State v. Alba

• Citation: 341 P.3d 91,2015 OK CR 2
• Decision Date: 16 January 2015
• Docket Number: No. S–2014–175.,S–2014–175.
• Parties: STATE of Oklahoma, Appellant, v. Veronica McLaina ALBA, Appellee.
• Court: United States State Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma. Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma

341 P.3d 91
2015 OK CR 2

STATE of Oklahoma, Appellant
v.
Veronica McLaina ALBA, Appellee.

No. S–2014–175.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma.

Jan. 16, 2015.

Brett Chapman, Assistant District Attorney, Claremore, OK, for Appellant.

Jeffrey A. Price, Attorney at Law, Claremore, OK, for Appellee.

OPINION

JOHNSON, Judge.

¶ 1 Appellee Veronica McLaina Alba was charged with Driving a Motor Vehicle While Under the Influence of Alcohol in violation of

341 P.3d 92

47 O.S.2011, § 11–902(A)(2), in Rogers County District Court, Case Number CM–2013–574. Alba filed a motion to suppress and a hearing was held on this motion on February 4, 2014. The district court judge did not rule on the motion at that time but took the matter under advisement. On February 11, 2014, Judge Terrell S. Crosson granted Alba's motion to suppress. Appellant, the State of Oklahoma, appeals the suppression order. We exercise jurisdiction pursuant to 22 O.S.2011, § 1053, reverse the district court's suppression order, and remand for further proceedings.

BACKGROUND

¶ 2 Around 4:00 p.m. on July 16, 2013, Claremore Police Lieutenant Steve Cox received a call from dispatch advising him of a possibly intoxicated driver. Dispatch told Lieutenant Cox that a concerned citizen called and reported that she had seen a woman at a mobile home park who appeared to be intoxicated get into a black SUV and start driving. The caller, who identified herself and gave dispatch her telephone number, reported that she observed the woman walk face first into a light pole before she got into her vehicle, that the woman was swaying and having a hard time keeping her eyes open, and that the woman was rolling something in her hands that could have been drugs. The caller described her own vehicle as a maroon SUV and told dispatch that she was following the black SUV. When Lieutenant Cox located the black SUV he noted that it was being followed by a maroon SUV. The woman in the maroon SUV caught Cox's attention and pointed at the black SUV. Cox stopped the black SUV based upon the information given to dispatch by the caller. He did not observe the driver of the black SUV commit any traffic violations.

¶ 3 Alba argued in the motion to suppress that the evidence against her was “fruit of the poisonous tree” because the stop was unlawful and violated her constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. The district court agreed, sustaining the motion to suppress. The State appeals the district court's order sustaining Alba's motion to suppress raising the sole issue of whether error occurred when the district court suppressed the evidence obtained during the investigatory stop. Title 22 O.S.2011, § 1053(5) provides that the State may appeal, “[u]pon a pretrial order, decision, or judgment suppressing or excluding evidence where appellate review of the issue would be in the best interests of justice.” We find that the State's appeal is proper and review of this issue is in the best interests of justice. See State v. Thomas, 2014 OK CR 12, ¶ 3, 334 P.3d 941, 943.

DISCUSSION

¶ 4 The State contends that the stop of Alba's vehicle was not an unreasonable seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and argues that the district court erroneously granted Alba's motion to suppress. When reviewing a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress evidence based on a complaint of an illegal search and seizure, this Court defers to the trial court's findings of fact unless they are not supported by competent evidence and are therefore clearly erroneous. Seabolt v. State, 2006 OK CR 50, ¶ 5, 152 P.3d 235, 237. We review the trial court's legal conclusions based on those facts de novo. Id.

¶ 5 Both the United States and Oklahoma Constitutions guarantee the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV ; Okla. Const. art. 2, § 30. Although Fourth Amendment protections extend to brief investigatory stops of persons or vehicles that fall short of traditional arrest, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1873, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), the police are allowed to conduct brief investigative stops if the officer possesses “reasonable suspicion to believe that criminal activity ‘may be afoot.’ ” United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273, 122 S.Ct. 744, 750, 151 L.Ed.2d 740 (2002). Reasonable suspicion for an investigatory stop may be based on information supplied by another person, and not solely upon an officer's personal observation. Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 147, 92 S.Ct. 1921, 1924, 32 L.Ed.2d 612 (1972).

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¶ 6 The district court's decision to grant Alba's motion to suppress was made in reliance on this Court's ruling in Nilsen v. State, 2009 OK CR 6, 203 P.3d 189. In Nilsen, an officer who observed no traffic violation stopped a vehicle based upon the tip of an anonymous caller that the person operating the vehicle was drinking a beer while driving. This Court found that the seizure was unconstitutional, reasoning as follows:

Because the informant was anonymous, the law enforcement officials had no means of assessing his or her reliability and there was no threat of criminal repercussion in case of false accusation. Further, the informant provided only identifying information and included nothing-not even predictive information-to sufficiently corroborate the allegation of criminal activity. Thus, the anonymous tip lacked

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