State v. Agnello

• Decision Date: 20 May 1999
• Docket Number: No. 96-3406-CR,96-3406-CR
• Citation: 593 N.W.2d 427,226 Wis.2d 164
• Parties: STATE of Wisconsin, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Lucian AGNELLO, Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner.
• Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Page 427

593 N.W.2d 427

226 Wis.2d 164

STATE of Wisconsin, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Lucian AGNELLO, Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner.

No. 96-3406-CR.

Supreme Court of Wisconsin.

Argued Jan. 15, 1999.

Decided May 20, 1999.

For the defendant-appellant-petitioner there were briefs by Jerome F. Buting, Pamela Moorshead and Buting Williams, S.C., Brookfield and oral argument by Jerome F. Buting.

For the plaintiff-appellant the cause was argued by Gregory M. Posner-Weber, assistant attorney general, with whom on the brief was James E. Doyle, attorney general.

¶1 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J

The petitioner, Lucian Agnello, seeks review of an unpublished decision of the court of appeals ¹ that affirmed the circuit court's finding that he voluntarily confessed to murdering his foster father. Agnello contends that the circuit court erroneously allowed the State to question him about the truthfulness of his confession at the Goodchild ² hearing and that this error tainted the circuit court's finding that his confession was voluntarily given. Because we conclude that Agnello preserved this issue for appeal, that the prosecutor improperly questioned Agnello about the truthfulness of his confession, and that the circuit court based its finding in part on Agnello's responses to the improper questions, we reverse the court of appeals and remand the cause to the circuit court. Additionally, we determine that on remand the State will need to prove Agnello's confession was voluntarily given by a preponderance of the evidence.

¶2 In February of 1996, the Milwaukee Police Department arrested Agnello in connection with the murder of his foster father, Theodore Agnello. Between midnight and 1:00 a.m., the police transported Agnello to the downtown station and placed him in a standard interrogation room where he remained alone and handcuffed to a wall until the police began interrogating him at 6:00 a.m. ³ From approximately 6:00 a.m. to 8:20 a.m., two detectives questioned him about his foster father's death. After over a 90-minute break, two other detectives began interrogating him at 10:15 a.m. This session continued, with significant breaks interspersed, until 3:20 p.m.

¶3 Whenever the police left Agnello alone in the room he was handcuffed to a wall; during his interrogation he was not handcuffed. From the time he was placed in the room until he confessed, the police allowed Agnello to use the bathroom once or twice and also fed him a hamburger. Agnello's ability to sleep was hampered both by the periods of interrogation and by being handcuffed to the wall. At 3:20 p.m. Agnello confessed to murdering his foster father and signed a written confession.

¶4 After being charged with first degree intentional homicide ⁴ and party to a crime, ⁵ Agnello filed a motion to suppress his confession on two grounds. First, Agnello alleged that his confession was obtained in violation of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), because the police did not honor his requests for an attorney. Second, Agnello alleged that his confession was not freely and voluntarily given because the police coerced him into confessing. The circuit court then held a Miranda-Goodchild hearing at which Agnello testified. On cross-examination, the following exchange occurred:

PROSECUTOR: Q. Sir, you signed the statement at the end and you wrote down the words, "this is true"; is that correct?

A. I wrote down the words?

Q. Answer my question. Did you write it down?

A. Yes, I was told to.

Q. And you wrote down, "this is true," and you signed it; is that right?

A. Yes, I was told to.

Q. And you did that because what is in the statement is true; is that correct?

A. No. Because I was extremely tired and scared.

...

Q. You told them that the shotgun was in Mr. Stream's attic; is that correct?

A. Yes.

Q. And you told them that you and Mr. Stream had planned on this killing; is that correct?

A. I don't quite remember that.

Q. You could have told them that? You don't remember telling them that?

A. I don't remember that.

Q. But you and Mr. Stream had planned this killing; is that correct?

DEFENSE COUNSEL: I object, Your Honor. I don't think that is relative ⁶ [sic] to the purposes of this hearing.

THE COURT: This goes to his credibility. Answer the question.

The remainder of Agnello's cross-examination consisted of the prosecutor attempting to ascertain whether or not statements in his confession were true and Agnello evasively answering those questions.

