State v. Robinson

Decision Date10 June 2011
Docket NumberNo. 20090015.,20090015.
Citation2011 UT 30,684 Utah Adv. Rep. 34,254 P.3d 183
PartiesSTATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee,v.Chance L. ROBINSON, Defendant and Appellant.
CourtUtah Supreme Court

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Mark L. Shurtleff, Att'y Gen., Jeffrey S. Gray, Asst. Att'y Gen., Salt Lake City, for plaintiff.Matthew R. Howell, Provo, for defendant

On Certification from the Utah Court of Appeals

Justice NEHRING, opinion of the Court:

INTRODUCTION

¶ 1 Chance Robinson was charged with unlawful possession or use of a controlled substance based on the presence of methamphetamine in his bloodstream. The charge was grounded on provisions of the Utah Controlled Substances Act that make it unlawful for any person to “knowingly and intentionally” have “any measurable amount of a controlled substance in [his or her] body.” 1 We are asked to determine whether this “measurable amount” provision violates the Utah or the United States Constitution. We hold that it does not and affirm the decision of the district court.

BACKGROUND

¶ 2 On August 10, 2007, Mr. Robinson was stopped by Lehi City police officers on suspicion of driving without insurance. Because Mr. Robinson had difficulty speaking and his eyes were bloodshot and glassy, one of the officers administered multiple sobriety tests. After Mr. Robinson failed the sobriety tests, he was arrested for driving under the influence.

¶ 3 At the police station, Mr. Robinson admitted using heroin twelve hours earlier. He also submitted to breath, urine, and blood tests. The urinalysis tested positive for cocaine and benzodiazepine. The blood analysis tested positive for methamphetamine.

¶ 4 Mr. Robinson was charged initially with various offenses not at issue in this appeal.2 The State subsequently added a charge of possession or use of methamphetamine after Mr. Robinson's blood tested positive for methamphetamine. The charge was based on a provision of the Utah Controlled Substances Act that makes it unlawful for any person to “knowingly and intentionally” 3 have “any measurable amount of a controlled substance in [his or her] body.” 4

¶ 5 At the preliminary hearing on the methamphetamine charge, Mr. Robinson argued that the “measurable amount” provision was an unconstitutional “status offense” under Robinson v. California.5 The district court found probable cause to bind over as to the methamphetamine charge, but allowed Mr. Robinson to file a motion to quash the bindover based on his constitutional arguments. After both parties briefed and argued the constitutional issues, 6 the district court held that the measurable amount provision was not unconstitutional under Robinson and denied Mr. Robinson's motion to quash the bindover order for the methamphetamine charge.

¶ 6 Mr. Robinson subsequently entered a conditional guilty plea to possession or use of methamphetamine and driving with a measurable amount of a controlled substance in his body. As part of the plea agreement, Mr. Robinson reserved the right to appeal the district court's denial of his motion to quash the bindover order for the methamphetamine charge,7 which he now exercises. On appeal, Mr. Robinson contends that Utah's measurable amount provision violates the Utah and United States Constitutions. We have jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code section 78A–3–102(3)(b) (Supp.2010).

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 7 “Constitutional challenges to statutes present questions of law, which we review for correctness.” 8

ANALYSIS

¶ 8 The Utah Controlled Substances Act makes it unlawful “for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess or use a controlled substance” in Utah without a valid prescription.9 ‘Possession’ or ‘use’ includes “the application, inhalation, swallowing, injection, or consumption” of a controlled substance.10 “Consumption” is defined, in turn, as “ingesting or having any measurable amount of a controlled substance in a person's body.” 11 When read together, the “measurable amount” provision of the Act makes it unlawful for any person to “knowingly and intentionally” have “any measurable amount of a controlled substance in [his or her] body.” 12

¶ 9 Mr. Robinson contends that the measurable amount provision violates the due process and the uniform operation of laws clause of the Utah Constitution. Next, he argues that the measurable amount provision violates the constitutional principles set forth under the United States Supreme Court's decision in Robinson v. California.13 For the reasons that follow, we hold that the measurable amount provision does not violate the Utah or the United States Constitution.14

I. THE MEASURABLE AMOUNT PROVISION OF THE UTAH CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES ACT DOES NOT VIOLATE THE DUE PROCESS OR THE UNIFORM OPERATION OF LAWS CLAUSE OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION

¶ 10 Mr. Robinson contends that Utah's measurable amount provision violates the due process and the uniform operation of laws clause of the Utah Constitution. We disagree and address each argument in turn.

