State v. Adams
| Decision Date | 16 December 2021 |
| Docket Number | S-1-SC-37722 |
| Citation | 503 P.3d 1130 |
| Parties | STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Brian ADAMS, Defendant-Petitioner. |
| Court | New Mexico Supreme Court |
Bennett J. Baur, Chief Public Defender, Caitlin C.M. Smith, Assistant Appellate Defender, John Charles Bennett, Assistant Appellate Defender, Santa Fe, NM, for Petitioner
Hector H. Balderas, Attorney General, John Kloss, Assistant Attorney General, Santa Fe, NM, for Respondent
{1} This case is one of six cases arising under very similar fact patterns.1 In each case, an "emergency department technician," also licensed as an emergency medical technician (EMT), performed a blood draw test at San Juan Regional Medical Center in Farmington for the purpose of a DWI investigation. The defendants in these cases argue that "emergency department technicians" are not qualified to draw blood under the Implied Consent Act, NMSA 1978, §§ 66-8-105 to -112 (1978, as amended through 2019). Thus, this case presents an issue of statutory construction. Specifically, whether an emergency department technician, licensed as an EMT, with training and experience in drawing blood is authorized to perform legal blood draw tests as a "laboratory technician" under NMSA 1978, Section 66-8-103 (1978), which states, "[o]nly a physician, licensed professional or practical nurse or laboratory technician or technologist employed by a hospital or physician shall withdraw blood from any person in the performance of a blood-alcohol test."2 As explained herein, we conclude that such medical professionals are qualified to draw blood under the statute so long as they were employed to do so by a hospital or physician and have adequate training and experience.
{2} After receiving a report of a drunk driver, a Farmington police officer was dispatched to a local gas station. Upon arriving at the gas station, the police officer found Defendant inflating his car tires. The officer noticed that Defendant's legs were shaking, his eyes were bloodshot, and his speech was slurred. The officer conducted a number of field sobriety tests with Defendant. In performing the tests, Defendant failed to follow directions, swayed back and forth, and struggled to maintain balance. Defendant told the officer that he drank whiskey and took Xanax and Suboxone pills earlier that day.
State v. Garcia , 2016-NMCA-044, ¶ 4, 370 P.3d 791. Defendant then signed the proper paperwork consenting to the procedure, and Atwood drew two vials of blood. The officer placed the vials into the SLD blood draw kit and sealed it in front of Atwood. The officer then submitted Defendant's blood samples for testing by the SLD of the New Mexico Department of Health. The test results revealed that Defendant's blood was negative for alcohol but positive for marijuana-related metabolites, benzodiazepines, and synthetic opioids.
{4} The State charged Defendant with one count of DWI contrary to NMSA 1978, Section 66-8-102 (2016). In magistrate court, Defendant moved to suppress the blood test results on the basis that Atwood was not qualified to draw blood under Section 66-8-103. The magistrate judge denied Defendant's motion to suppress. Defendant pleaded no contest, reserving his right to appeal the magistrate court's decision.