¶5 At the close of the Miranda-Goodchild hearing the circuit court concluded that the police officers' testimony of the events was more credible than that of Agnello, in part because of what the court described as Agnello's "selective memory." The court then concluded that the police did not run afoul of Miranda because Agnello did not request an attorney. ⁷ Finally, the court concluded that the police did not engage in any coercive tactics and that Agnello's confession was a "voluntary product of his free will." Agnello then pled guilty and was sentenced to life in prison.

¶6 On appeal, Agnello argued that the circuit court erred under Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 81 S.Ct. 735, 5 L.Ed.2d 760 (1961), and Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 84 S.Ct. 1774, 12 L.Ed.2d 908 (1964), by allowing the prosecutor to question Agnello about the truthfulness of his confession. The court of appeals concluded that Agnello waived his right to appeal this issue because his relevancy objection did not adequately apprise the circuit court of the basis of his objection. In order to have a valid objection, the court of appeals reasoned that Agnello needed to reference more specifically the Supreme Court's rulings that the truthfulness of a confession may not be considered in a voluntariness determination. The court of appeals determined that as it was stated, Agnello's objection did not adequately inform the circuit court of his objection and as a result did not give the circuit court the opportunity to assess and correct any constitutional error.

¶7 Agnello also argued that the circuit court erred in concluding that his confession was voluntary. The court of appeals concluded that the State's burden is a preponderance of the evidence and that Agnello argued to the circuit court only that his confession was involuntary because he was deprived of sleep. Based upon a review of the circuit court's findings of fact, the court of appeals determined that Agnello's confession was voluntary.

¶8 On petition to this court Agnello challenges nearly every aspect of the court of appeals' ruling. Specifically, he argues that his relevancy objection during cross-examination adequately preserved the issue for appeal. Agnello contends that the circuit court committed constitutional error under Rogers and Jackson by allowing the prosecutor to question him about the truthfulness of his confession. He also argues that, contrary to the court of appeals' decision, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant voluntarily confessed. ⁸

¶9 Whether an objection adequately preserves an issue for appeal requires a court to apply a set of facts to a legal standard. This is a question of law that we review independently of the legal determinations rendered by the court of appeals and circuit court but benefiting from their analyses. In re Corey J.G., 215 Wis.2d 395, 405, 572 N.W.2d 845 (1998).

¶10 The necessity of lodging an adequate objection to preserve an issue for appeal cannot be overstated. We have written on numerous occasions that in order to maintain an objection on appeal, the objector must articulate the specific grounds for the objection unless its basis is obvious from its context. Id.; State v. Caban, 210 Wis.2d 597, 604, 563 N.W.2d 501 (1997); State v. Marks, 194 Wis.2d 79, 88, 533 N.W.2d 730 (1995). This rule exists in large part so that both parties and courts have notice of the disputed issues as well as a fair opportunity to prepare and address them in a way that most efficiently uses judicial resources. Corey J.G., 215 Wis.2d at 405, 572 N.W.2d 845; Caban, 210 Wis.2d at 605, 563 N.W.2d 501.

¶11 The State maintains that Agnello's relevancy objection was insufficient to alert the circuit court of the "specific ground for the objection." See Daniel Blinka, 7 Wisconsin Practice: Evidence, § 103, p. 8 (1991). It contends that the legal theory of relevancy advanced by Agnello was neither stated with sufficient specificity nor obvious and commonplace so as to be immediately recognized by the court. The State contends in its brief that Agnello should have alerted the circuit court to the existence of Rogers and Jackson, although at oral argument it backed away slightly from this chapter and verse recitation requirement. Regardless of which degree of specificity it would impose on Agnello, the State argues that had Agnello alerted the court to his concerns, both the State and the court could have reacted in such manner to insure that any error was eliminated and appellate review on this issue would have been unnecessary.

¶12 There is no question that Agnello's objection was not as specific as it could have been. The addition of a short phrase, such as "the truthfulness of a confession has no bearing on voluntariness," would have gone a long way to eliminate any confusion over the nature of the objection. However, we have never required an objection to be as specific as possible to be effective. All that we have required of a party is to object in such a way that the objection's words or context alert the court of its basis. Corey J.G., 215 Wis.2d at 405, 572 N.W.2d 845. In this instance, the context of the objection and the status of the law in this area gravitate toward a conclusion that Agnello has preserved this issue for appeal.

¶13 It is well settled constitutional law that the truthfulness of a confession can play no role in determining whether that confession was voluntarily given. Jackson, ...