C. § 49-630(1) applied to highway on-ramps and concluded that it did. Because highway on-ramps and off-ramps are essentially the same, we see no reason to hold differently here. Thus, when the officer observed Garcia-Rodriguez drive across the fog line and onto the shoulder of the highway off-ramp, the officer had reasonable suspicion Garcia-Rodriguez violated I.C. § 49-630(1). Accordingly, the district court erred in holding the officer did not have reasonable suspicion that Garcia-Rodriguez was driving his vehicle contrary to traffic laws.
The State next argues the district court erred in holding Garcia-Rodriguez's arrest, search incident to arrest, and detention were unlawful. Specifically, the State asserts the officer developed probable cause to believe Garcia-Rodriguez was driving without a driver's license almost immediately after stopping him. According to the State, this probable cause justified Garcia-Rodriguez's detention, arrest, and search incident to arrest.
A warrantless search is presumptively unreasonable unless it falls within certain special and well-delineated exceptions to the warrant requirement. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-55 (1971); Ferreira, 133 Idaho at 479, 988 P.2d at 705. A search incident to a valid arrest is among those exceptions and thus, does not violate the Fourth Amendment proscription against unreasonable searches. State v. Moore, 129 Idaho 776, 781, 932 P.2d 899, 904 (Ct. App. 1996). Pursuant to this exception, the police may search an arrestee incident to a lawful custodial arrest. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973); Moore, 129 Idaho at 781, 932 P.2d at 904. Thus, the issue turns on whether the officer lawfully arrested Garcia-Rodriguez.
The district court held Garcia-Rodriguez's arrest was unlawful because it did not comply with I.C. § 49-1407. Driving without a driver's license is a misdemeanor offense. I.C. § 49-301(1), (7). Idaho Code § 49-1407 prevents an officer from arresting a driver for a misdemeanor offense unless the driver does not "furnish satisfactory evidence of identity" or "the officer has reasonable and probable grounds to believe the [driver] will disregard a written promise to appear in court." The court held Garcia-Rodriguez's Mexican consulate card was...
To continue reading
Request your trial