State v. Alcantara, 43691

• Decision Date: 05 August 1976
• Docket Number: No. 43691,43691
• Citation: 552 P.2d 1049,87 Wn.2d 393
• Parties: STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Joseph E. ALCANTARA, Appellant.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

Page 393

87 Wn.2d 393

552 P.2d 1049

STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Joseph E. ALCANTARA, Appellant.

No. 43691.

Supreme Court of Washington, En Banc.

Aug. 5, 1976.

David Allen, Seattle-King County Public Defender, Seattle, for appellant.

Christopher T. Bayley, King County Pros. Atty., Douglas J. Smith, Seattle, for respondent.

HAMILTON, Associate Justice.

This appeal concerns the constitutional validity of a statutory criminal presumption.

In September 1974, appellant, Joseph E. Alcantara, rented an automobile for 2 days from Compacts Only Rent-A-Car Company (Compacts). The following words were stamped on the rental agreement: 'FAILURE TO RETURN RENTAL PROPERTY WITHIN 10 DAYS OF THE DUE DATE WILL RESULT IN CRIMINAL PROSECUTION.' Appellant returned the car 2 weeks after the due date, and Compacts accepted payment for the entire period.

Appellant rented another automobile from Compacts, and he did not return this car on the October 2nd due date. The manager called appellant's mother and she told him her son was in Canada on business. His mother spoke to appellant during this period and apprised him of her conversation with the manager.

On October 22, 1974, the manager sent a certified letter, with return receipt requested, to the address on the rental agreement. The letter stated:

If word has not been received by us or car returned within ten (10) days of this writing (October 22, 1974) the car will be reported as stolen and turned over to the police department for recovery.

Appellant's mother received the letter and related its contents to her son. Appellant informed his mother he would contact Compacts upon his return to Seattle, and his mother conveyed this message to the manager.

The manager telephoned the police on November 2, 1974, and reported the car stolen. Appellant arrived in Seattle on November 20, 1974. He testified that he contacted Compacts' office the next morning and told an employee he would return the car on the weekend.

On the same day, appellant was involved in a minor automobile accident. The other driver was at fault, and appellant asked a passerby to summon a policeman to secure an accident report for insurance purposes. A police officer responded to the scene of the accident, and appellant presented his driver's license and the rental agreement to the investigating officer. The officer noticed the October 2nd return date on the rental agreement. He phoned Compacts to determine the status of the automobile. An employee of Compacts told the officer everything was alright. The officer concluded the investigation and permitted the drivers to leave the scene of the accident. Later that night, the manager of Compacts phoned the police station to inquire about the car. He informed the police his employee had given incorrect information to the officer, and he considered the car stolen as of November 2.

That same evening, officers entered a tavern and routinely examined appellant's identification for a liquor law violation. The officers also ran an arrest warrant check. Appellant had outstanding warrants for minor traffic tickets, and the officers arrested him. Before appellant was released on bail, the officers discovered he was in possession of the automobile which Compacts had reported stolen. The police rearrested appellant, and he was subsequently charged with larceny pursuant to RCW 9.54.010 ¹ and tried before a jury.

During the trial, the judge gave the following instruction:

Any person to whom a motor vehicle, or piece of machinery or equipment having a fair market value in excess of two thousand dollars, is delivered on a rental or lease basis under any agreement in writing providing for its return to a particular place at a particular time, who refuses or wilfully neglects to return such vehicle or piece of machinery or equipment after the expiration of a reasonable time after a notice in writing proved to have been duly mailed by registered or certified mail with return receipt requested addressed to the last known address of the person who rented or leased the motor vehicle, or piece of machinery or equipment shall be presumed to have intended to deprive or defraud the owner thereof within the meaning of RCW 9.54.010 defining the crime of larceny. This presumption may be rebutted by evidence creating a reasonable inference that the failure to return the vehicle or piece of machinery or equipment was not with the intent to defraud or otherwise deprive the owner of his property.

Instruction No. 15.

This instruction is identical to RCW 9.54.140. ² The jury convicted appellant of larceny and he appeals.

The sole issue before us is whether the instruction on the statutory presumption violated due process of law. In Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6, 36, 89 S.Ct. 1532, 1548, 23 L.Ed.2d 57 (1969), the Supreme Court discussed the appropriate standards for measuring the validity of statutory presumptions and held

that a criminal statutory presumption must be regarded as 'irrational' or 'arbitrary,' and hence unconstitutional, unless it can at least be said with substantial assurance that the presumed fact is more likely than not to flow from the proved fact on which it is made to depend.

(Footnote omitted.) Accord, Barnes v. United States, 412 U.S. 837, 841--43, 93 S.Ct. 2357, 37 L.Ed.2d 380 (1973); Turner v. United States, 396 U.S. 398, 90 S.Ct. 642, 24 L.Ed.2d 610 (1970).

The Court also indicated the due process clause may require a more stringent standard:

Since we find that the . . . presumption is unconstitutional under (the above more-likely-than-not) standard, we need not reach the question whether a criminal presumption which passes muster when so judged must also satisfy the criminal 'reasonable doubt' standard if proof of the crime charged or an essential element thereof depends upon its use.

(Citations omitted.) Leary v. United States, supra at 36, n. 64, 89 S.Ct. at 1548.

Even though the Supreme Court has not specifically interpreted the due process clause to require the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard, we adopted the stricter standard in State v. Odom, 83 Wash.2d 541, 548, 520 P.2d 152 (1974). Accord, State v. Rogers, 83 Wash.2d 553, 520 P.2d 159 (1974). Our position is supported by many legal commentators. Christie & Pye, Presumptions and Assumptions in the Criminal Law: Another View, 1970 Duke L.J. 919, 923--24; Holland & Chamberlin, Statutory Criminal Presumptions: Proof Beyond a Reasonable Doubt?, 7 Val.U.L.Rev. 147 (1973); Comment, Criminal Statutory Presumptions and the Reasonable Doubt Standard of Proof: Is Due Process Overdue?, 19 St. Louis L.J. 223 (1974); Comment, Statutory Criminal Presumptions: Reconciling the Practical with the Sacrosanct, 18 U.C.L.A.L.Rev. 157 (1970); Note, The Unconstitutionality of Statutory Criminal Presumptions, 22 Stan.L.Rev. 341 (1970).

Also, our adoption of the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard is consistent with the Supreme Court's decision in In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 1073, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970).

Lest there remain any doubt about the constitutional stature of the reasonable-doubt standard, we explicitly hold that the Due Process Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged.

If we apply the more-likely-than-not standard, the prosecution may prove an essential fact without meeting the Winship requirements. A jury could be induced to find that the presumed fact exists beyond a reasonable doubt on the basis of a general legislative belief that the presumed fact exists in only 51 percent of the cases in which the proven fact exists.

We, therefore, must consider the presumption contained in RCW 9.54.140 and determine whether the proven facts established the presumed fact beyond a reasonable doubt. RCW 9.54.140...