State v. Boyse

• Decision Date: 10 June 2013
• Docket Number: No. 33,257.,33,257.
• Citation: 303 P.3d 830
• Parties: STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff–Petitioner, v. Lester BOYSE and Carol Boyse, Defendants–Respondents.
• Court: New Mexico Supreme Court

303 P.3d 830

STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff–Petitioner,

v.Lester BOYSE and Carol Boyse, Defendants–Respondents.

No. 33,257.

Supreme Court of New Mexico.

June 10, 2013.

Gary K. King, Attorney General, William H. Lazar, Assistant Attorney General, Santa Fe, NM, for Petitioner.

Jeffrey C. Lahan, Las Cruces, NM, for Respondents.

OPINION

VIGIL, Justice.

I. INTRODUCTION

{1} This case requires us to interpret the New Mexico Constitution to determine whether it allows for the process of requesting and approving search warrants by telephone. Article II, Section 10 of the New Mexico Constitution requires search warrants to be based on a written showing of probable cause supported by oath or affirmation. We are asked to decide whether the written showing requirement necessarily means that the issuing judge or magistrate must see the writing in order to approve the search warrant. We interpret the meaning of the word “showing” in Article II, Section 10 of the New Mexico Constitution as a presentation or statement of facts that can be made through audible or other sensory means as well as through visual means. Thus, we hold as a matter of law that the New Mexico Constitution allows for alternative methods for requesting and approving search warrants, including by telephone.

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

{2} Lester and Carol Boyse (Defendants) were each charged with fifty-two counts of felony cruelty to animals contrary to NMSA 1978, Section 30–18–1(E) (2007), and fifty-five counts of misdemeanor cruelty to animals contrary to Section 30–18–1(B). They sought to suppress evidence discovered by the investigating officer because he obtained approval for a warrant to search their property from the magistrate judge by telephone rather than in person. The district court denied the motion. Defendants entered conditional pleas of no contest to 107 counts of misdemeanor cruelty to animals, preserving their right to appeal.

{3} On August 21, 2008, officers from the Doña Ana County Sheriff's Department and the Mesilla Marshal's Department investigated a neighbor's complaint regarding a dead horse on Defendants' property. During the initial investigation, officer Jeff Gray from the Mesilla Marshal's Department learned that Defendants kept a large number of animals on their property. He also learned that there was a strong foul odor coming from Defendants' property. Officer Gray interviewed Defendant Carol Boyse, who admitted to having two dead horses on her property, keeping several other horses untended, and keeping an unknown number of cats inside her house, including three dead cats in her freezer.

{4} Even though Officer Gray had obtained verbal consent from Defendant Carol Boyse to enter the house, his supervisor instructed him to obtain a search warrant. Officer Gray prepared a detailed, type-written affidavit as part of an application for a search warrant to investigate what he described as extreme animal cruelty at Defendants' property. By the time Officer Gray completed the search warrant application, the magistrate court was already closed, so he left a voice-recorded message for the on-call judge. The magistrate judge returned the call. Over the telephone, the magistrate judge administered an oath to Officer Gray, who then read the entire written affidavit verbatim. The magistrate judge approved the search warrant over the telephone, and Officer Gray noted the approval on the search warrant form. Officer Gray then immediately executed the search warrant. Officer Gray later obtained the magistrate judge's actual signature and initials on the search warrant and affidavit.

III. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

{5} Defendants moved to suppress the evidence seized from their property, arguing that the search warrant was invalid because it was improperly obtained by telephone in violation of Article II, Section 10 of the New Mexico Constitution, Rule 6–208 NMRA, and Forms 9–213 and 9–214 NMRA of the New Mexico Rules of Criminal Procedure. Defendants argued that, because the search warrant was invalid, their rights against unreasonable search and seizure by the government under Article II, Section 10 of the New Mexico Constitution and the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution were violated.

{6} The district court denied Defendants' motion, finding that the search warrant was based upon a sworn written statement of facts showing sufficient probable cause under the requirements of Article II, Section 10 and Rule 6–208. Defendants subsequently pleaded no contest to 107 counts of misdemeanor cruelty to animals, reserving their right to appeal the district court's denial of their suppression motion.

{7} On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed, interpreting the written “showing” of probable cause requirement in Article II, Section 10 to mean that a judge must see the writing before issuing a warrant. See State v. Boyse, 2011–NMCA–113, ¶ 16, 150 N.M. 712, 265 P.3d 1285. We granted certiorari to review the Court of Appeals' opinion.

IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW

{8} This is a case of constitutional interpretation. “We review [questions] of statutory and constitutional interpretation de novo.” State v. Ordunez, 2012–NMSC–024, ¶ 6, 283 P.3d 282 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “The most important consideration for us is that we interpret the constitution in a way that reflects the drafters' intent.” State v. Lynch, 2003–NMSC–020, ¶ 24, 134 N.M. 139, 74 P.3d 73. In interpreting the Constitution, the rules of statutory construction “apply equally to constitutional construction.” State ex rel. Richardson v. Fifth Judicial Dist. Nominating Comm'n, 2007–NMSC–023, ¶ 17, 141 N.M. 657, 160 P.3d 566.

{9} Under the rules of statutory construction, we first turn to the plain meaning of the words at issue, often using the dictionary for guidance. See State v. Nick R., 2009–NMSC–050, ¶ 18, 147 N.M. 182, 218 P.3d 868 (recognizing that our courts interpret the intended meaning of statutory language by consulting the dictionary to ascertain the words' ordinary meaning). The plain meaning rule requires that statutes “be given effect as written without room for construction unless the language is doubtful, ambiguous, or an adherence to the literal use of the words would lead to injustice, absurdity or contradiction, in which case the statute is to be construed according to its obvious spirit or reason.” State v. Maestas, 2007–NMSC–001, ¶ 9, 140 N.M. 836, 149 P.3d 933 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

V. DISCUSSION

{10} Defendants argue, and the Court of Appeals agreed, that telephonically approved search warrants violate Article II, Section 10 of the New Mexico Constitution because a written showing of probable cause cannot be made over the telephone. See Boyse, 2011–NMCA–113, ¶ 16, 150 N.M. 712, 265 P.3d 1285. Defendants assert that the New Mexico Rules of Criminal Procedure do not provide for the process of requesting and approving search warrants by telephone. As a policy argument in support of their position, Defendants point out that procedural safeguards imposed in jurisdictions that recognize telephonic search warrants were not followed by the law enforcement officers and the court officials in this case. Defendants argue that because the search warrant in this case was invalid, their Fourth Amendment rights under the United States Constitution were violated. We address each of Defendants' points in turn, beginning with their argument under the New Mexico Constitution.

A. THE NEW MEXICO CONSTITUTION ALLOWS FOR REQUESTING AND APPROVING SEARCH WARRANTS BY TELEPHONE

{11} Defendants argue that the process of requesting and approving search warrants by telephone violates the plain language of Article II, Section 10 of the New Mexico Constitution, Rule 6–208, and Forms 9–213 and 9–214. We disagree.

The New Mexico Constitution provides that:

[t]he people shall be secure in their persons, papers, homes and effects, from unreasonable searches and seizures, and no warrant to search any place, or seize any person or thing, shall issue without describing the place to be searched, or the persons or things to be seized, nor without a written showing of probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation.

N.M. Const. art. II, § 10 (emphasis added). Similarly, our rules of criminal procedure for the magistrate courts provide that a warrant “shall contain or have attached the sworn written statement of facts showing probable cause for its issuance and the name of any person whose sworn written statement has been taken in support of the warrant.” Rule 6–208(B); accordRule 5–211(B) NMRA (containing the same requirement for a search warrant obtained in district court); Rule 7–208(B) NMRA (containing the same requirement for a search warrant obtained in metropolitan court); Rule 8–207(B) NMRA (containing the same requirement for a search warrant obtained in municipal court).

{12} We recently amended our rules of criminal procedure for the district courts to specifically recognize the process of requesting and approving search warrants through remote means, including by telephone. SeeRule 5–211(F) & (G). But the rules were silent as to the recognized methods for requesting a search warrant on August 21, 2008, when the magistrate judge approved the search warrant at issue in this case. SeeRule 5–211 (1980) (amended 2012); Rule 6–208; Rule 7–208; Rule 8–207. Notably, Rules 6–208, 7–208, and 8–207 have since been amended to provide for remote issuance of search warrants. See Supreme Court Order No. 13–8300–011 (adopting amendments to these rules, which will be effective July 15, 2013).

{13} Therefore, the question before us is whether telephonic approval of search warrants was allowed because at the time the rules did not expressly disallow the issuance of a search warrant telephonically. To answer this question we interpret the constitutional requirements for search warrants as they existed at the time the magistrate judge issued the search...