State v. Ainsworth, 20130924–CA.

• Decision Date: 07 January 2016
• Docket Number: No. 20130924–CA.,20130924–CA.
• Citation: 365 P.3d 1227
• Parties: STATE of Utah, Appellee, v. Thomas Randall AINSWORTH, Appellant.
• Court: Utah Court of Appeals

365 P.3d 1227

STATE of Utah, Appellee,

v.Thomas Randall AINSWORTH, Appellant.

No. 20130924–CA.

Court of Appeals of Utah.

Jan. 7, 2016.

David P.S. Mack, Caleb J. Cunningham, and Lori J. Seppi, for Appellant.

Sean D. Reyes and Jeffrey S. Gray, Salt Lake City, for Appellee.

Senior Judge RUSSELL W. BENCH authored this Opinion, in which Judges J. FREDERIC VOROS JR. and STEPHEN L. ROTH concurred.¹

Opinion

BENCH, Senior Judge:

¶ 1 Thomas Randall Ainsworth appeals his convictions and sentences for three counts of driving with a measurable amount of a controlled substance in his body and negligently causing death or serious bodily injury, second-degree felonies. See Utah Code Ann. § 58–37–8(2)(g)–(h) (LexisNexis Supp. 2015). We vacate Ainsworth's second-degree felony convictions and remand for the district court to enter a judgment of conviction for three third-degree felonies and to resentence him accordingly.

BACKGROUND

¶ 2 Ainsworth's actions led to a great tragedy. On December 24, 2011, Ainsworth drove over a median into oncoming traffic and crashed head-on into another vehicle. The driver and front passenger sustained serious injury as a result of the crash, and their eighteen-month-old child was killed. Ainsworth informed police that he had dropped his cell phone on the floor of his vehicle and was reaching for it when he lost control of the vehicle. Following the accident, Ainsworth's blood tested positive for methamphetamine.

¶ 3 Ainsworth was charged with three counts of driving with a measurable amount of a controlled substance in the body and negligently causing death or serious bodily injury, each a second-degree felony. Ainsworth moved to amend one of these counts to automobile homicide, a third-degree felony, and the other two to driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs and causing serious bodily injury (DUI With Serious Injury), also a third-degree felony, on the ground that section 58–37–8(2)(g) and (h) of the Utah Code (the Measurable Amount Statute), under which he was charged, violate the Utah Constitution's uniform operation of laws provision. In the alternative, he moved the court to reduce all three of his charges to third-degree felonies. The district court denied Ainsworth's motion. Ainsworth then moved the court to declare the Measurable Amount Statute unconstitutional as applied and to reconsider the motion to amend. The district court again denied Ainsworth's motion.

¶ 4 Ainsworth pleaded guilty to all three charges under the Measurable Amount Statute but reserved his right to appeal the constitutionality of the statute. Ainsworth requested concurrent sentencing, but the district court ordered that Ainsworth serve three consecutive prison terms of one to fifteen years each. Ainsworth now appeals.

ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW

¶ 5 Ainsworth first asserts that the district court erred in concluding that the Measurable Amount Statute was constitutional. "Constitutional challenges to statutes present questions of law, which we review for correctness." State v. Robinson, 2011 UT 30, ¶ 7, 254 P.3d 183 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

¶ 6 Ainsworth also asserts that the district court exceeded its discretion by imposing consecutive sentences. "Because trial courts are afforded wide latitude in sentencing, a court's sentencing decision is reviewed for an abuse of discretion." State v. Epling, 2011 UT App 229, ¶ 8, 262 P.3d 440 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

ANALYSIS

I. Constitutionality of the Measurable Amount Statute

¶ 7 Ainsworth asserts that the Measurable Amount Statute violates Article I, Section 24 of the Utah Constitution, known as the uniform operation of laws provision, by making impermissible distinctions between those who may be charged under the Automobile Homicide Statute and the DUI With Serious Injury Statute and those who may be charged under the Measurable Amount Statute.