{5} Defendant then appealed to the district court, which held an evidentiary hearing to determine the issue. After the hearing, the district court granted Defendant's motion to suppress the blood test results because it concluded that Atwood was not qualified to draw blood under the statute. The district court explained that it was bound by the New Mexico Court of Appeals holding in Garcia , 2016-NMCA-044, ¶ 20, 370 P.3d 791, "that a person's ‘license as an EMT does not qualify her to draw blood to determine its alcohol or drug content under the Implied Consent Act.’ "
{6} Following the district court's ruling, the State appealed the issue to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals reversed the district court's order and held that the blood test should not have been excluded. State v. Adams , 2019-NMCA-043, ¶¶ 1, 29, 447 P.3d 1142. The Court of Appeals explained that Garcia stands for the proposition that an EMT license alone does not qualify an employee like Atwood to draw blood for legal blood tests. Id. ¶ 20. Here, however, the Court of Appeals clarified that Atwood was qualified as a laboratory technician under Section 66-8-103 because she held an EMT license in addition to having experience and training in drawing blood. Id. ¶¶ 21, 29. The Court of Appeals held "that an individual qualifies as a laboratory technician, despite her official title, if she has sufficient skills, training, and experience to assure a hospital or physician that she is qualified to perform blood draws in accordance with approved medical practice." Id. ¶ 28. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals concluded that even though "Atwood did not have the title ‘laboratory technician,’ or work in a laboratory," she was a laboratory technician under the statute because of her "assigned duties, skills, training, and experience." Id. ¶¶ 28, 29
{7} Defendant appealed the Court of Appeals ruling, and we granted certiorari to resolve the issue of which medical professionals qualify to draw blood as a "laboratory technician" under Section 66-8-103. With this opinion, we affirm the Court of Appeals but write to clarify that, in order for a medical professional to qualify as a laboratory technician for the purposes of performing legal blood draws, the person must be employed by a hospital or physician to perform blood draws, trained to perform legal blood draws, and have on-the-job experience in doing so.
{8} We begin by addressing the statutory construction issue and then turn to the issue of whether the district court abused its discretion in suppressing the blood test results.
{9} We must first determine the statutory interpretation of the words "laboratory technician" in Section 66-8-103. Statutory construction is a matter of law that is reviewed de novo. State v. Almanzar , 2014-NMSC-001, ¶ 9, 316 P.3d 183. In engaging in statutory construction, our "primary goal is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the Legislature." State v. Nick R. , 2009-NMSC-050, ¶ 11, 147 N.M. 182, 218 P.3d 868.
{10} In conducting a statutory construction analysis, we begin by considering the plain meaning of the statute. We "look to the plain language of the statute to determine if the statute can be enforced as written." State v. Padilla , 2008-NMSC-006, ¶ 7, 143 N.M. 310, 176 P.3d 299. When words are not otherwise defined in a statute, we "giv[e] those words their ordinary meaning absent clear and express legislative intention to the contrary." State v. Johnson , 2009-NMSC-049, ¶ 10, 147 N.M. 177, 218 P.3d 863 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). To do so, we consult common dictionary definitions. See State v. Boyse , 2013-NMSC-024, ¶ 9, 303 P.3d 830. "A statute must be construed so that no part of the statute is rendered surplusage or superfluous." Katz v. N.M. Dep't of Hum. Servs. , 1981-NMSC-012, ¶ 18, 95 N.M. 530, 624 P.2d 39. "Unless ambiguity exists, this Court must adhere to the plain meaning of the language." State v. Maestas , 2007-NMSC-001, ¶ 14, 140 N.M. 836, 149 P.3d 933. "A statute is ambiguous when it can be understood by reasonably well-informed persons in two or more different senses." Maestas v. Zager , 2007-NMSC-003, ¶ 9, 141 N.M. 154, 152 P.3d 141 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
{11} Section 66-8-103 requires that "[o]nly a physician, licensed professional or practical nurse or laboratory technician or technologist employed by a hospital or physician shall withdraw blood from any person in the performance of a blood-alcohol test." We must interpret the Legislature's intended definition of a "laboratory technician" as it is used in this statute. As the Court of Appeals correctly stated, "[t]here is no statutory or regulatory definition of ‘laboratory technician’ " and "New Mexico courts have not previously addressed the requirements for qualification as a laboratory technician under Section 66-8-103." Adams , 2019-NMCA-043, ¶¶ 26-27, 447 P.3d 1142. Turning to dictionary definitions, the Court of Appeals noted that Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary defines a technician as Id. ¶ 26 (omission in original). Finding no clear meaning from the plain language of the statute, the Court of Appeals proceeded to consider the legislative purpose in its construal of the term "laboratory technician." See id. ¶ 28.
{12} Defendant argues that the Court of Appeals should have adhered more closely to the plain meaning of the statute before consulting other sources of statutory interpretation. According to Defendant, the Court of Appeals improperly strayed from the plain meaning of the...
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