State v. Adkins
| Decision Date | 10 March 2009 |
| Docket Number | No. DA 07-0245.,DA 07-0245. |
| Citation | 2009 MT 71,204 P.3d 1 |
| Parties | STATE of Montana, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. David ADKINS, Defendant and Appellant. |
| Court | Montana Supreme Court |
For Appellant: Jim Wheelis, Chief Appellate Defender; Koan Mercer, Assistant Appellate Defender; Helena, Montana.
For Appellee: Hon. Steve Bullock, Montana Attorney General; David Ole Olson, Assistant Attorney General; Helena, Montana, Brant S. Light, Cascade County Attorney; Joel Thompson, Deputy County Attorney; Great Falls, Montana.
¶ 1 David Neil Adkins ("Adkins") appeals from rulings of the Eighth Judicial District Court denying his untimely motions to suppress un-Mirandized statements that led to the discovery of evidence which ultimately led to his conviction for felony Criminal Possession of Dangerous Drugs and misdemeanor Criminal Possession of Drug Paraphernalia. We affirm.
¶ 2 In April of 2006, Adkins was implicated in a methamphetamine distribution ring. The individual implicating Adkins also indicated that Adkins kept a small amount of methamphetamine at his residence. With the assistance of Adkins's probation officer, agents from the Central Montana Drug Task Force ("CMDTF") decided to conduct a probation search of Adkins's residence, planning to use any methamphetamine found as leverage to gain his cooperation in their larger investigation. The agents met Adkins in his driveway, searched his person pursuant to the terms of his probation, and explained that he had been implicated in the methamphetamine ring. Upon the agents' inquiry, Adkins indicated he had a personal use amount of methamphetamine and paraphernalia hidden in his basement, which the agents retrieved. Adkins spent the next eleven days sequestered in a hotel room, cooperating with the CMDTF investigation into the larger methamphetamine distribution ring in exchange for their promise not to bring federal charges against him.
¶ 3 On May 25, 2006, Adkins was charged with felony Criminal Possession of Dangerous Drugs With Intent to Distribute (hereinafter "intent to distribute") and misdemeanor Criminal Possession of Drug Paraphernalia. Adkins pled not guilty to both charges, and a jury trial was scheduled. For reasons not relevant to this opinion, at the omnibus hearing on November 15, 2006, the trial date was continued upon Adkins's motion and the court extended the deadline for filing pretrial motions to November 29, 2006. On November 27, 2006, the State moved to amend the information to add an alternative count of felony Criminal Possession of Dangerous Drugs (hereinafter "straight possession"), which the District Court granted. On November 28, 2006, Adkins filed a motion to suppress statements made during his eleven day sequestration in the hotel room, alleging the CMDTF agents had not complied with the requirements set forth in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). Adkins was arraigned on the straight possession charge and entered a plea of not guilty. On January 23, 2007, the day before the court heard argument on Adkins's motion to suppress, the State again moved to amend the information to dismiss the intent to distribute charge.
¶ 4 At the hearing, the District Court determined that, in light of the State's decision to prosecute Adkins solely for the straight possession charge, Adkins's motion to suppress statements made in the hotel room (which formed the basis for the intent to distribute charge) was rendered moot. The court's decision was based in part upon the State's representation that the remaining charges were based solely on events that occurred during the initial encounter with the CMDTF agents at Adkins's residence, prior to his sequestration in the hotel room. Adkins's defense counsel strenuously objected, arguing that the straight possession charge constituted a new charge of which Adkins had no notice. Counsel therefore argued Adkins needed additional time to file a new motion to suppress statements he made to the CMDTF officers during the initial encounter which ultimately resulted in the recovery of methamphetamine and paraphernalia from his residence.
¶ 5 The District Court explained to Adkins's counsel that the straight possession charge was not new, rather, that Adkins had notice of both the charge and the underlying facts since at least November 27, 2006, when the prosecution amended the information to add the alternative charge. The court noted that what Adkins's counsel alleged was an "11th hour" change in the charges was actually of benefit to Adkins—that the State was simply removing the more serious alternative charge from the information. Ultimately, the court denied Adkins's oral motion to continue, maintaining the scheduled trial date.