¶ 8 Under the Automobile Homicide Statute, a person who, while "under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or the combined influence of alcohol and any drug to a degree that renders the person incapable of safely operating a vehicle," "operates a motor vehicle in a negligent manner causing the death of another" commits a third-degree felony. Utah Code Ann. § 76–5–207(2)(a) (LexisNexis 2012). Under the DUI With Serious Injury Statute, a person who, while "under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or the combined influence of alcohol and any drug to a degree that renders the person incapable of safely operating a vehicle," "inflicted serious bodily injury upon another as a proximate result of having operated the vehicle in a negligent manner" also commits a third-degree felony. Id. §§ 41–6a–502(1)(b), –503(2)(a) (2014). But under the Measurable Amount Statute, a person who, "in an offense not amounting to a violation of [the Automobile Homicide Statute]," "knowingly and intentionally [has] in the person's body any measurable amount" of a Schedule I or II controlled substance (such as methamphetamine) without a valid prescription, "operates a motor vehicle ... in a negligent manner," and causes either death or serious bodily injury to another commits a second-degree felony. Id. § 58–37–8(2)(a)(i), (g), (h)(i) (Supp. 2015).

¶ 9 Ainsworth asserts that the Measurable Amount Statute violates the uniform operation of laws provision in two ways: first, by distinguishing between those who have a prescription for a controlled substance and those who do not and, second, by classifying a violation of the Measurable Amount Statute by use of a Schedule I or II controlled substance as a second-degree felony, while classifying the more culpable offenses of Automobile Homicide and DUI With Serious Injury as third-degree felonies. We agree with the State that the legislature has a reasonable objective for distinguishing between prescription and nonprescription users of controlled substances. However, there does not appear to be any rational basis for punishing individuals who have "any measurable amount" of controlled substance in their bodies more harshly than individuals who have an incapacitating amount of the substance in their bodies.

¶ 10 The uniform operation of laws provision mandates that "[a]ll laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation." Utah Const. art. I, § 24. This provision is an "analogue to the federal due process guarantee," Wood v. University of Utah Med. Ctr., 2002 UT 134, ¶ 33, 67 P.3d 436, but may, "in some circumstances, [be] more rigorous than the standard applied under the federal constitution," Gallivan v. Walker, 2002 UT 89, ¶ 33, 54 P.3d 1069 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

In analyzing the constitutionality of a statutory scheme under the uniform operation of laws provision[ ] we engage in a three-part inquiry. First, we determine what, if any, classification is created under the statute. Second, we inquire into whether the classification imposes on similarly situated persons disparate treatment. Finally, we analyze the scheme to determine if the legislature had any reasonable objective that warrants the disparity.

State v. Drej, 2010 UT 35, ¶ 34, 233 P.3d 476 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). To determine whether the legislature had a reasonable objective to warrant a disparity, we must consider "(1) whether the classification is reasonable, (2) whether the objectives of the legislative action are legitimate, and (3) whether there is a reasonable relationship between the classification and the legislative purpose." State v. Robinson, 2011 UT 30, ¶ 22, 254 P.3d 183. "Broad deference is given to the legislature when assessing the reasonableness of its classifications and their relationship to legitimate legislative purposes." Id. ¶ 23 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

¶ 11 Ainsworth first challenges the Measurable Amount Statute's distinction between those who use controlled substances without a prescription and those who use them with a prescription. Those who have a prescription for a controlled substance may be charged only under the Automobile Homicide Statute or the DUI With Serious Injury Statute, not the Measurable Amount Statute. See Utah Code Ann. § 58–37–8(2)(a)(i), (g)(i) (exempting from the Measurable Amount Statute those who have a valid prescription). In other words, unlike nonprescription users, prescription users can be charged with no more than a third-degree felony² and can be convicted only if the State demonstrates that they were intoxicated to a degree that rendered them incapable of safely operating a motor vehicle. See id. § 41–6a–503(2)(a) (2014); id. § 76–5–207(2)(a) (2012). Thus, the Measurable Amount Statute creates a classification. Because the same drugs may be used by both types of users and the existence of a prescription presumably does not alter the effect of the drug, we conclude that prescription and nonprescription users of controlled substances are similarly situated.

¶ 12 However, the classification does not violate the uniform operation of laws provision, because the legislature had a reasonable basis for making the classification. Ainsworth asserts that the distinction between prescription and nonprescription users of methamphetamine is not supported by a reasonable legislative objective "because the harm presented by a person driving with methamphetamine in his system is the same regardless of whether he has a prescription." Ainsworth's assertion rests on the mistaken assumption that the only rational objective the legislature could have in distinguishing between prescription and nonprescription users of controlled substances is the relative danger they pose when driving. But the legislature also has a legitimate interest in regulating the use of controlled substances due to their high potential for abuse. Those who use such substances pursuant to a valid prescription are subject to controls and safeguards, including, among other things, limits on their dosages and regulation of...