State v. Adams
Decision Date | 12 April 1988 |
Docket Number | No. 6041,6041 |
Citation | 14 Conn.App. 119,539 A.2d 1022 |
Parties | STATE of Connecticut v. Ronald ADAMS. |
Court | Connecticut Court of Appeals |
Dennis F. O'Toole, Asst. Public Defender, for appellant (defendant).
Joseph C. Morelli, Sp. Asst. State's Atty., for appellee (state).
Before SPALLONE, DALY and NORCOTT, JJ.
The defendant appeals from the judgment of conviction, after a jury trial, of burglary in the third degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-103, larceny in the fourth degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-125, and tampering with a motor vehicle in violation of General Statutes § 53a-119b(c)(2).
The defendant claims that the evidence adduced at trial was insufficient to support the jury verdict convicting him of the crimes charged. The defendant further claims that the trial court erred (1) in refusing to allow him to present foundation testimony for a "missing witness" instruction to the jury, (2) in refusing to grant his motion for mistrial due to the prosecutor's reference to his prior criminal convictions as relating to guilt during the state's final argument, and (3) in reopening, sua sponte, his sentence and resentencing him on that very same day. We find no error.
From the evidence produced at trial, the jury could reasonably have found the following facts. On the evening of December 13, 1986, Ephram Torres and Kevin Williams observed the defendant sitting in a small white car which was parked in the rear parking lot of 85 Sumner Street in Hartford. Williams did not testify at trial, but Torres testified that he observed the defendant in the driver's seat with his left hand on the steering wheel and with a screwdriver in his right hand which was near or on the ignition. The dome light of the car was on at the time of Torres' observation. Believing that the defendant was calling to him, Torres approached the vehicle. Thereupon, the defendant exited the vehicle and struck Torres. A fight ensued between the two men. While Williams unsuccessfully tried to separate the combatants, a large crowd gathered prompting someone to call for the police.
Officer John Cunningham of the Hartford police department responded to the scene of the fight. During the course of his investigation that night, he observed that the identification number of the small white vehicle matched that of a vehicle reported stolen almost one month earlier by Lynn Olsen, another Hartford resident. Cunningham also noticed that the ignition had been "popped" or forcibly removed from the vehicle. The defendant was arrested and charged with the three crimes of which he was convicted.
The evidence presented at the defendant's trial included the testimony of Olsen to the effect that some time between late evening November 11 and early morning November 12, 1986, her white 1976 Ford Maverick was stolen from the parking lot of her apartment building on Asylum Street in Hartford. She testified that at the time of its disappearance, the car was locked, physically intact and in excellent condition. When she next viewed her vehicle on December 14, 1986, she observed that the locks to the trunk, driver's door and glove compartment and the ignition all had been "popped." In addition, the driver's door had been damaged, and the new set of tires which she had recently installed prior to the theft were badly worn.
Olsen also testified that she transferred the title to the vehicle to her insurance carrier which paid her $816 based on the "Blue Book" value of the vehicle and $100 for the stolen contents of the vehicle.
During the state's closing argument, the state's attorney made the following remarks in reference to the defendant: The defendant promptly objected to the prosecutor's remarks, and the court gave an immediate cautionary instruction to the jury after which it denied the defendant's motion for a mistrial.
Thereafter, the defendant was convicted as charged. On the morning of the sentencing, April 22, 1987, the trial court sentenced the defendant as follows: for burglary in the third degree, three years; for larceny in the fourth degree, one year consecutive to the previous sentence; and, for tampering with a motor vehicle, one year consecutive to the two prior sentences for a total effective sentence of five years. In the afternoon of that same day, the court recalled the defendant, vacated the previous sentence and resentenced the defendant as follows: for burglary in the third degree, five years; for larceny in the fourth degree, one year concurrent; and for tampering with a motor vehicle, one year concurrent for the same total effective sentence of five years. This appeal followed the resentencing.
The defendant first makes a wholesale attack on the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the jury verdict. State v. Hendrickson, 12 Conn.App. 662, 670, 533 A.2d 894 (1987).
With respect to the charge of tampering with a motor vehicle, the defendant claims that the state failed to provide sufficient evidence from which the jury could have found the defendant guilty under General Statutes § 53a-119b(c)(2). 1 The essence of the defendant's claim is that there was no evidence in the record to prove that the defendant had any intent to do damage to the car or, in fact, did any damage to the vehicle on December 13, 1986, the date charged in the information. We disagree.
The sole witness at the trial to the acts of the defendant on December 13, 1986, was Torres. Torres testified that on the night in question he saw the defendant "playing with the steering wheel of the car with an object that looked like a screwdriver." He also testified that he saw the defendant "playing with an object on the steering wheel" and "his [the defendant's] left hand was holding the steering wheel and his right hand was on the ignition switch." The jury also heard testimony from the investigating officer who testified that he "observed the ignition popped." The owner of the vehicle testified that her car, the 1976 white Ford Maverick, was locked at the time it was stolen on November 12, 1986, and when she next saw the car, all the locks were popped and other damage was evident as well.
State v. Greene, 11 Conn.App. 575, 579, 528 A.2d 855 (1987). State v. Avila, 166 Conn. 569, 579, 353 A.2d 776 (1974). The question of intent is purely a question of fact to be determined by the jury. See State v. Miller, 202 Conn. 463, 486, 522 A.2d 249 (1987); State v. Chace, 199 Conn. 102, 105, 505 A.2d 712 (1986); State v. Morrill, 193 Conn. 602, 609, 478 A.2d 994 (1984). In this case, the evidence was sufficient, if believed by the jury, to establish that the defendant not only intended to "damage or remove a component part of a motor vehicle" within the meaning of General Statutes § 53a-119b(c)(2), but that he actually did so.
Furthermore, we find no merit in the defendant's claim that the crimes charged need be proven to have been committed on the precise date of the defendant's arrest. Such precision is not required State v. Bowman, 3 Conn.App. 148, 155, 485 A.2d 1343 (1985). Our review of this record reveals that the state clearly proved the first two elements under Bowman and that time was neither an essential element of the crimes charged nor a material fact in the defendant's case.
With respect to the conviction for larceny in the fourth degree, the defendant claims that there was insufficient evidence produced at trial upon which the jury could determine the market value of the car at the time of the crime or the replacement value within a reasonable time after the crime. It is the defendant's contention that the state failed to introduce valuation evidence to conclusively establish the market value of the vehicle to be at least $500. We again disagree.
Under General Statutes § 53a-125(a), "a person is guilty of larceny in the fourth degree when he commits larceny ... and the value of the property ... exceeds five hundred dollars." 2 Olsen testified that she received from her insurance carrier "Blue Book" value of $816 for the car and $100 for personal items stolen from within the vehicle. She further testified that she considered the amount received to be low due to the "excellent shape" of the car at the time of the theft. A victim's opinion as to the value of his stolen property may properly be placed before the jury. See State v....
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