State v. Adkins

• Decision Date: 31 May 1909
• Parties: STATE ex rel. ATTY. GEN. v. ADKINS et al., County Court Justices.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

119 S.W. 1091

221 Mo. 112

STATE ex rel. ATTY. GEN. v. ADKINS et al., County Court Justices.

Supreme Court of Missouri, Division No. 1.

May 31, 1909.

1. COURTS (§ 231)—SUPREME COURT—JURISDICTION —"INVOLVING THE CONSTRUCTION OF REVENUE LAWS."

Cases "involving the construction of the revenue laws," in which the Supreme Court has jurisdiction on direct appeal from the circuit courts under Const. art. 6, § 12 (Ann. St. 1906, p. 219), and Const. Amend. 1884, § 5 (Rev. St. 1899, p. 93; Ann. St. 1906, p. 244), must be cases involving state laws, as distinguished from special city charters, but it is not material whether the provision appears under the title "revenue" in the statute or not, if revenue is directly and primarily, and not merely incidentally, concerned, and laws relating to the preservation and disbursement of the revenue are within the meaning of the clause as well as those relating to its assessment, levy, and collection; but where the question in a case relates merely to the general practice of the court, revenue is not involved in a constitutional sense, even though the case relates to the collection of taxes.

2. COURTS (§ 231)—SUPREME COURT— JURISDICTION—REVENUE LAWS.

The County Depository Act (Rev. St. 1899, §§ 6817-6829 [Ann. St. 1906, pp. 3344-3348]) relates to the preservation and disbursement of the funds of the county, and provides for the payment of warrants. The county obtains a share in the increment arising from the use of the funds by banks of deposit, which is disposed of for road and bridge purposes, and the treasurer is relieved from liability for the county funds in certain contingencies. Held, that the statute relates to revenue, and the Supreme Court has jurisdiction of a direct appeal from the circuit court in an action to construe it, under Const. art. 6, § 12 (Ann. St. 1906, p. 219), and Const. Amend. 1884, § 5 (Rev. St. 1899, p. 93; Ann. St. 1906, p. 244), giving the Supreme Court jurisdiction of direct appeals from the circuit court in cases involving the construction of the revenue laws.

3. APPEAL AND ERROR (§ 586)—ABSTRACT OF RECORD—SUFFICIENCY.

An abstract of record must show in some orderly and reasonable way that exceptions and motions relied on were preserved in a bill of exceptions, or they cannot be considered, and where the only references in an abstract to a bill of exceptions were recitals that the court allowed the appeal, and gave appellants 90 days in which to file their bill of exceptions, and that it was presented within the time allowed, and signed and made a part of the record, and there was nothing from which it could be determined what parts of the abstract were in the bill, the abstract was insufficient.

Appeal from Circuit Court, McDonald County; F. C. Johnston, Judge.

Certiorari by the State, on the relation of the Attorney General, against W. J. Adkins and others, Justices of the County Court of McDonald county. Judgment for relator, and defendants appealed to the St. Louis Court of Appeals, which transferred the cause to the Supreme Court. 119 Mo. App. 396, 100 S. W. 661. Affirmed.

Joseph S. Long and James H. Pratt, for appellants. Herbert S. Hadley, Atty. Gen., J. A. Sturges, and O. R. Puckett, for respondent.

LAMM, P. J.

The Attorney General sued out a writ of certiorari against defendants, the justices of the county court of McDonald county. The theory of the petition was that defendants, as such justices, had violated article 6, c. 97, Rev. St. 1899 (Ann. St. 1906, pp. 3344-3348), relating to county depositaries. Section 6817 of that article ordains that the county courts, as a condition precedent to receiving proposals and accepting bids from banks or bankers to become county depositaries, shall publish a notice in some newspaper of the county for 20 days before the commencement of the May term of the court at which the letting occurs that such bids would be received. It is alleged that notice was not published for the time required by that statute, but that, in the face of that fact, defendants accepted the bid of a certain bank, approved its bond, and, in violation of the statutes, made it the county depository for the ensuing two years. The writ issued to fetch up the record in that matter by a day certain. On return coming in, such steps were taken that the cause came to judgment, with the result that the proceedings in the county court in that behalf were held irregular and void, and were quashed. From that judgment, defendants appealed to the St. Louis Court of Appeals. That court held it had no jurisdiction, and transferred the case here. 119 Mo. App. 396, 100 S. W. 661. This, on the theory that the case was one "involving the construction of the revenue laws of this state." Section 12, art. 6, Const. (Ann. St. 1906, p. 219); section 5 of the Amendment to the Constitution adopted in 1884 (Rev. St. 1899, p. 93 [Ann. St. 1906, p. 244]).