¶ 6 On January 25, 2007, Adkins filed a "Motion for a Hearing on Miranda." In substance, the motion sought to exclude the statements Adkins made to the CMDTF agents which led to the discovery of methamphetamine and paraphernalia in his basement. The District Court denied the motion as untimely. A jury trial was held, and Adkins was convicted of both charges.
¶ 7 We restate the dispositive issues on appeal:
¶ 8 1. Was the District Court required to hold a second omnibus hearing upon Adkins's arraignment on an alternative charge where the factual basis for the alternative charge was the same as the factual basis for the initial charges?
¶ 9 2. Did the District Court err in denying Adkins's motion for a suppression hearing as untimely?
¶ 10 3. Was Adkins denied effective assistance of counsel?
¶ 11 A district court's determination that a motion to suppress is untimely is a conclusion of law which we review for correctness. State v. VonBergen, 2003 MT 265, ¶ 7, 317 Mont. 445, 77 P.3d 537. We review for abuse of discretion a district court's determination of the existence of good cause to grant relief from a waiver of an untimely motion to suppress. VonBergen, ¶ 18. We similarly review a district court's trial administration rulings for abuse of discretion. State v. Price, 2006 MT 79, ¶ 17, 331 Mont. 502, 134 P.3d 45. Finally, claims of ineffective assistance of counsel implicate mixed questions of law and fact for which our review is de novo. State v. Wood, 2008 MT 298, ¶ 19, 345 Mont. 487, 191 P.3d 463.
¶ 12 As a threshold matter, Adkins's assertion that the dispositive issue on appeal is whether the CMDTF agents' un-Mirandized questioning violated his constitutional rights is not well taken. It is well established that this Court should avoid constitutional issues whenever possible. See e.g. Sunburst Sch. Dist. No. 2 v. Texaco, Inc., 2007 MT 183, ¶ 62, 338 Mont. 259, 165 P.3d 1079. Where, as here, we deem it possible to resolve the merits of an appeal without resort to a resolution of constitutional questions presented, we take that approach. Sunburst, ¶ 62. We therefore turn to the dispositive issues on appeal.
¶ 13 1. Was the District Court required to hold a second omnibus hearing upon Adkins's arraignment on an alternative charge where the factual basis for the alternative charge was the same as the factual basis for the initial charges?
¶ 14 Section 46-13-110(1), MCA, provides that the District Court shall hold an omnibus hearing "within a reasonable time following the entry of a not guilty plea but not less than 30 days before trial." The District Court may grant the State leave to substantively amend an information up until five days before trial. Section 46-11-205(1), MCA. Where the State substantively amends an information, the defendant must be given a reasonable time to prepare for trial on the amended information. Section 46-11-205(2), MCA. The criminal procedure statutes are silent as to whether a new omnibus hearing is required where a criminal defendant is arraigned on an alternative charge in an amended information. However, failure to hold an omnibus hearing where such failure prejudiced the defendant may constitute reversible error. Section 46-20-701(1), MCA.
¶ 15 Adkins contends that the plain language of § 46-13-110(1), MCA, required the District Court to hold a new omnibus hearing after he entered a plea of not guilty to the alternative straight possession charge contained in the amended information. The State counters that the factual basis underlying the intent to distribute charge was identical to the factual basis underlying the straight possession charge, and thus a new omnibus hearing was not required because it would serve no practical purpose. Essentially, the State argues that the District Court correctly concluded that "nothing had changed."
¶ 16 We find the State's logic persuasive. Adkins was originally arraigned on the intent to distribute charge. The charge of Possession of Dangerous Drugs With the Intent to Distribute is predicated on a criminal defendant's possession of dangerous drugs. Here, the intent to distribute charge was predicated on Adkins's possession of the drugs found in his basement. Therefore, the factual basis underlying the amended charge of straight possession was identical to the factual basis underlying the intent to distribute charge for which an omnibus hearing had already been held. Where, as here, the State amends an information to charge an alternate, lesser included offense which is supported by an identical factual basis, the District Court is not required to hold a new omnibus hearing.
¶ 17 This conclusion is consistent with a holistic view of our criminal procedure statutes and relevant case law. Conspicuously absent from § 46-11-205, MCA, which provides for a substantive amendment of an information up to five days before trial, is language requiring that a new omnibus hearing be held. Rather, the statute logically provides that the defendant must be given a reasonable time to prepare for trial on the...
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