A. The Measurable Amount Provision Does Not Violate the Due Process Clause of the Utah Constitution

¶ 11 Article I, section 7 of the Utah Constitution states, “No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law.” 15 Mr. Robinson contends that the measurable amount provision violates the due process clause because it exposes a person to criminal liability for unintentional or involuntary conduct. This argument relies on Mr. Robinson's erroneous belief that a defendant can be convicted under the measurable amount provision based solely on the presence of a controlled substance in his body. For instance, Mr. Robinson argues that a defendant can be convicted even if a third party injects a controlled substance into the defendant's body while he is asleep or over his objection. Likewise, Mr. Robinson argues that a defendant would be subject to prosecution after unintentionally inhaling secondhand marijuana smoke from another person.

¶ 12 None of Mr. Robinson's hypothetical applications of the measurable amount provision are plausible. The measurable amount provision makes it unlawful for any person to “ knowingly and intentionally ” have “any measurable amount of a controlled substance in [his or her] body.” 16 A person cannot “knowingly and intentionally” have a controlled substance in his body unless he first introduces the substance into his body voluntarily. Thus, the State cannot convict a defendant under the measurable amount provision by simply presenting evidence that the illegal substance was present in the defendant's body; it must also prove that the defendant “knowingly and intentionally” introduced the substance into his body.

¶ 13 Next, Mr. Robinson argues that his conviction violates his due process rights because the State did not present any evidence that he “actually ingested the methamphetamine into his body in a voluntary or knowing manner.” Mr. Robinson misapprehends the nature of his conviction. Mr. Robinson pled guilty to “knowingly and intentionally” possessing or using methamphetamine and admitted that methamphetamine was present in his blood at the time of arrest. By pleading guilty, he relieved the State of its burden to prove the elements of the crime charged.17 As we previously explained, one of those elements is that the defendant “knowingly and intentionally” introduced the illegal substance into his body. Thus, contrary to his assertions, Mr. Robinson pled guilty to having “ingested methamphetamine into his body in a voluntary [and] knowing manner,” and the State was thereby relieved from presenting any evidence to that effect.

¶ 14 Finally, Mr. Robinson argues that his conviction under the measurable amount provision violates his due process rights because, even if he knowingly and intentionally ingested methamphetamine, “there [was] nothing [he] could do to conform his actions to the requirements of [the measurable amount provision] but “wait until his body's natural metabolic processes cleansed his system.” Mr. Robinson claims that this situation is particularly egregious because the ingestion could have occurred in a jurisdiction where methamphetamine is subject to lesser penalties.

¶ 15 Mr. Robinson's only attempt to anchor this argument to any legal authority is his assertion that “if due process [under the Utah Constitution] is to mean anything beyond notice and a hearing, it has to mean that a person cannot be prosecuted and convicted for something beyond his ability to control.” And his only support for this assertion is a bald citation to Swayne v. L.D.S. Social Services18 and Ellis v. Social Services Department of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints.19 But these cases simply hold that due process requires that a person be given “a reasonable opportunity to comply with the statute.” 20 We conclude that the measurable amount provision meets this standard.

¶ 16 To start, the measurable amount provision provides clear notice that it is unlawful for any person to have a controlled substance in his body while he is in Utah so long as he “knowingly and intentionally” introduced the substance into his body.21 Accordingly, Mr. Robinson could have complied with the measurable amount provision by refusing to introduce methamphetamine into his body in the first place. And even if Mr. Robinson introduced the methamphetamine into his body in another jurisdiction, he could have complied with the measurable amount provision by choosing to remain outside Utah's borders until the methamphetamine22 was no longer present in his body.23 We therefore reject Mr. Robinson's contention that the measurable amount provision violates the due process clause of the Utah Constitution.

B. The Measurable Amount Provision Does Not Violate the Uniform Operation of Laws Clause of the Utah Constitution

¶ 17 Mr. Robinson also contends that Utah's measurable amount provision violates the uniform operation of laws clause of the Utah Constitution. Article I, section 24 of the Utah Constitution provides, ...

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