State v. Adams

• Decision Date: 09 November 2017
• Docket Number: No. 20150565-CA,20150565-CA
• Citation: 407 P.3d 1027
• Parties: STATE of Utah, Appellee, v. Timothy Joseph ADAMS, Appellant.
• Court: Utah Court of Appeals

407 P.3d 1027

STATE of Utah, Appellee,

v.Timothy Joseph ADAMS, Appellant.

No. 20150565-CA

Court of Appeals of Utah.

Filed November 9, 2017

Dale W. Sessions, Cedar City, Attorney for Appellant

Sean D. Reyes and Lindsey L. Wheeler, Salt Lake City, Attorneys for Appellee

Judge Gregory K. Orme authored this Opinion, in which Judges Kate A. Toomey and Jill M. Pohlman concurred.

Opinion

ORME, Judge:

¶1 Timothy Joseph Adams (Defendant) appeals his convictions for producing and intending to distribute a controlled substance, arguing that the district court erred when it denied his motion to suppress evidence discovered during a police search of his home. Because we agree with the district court that the challenged search did not violate Defendant's rights under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, we affirm.

¶2 On March 2, 2013, Big Water Deputy Rob Johnson responded to a call from Defendant's elderly mother, who was very concerned about her son. Defendant, who lived alone in Big Water, had not been in contact with her in several days, although typically they would speak on a near-daily basis. At sixty-five, Defendant was not in good health, and his mother feared the worst. Having responded to many similar calls involving older individuals in the past, Deputy Johnson did, too.

¶3 Deputy Johnson departed immediately to conduct a "welfare check" at Defendant's home. Upon arriving, he saw that a light was on inside, but no one answered when he knocked on the door and yelled into the home. Deputy Johnson saw no vehicles on the property, but he did find signs that someone had recently been repairing leaky pipes underneath the home. The area around the entrance to the crawl space was moist, and a light in the crawl space was being powered by an extension cord that ran up through an open window and into the living room. He also saw that some tools had been left near the air conditioning unit on top of the roof, and near them a ladder had been left leaning up against the home. While all of this might have suggested that Defendant had left to buy a part or borrow a tool mid-project, Defendant's neighbors informed Deputy Johnson that they had not seen Defendant for two or three days.

¶4 Deputy Johnson called Defendant's mother to apprise her of the situation. After reiterating her concerns for her son's health and safety, she implored Deputy Johnson to "use whatever means necessary" to ensure that her son was alright. He complied and entered Defendant's living room through the open window.

¶5 Upon entering Defendant's house, Deputy Johnson saw a grow light and several plants, all in various stages of cultivation. He recognized the plants to be marijuana. After searching every area within the residence where he believed he might find Defendant, Deputy Johnson concluded that Defendant was not at home. After photographing the plants with his cell phone, Deputy Johnson left the residence.

¶6 After obtaining a search warrant, Deputy Johnson returned to Defendant's home accompanied by Big Water's Marshal. When they arrived, Defendant was loading marijuana plants into his pickup truck and texting on his cell phone. All in all, the officers found six marijuana plants, in addition to some potting soil, industrial grow lights, rolling papers, and a rifle. Based on what they found while executing this warrant, the officers obtained a second warrant to seize Defendant's rifle and cell phone.

¶7 Defendant was later charged with production of a controlled substance and possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute, both second degree felonies. He was also charged with three less serious offenses.

¶8 Defendant moved to suppress the State's evidence against him on the grounds that Deputy Johnson's initial search of his home violated his Fourth Amendment rights and that all evidence obtained as a result of the first and second warrants was therefore fruit of an unlawful search. After extensive briefing and an evidentiary hearing, the district court denied Defendant's motion and issued a memorandum decision setting forth its findings of fact and conclusions of law. The court determined that, viewing the circumstances "objectively, and as a whole, it was reasonable for Deputy Johnson to conclude there was an emergency and that Defendant was in immediate need of life-saving assistance." The court concluded that the deputy's warrantless entry into Defendant's home was therefore "reasonable and lawful under the circumstances."

¶9 Ultimately, Defendant agreed to enter guilty pleas on his two second degree felony charges in exchange for the State's dismissal of the three remaining charges. As a part of his plea agreement, however, Defendant reserved the right to appeal the district court's ruling on his motion to suppress. See generally Utah R. Crim. P. 11(j) ; State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935, 939 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). That appeal is now before us.