1. Of Jurisdiction: At the threshold is the question of jurisdiction. The county of McDonald is not a party. The title to real estate is not involved. No federal or constitutional question is lodged in the case. There is no amount in dispute disclosed in the record, and if the Supreme Court has jurisdiction of the appeal it is because the case involves "the construction of the revenue laws of this state," as suggested by the Court of Appeals.

(a) Speaking broadly, the revenue laws of the state are found bundled together as articles 1 to 12, inclusive, of chapter 149, Rev. St. 1899 (Ann. St. 1906, pp. 4198-4322), under the caption "Revenue," and in acts of the Legislature amendatory thereof and supplemental thereto, passed since the revision of 1899. But the subject of revenue is dealt with in the Constitution, and is involved in other statutes. Hence the fact that the subject-matter of county depositaries is found classified under the title of "Counties" in chapter 97 would not alone control, if it were found that in article 6 of that chapter, under the subtitle "County Depositary," a provision relating to revenue had place. The subtitle of "County Treasurers and County Warrants" (article 4) is also found classified under the main title of "Counties" in chapter 97, and some provisions of that article clearly relate to revenue; for example, section 6810 makes county warrants receivable for taxes, and other provisions relate to registration of county warrants and the order of priority of their payment, which, as presently seen, has been ruled to concern revenue. In this connection it may be said that the constitutional phrase under review does not relate alone to the assessment of property, the levy or collection of taxes, licenses, etc., but "revenue laws of this state" may well include statutes concerning the disbursement of the revenue as well as the gathering of it into the county or state chest.

(b) There being no adjudication of this court directly in point, and none laying down general rules or providing a standard whereby a statute may be determined to be a revenue law or not, we must look to the good sense of the thing and to our decisions on kindred matters, which, by parity of reasoning, may give out an interpreting side hight. The working theory whereby courts get at the meaning of a constitutional provision, clothed in general language, as is the one up for consideration, is to gradually and guardedly approach its full construction by a process of evolution by inclusion and exclusion, as cases arise. With that end in view, the drift and trend of the judicial mind is discoverable by an analysis of the decided cases. Let us attend to them. Hilton v. Smith, 134 Mo. 499, 33 S. W. 464, 35 S. W. 1137, was a controversy between two interpleading parties, each claiming a fund. The claim of one of the parties arose under abandoned tax laws. The construction of these laws was held in judgment. So, too, another question was in the case, viz., the interpretation of the phrase "the owner of the property," found in the provisions of the revenue chapter relating to suits for the recovery of back taxes. Though the Hilton Case involved an amount in dispute less than conferred jurisdiction on this court, yet jurisdiction was retained on the ground that the construction of the revenue laws was involved. Moore v. Vaughan, 127 Mo. 538, 30 S. W. 162, was a suit for the collection of a $4-poll tax; the plaintiff being a road overseer. The cause was sent here by the St. Louis Court of Appeals. 53 Mo. App. 632. The point to be ruled was the construction of section 7815, Rev. St. 1889, in the chapter entitled "Roads and Highways." That section concerns the listing of able-bodied male persons between 21 and 50 years of age for poll-tax purposes. We retained jurisdiction, on the theory the construction of the revenue laws was involved as held by the Court of Appeals. However, in State ex rel. v. Holland, 186 Mo. 222, 85 S. W. 356, another poll-tax case, we declined jurisdiction. This, on the theory that the only question involved was one of practice, viz., the sufficiency of the statement filed before the justice of the peace. In that case it seems there was testimony, nisi, tending to establish facts within the purview of the poll-tax law, as set forth in the general statutes relating to roads and highways. However, presently in Sone v. Wallendorf, 187 Mo. 1, 85 S. W. 592, a similar state of things was held in judgment by this court in banc. There it was unanimously ruled that a construction of the revenue laws was involved, although the case finally rode off on a construction of the general provisions of the statute relating to practice before justices of the peace. In State ex rel. Shannon County v. Hawkins, 169 Mo. 615, 70 S. W. 119, jurisdiction was retained on two grounds: First, because the county was a party, and, second, because the revenue laws were involved,...