¶10 Defendant contends that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress. Specifically, Defendant argues that the district court incorrectly held that Deputy Johnson's initial search was permissible under the "emergency aid" exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement.¹

¶11 "We review a trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion to suppress for an alleged Fourth Amendment violation as a mixed question of law and fact." State v. Fuller, 2014 UT 29, ¶ 17, 332 P.3d 937. "While the court's factual findings are reviewed for clear error, its legal conclusions are reviewed for correctness, including its application of law to the facts of the case." Id.

¶12 The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures." U.S. Const. amend. IV.² "Physical entry into the home is the ‘chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed.’ " State v. Maxwell, 2011 UT 81, ¶ 13, 275 P.3d 220 (quoting United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313, 92 S.Ct. 2125, 32 L.Ed.2d 752 (1972) ). For that reason, "warrantless searches and seizures within an individual's home are ‘presumptively unreasonable[.]’ " Id. (quoting Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980) ).

¶13 Nevertheless, the "ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is ‘reasonableness,’ " and "the warrant requirement is subject to certain reasonable exceptions." Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 459, 131 S.Ct. 1849, 179 L.Ed.2d 865 (2011) (quoting Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403, 126 S.Ct. 1943, 164 L.Ed.2d 650 (2006) ). One well-established exception is where " ‘the exigencies of the situation’ make the needs of law enforcement so compelling that the warrantless search is objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment."

Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 394, 98 S.Ct. 2408, 57 L.Ed.2d 290 (1978) (quoting McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 456, 69 S.Ct. 191, 93 L.Ed. 153 (1948) ). Accord Michigan v. Fisher, 558 U.S. 45, 47, 130 S.Ct. 546, 175 L.Ed.2d 410 (2009) (per curiam); Maxwell, 2011 UT 81, ¶ 14, 275 P.3d 220.

¶14 In Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 126 S.Ct. 1943, 164 L.Ed.2d 650 (2006),³ the United States Supreme Court held that one such "exigency obviating the requirement of a warrant is the need to assist persons who are seriously injured or threatened with such injury." Id. at 403, 126 S.Ct. 1943. "The need to protect or preserve life or avoid serious injury is justification for what would be otherwise illegal[.]" Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The Court made it clear in Brigham City that law enforcement officers may enter a residence without a warrant where they have "an objectively reasonable basis" to believe that any of its occupants are in need of such assistance. Id. at 406, 126 S.Ct. 1943. The Utah Supreme Court has referred to this principle as the "emergency aid doctrine." See, e.g., State v. Anderson, 2015 UT 90, ¶ 19, 362 P.3d 1232.

¶15 Defendant advances two reasons why he believes it was error for the district court to apply the emergency aid doctrine in his case. First, he maintains that his "mother's concern that her adult son had not contacted her in four days did not [rise] to the level of an emergency as contemplated by law." Second, he argues that even if Deputy Johnson had been justified in concluding that an emergency existed given Defendant's mother's report, he could not reasonably have concluded that such an emergency was taking place inside Defendant's home once he arrived on the scene and surveyed the premises.⁴ We address Defendant's arguments in turn.

¶16 We conclude that Defendant's first argument is foreclosed by the Supreme Court's decisions in Brigham City and Michigan v. Fisher, 558 U.S. 45, 130 S.Ct. 546, 175 L.Ed.2d 410 (2009) (per curiam). In Fisher, law enforcement officers responded to a complaint about a disturbance taking place inside a residence. 558 U.S. at 45, 130 S.Ct. 546. Upon arriving at the scene, the officers found "a pickup truck in the driveway with its front smashed." Id. They also found "blood on the hood of the pickup and on clothes inside of it, as well as on one of the doors of the house." Id. at 46, 130 S.Ct. 546.

"Through a window, the officers could see [the] respondent ... inside the house, screaming and throwing things." Id. They could also see that the respondent had a cut on his hand. Id.

¶17 The officers knocked on the door and asked whether the respondent needed medical attention. Id. He ignored their offers of assistance and demanded that they get a search warrant. Id. One of the officers then "pushed the front door partway open and ventured into the house" but withdrew upon seeing that the respondent was pointing a gun at him. Id. The respondent was later charged with assault with a dangerous weapon and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. Id.

¶18 The trial court concluded,...