State v. Alegria
| Decision Date | 09 March 2016 |
| Docket Number | No. 2 CA-CR 2013-0567,2 CA-CR 2013-0567 |
| Parties | THE STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee, v. LORETTO KYLE ALEGRIA, Appellant. |
| Court | Arizona Court of Appeals |
THIS DECISION DOES NOT CREATE LEGAL PRECEDENT AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED BY APPLICABLE RULES.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
See Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 111(c)(1); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 31.24.
Appeal from the superior Court in Pima County
The Honorable Deborah Bernini, Judge
AFFIRMED
Mark Brnovich, Arizona Attorney General
Joseph T. Maziarz, Section Chief Counsel, Phoenix
By Jonathan Bass, Assistant Attorney General, Tucson
Counsel for Appellee
Steven R. Sonenberg, Pima County Public Defender
By Rebecca A. McLean and
Lisa M. Surhio, Assistant Public Defenders, Tucson
Counsel for Appellant
Judge Miller authored the decision of the Court, in which Presiding Judge Vásquez and Chief Judge Eckerstrom concurred.
¶1 A jury convicted Loretto Alegria of first-degree murder, sexual conduct with a minor under age fifteen, and kidnapping a minor under age fifteen. The trial court sentenced him to consecutive terms, the longest of which is natural life. Alegria claims the court erred in rulings that (1) found him competent to stand trial, (2) sustained hearsay objections to his girlfriend's testimony about his statements before the crimes, (3) excluded testimony from his former special education teacher about his mental condition years before the murder, and (4) precluded use of jail visitation videos to cross-examine the state's insanity expert. We conclude the court did not abuse its discretion in its rulings or, if it did, the error was harmless. Thus, we affirm.
¶2 We view the facts in the light most favorable to sustaining the verdicts. State v. Abdi, 236 Ariz. 609, n.1, 343 P.3d 921, 922 n.1 (App. 2015). In June 2009, seven-year-old R.A. went to the family home of 19-year-old Alegria and his nine-year-old brother, E.A. She wanted to play with E.A., but only Alegria was home. Alegria brought R.A. inside the house, sexually assaulted her, and beat and stabbed her to death. He hid R.A.'s body in a nearby wash. Alegria also hid bloodied clothing and towels in a nearby abandoned house. When his father returned home, Alegria was washing bedsheets and cleaning the house with bleach.
¶3 Alegria was charged as detailed above, and the state filed its notice of intent to seek the death penalty. The court initially ruled him incompetent to stand trial, but found him competent after he participated in a restoration to competency program. Six months before trial, he asserted an insanity defense. The jury found him guilty on all counts, but rejected the state's request for a capital sentence. He timely appealed, and we have jurisdiction pursuant to A.R.S. §§ 13-4031 and 13-4033(A).
¶4 Alegria contends the trial court erred in finding him restored to competency, arguing he continued to display symptoms that were present when he was found to be incompetent. He maintains the state failed to rebut the presumption of continuing incompetency that arose from the court's earlier finding. We will not disturb a trial court's competency determination absent an abuse of discretion, nor will we reweigh the evidence. State v. Lewis, 236 Ariz. 336, ¶ 8, 340 P.3d 415, 419 (App. 2014). We consider only whether "'reasonable evidence supports the trial court's finding that the defendant was competent, considering the facts in the light most favorable to sustaining the trial court's findings.'" Id., quoting State v. Glassel, 211 Ariz. 33, ¶ 27, 116 P.3d 1193, 1204 (2005).
¶5 When, "as a result of a mental illness, defect, or disability, [a] person is unable to understand the proceedings against him or her or to assist in his or her own defense," that person is incompetent to stand trial. Ariz. R. Crim. P. 11.1. The court shall order competency restoration treatment for a defendant found to be incompetent, absent "clear and convincing evidence that [the] defendant will not regain competency within 15 months." Ariz. R. Crim. P. 11.5(b)(3). "[An] initial determination of incompetence raises a rebuttable presumption of continued incompetence." Lewis, 236 Ariz. 336, ¶ 10, 340 P.3d at 419-20. However, "evidence demonstrating the defendant is competent" will remove that presumption entirely, leaving the court free to determine the defendant's competence "'exactly as if no presumption had ever been operative.'" Id. ¶ 14, quoting Sheehan v. Pima Cty., 135 Ariz. 235, 238, 660 P.2d 486, 489 (App. 1982).
¶6 In April 2012, the trial court found Alegria incompetent and referred him to the Pima County Restoration to Competency Program (RTC). At a hearing in February 2013, the state presented the testimony of Dr. Sloan King, a psychologist from the RTC program. Based on her observations of Alegria during his nine months in the program and her review of his mental health records, King opined Alegria was competent to stand trial. She testified there was "no question" that he could understand the nature and object of the proceedings, including "the role of the Court . . . what the trial is, the role of the jury, the judge, his attorneys, [and] the prosecutors." She also opined he was rationally able to assist his attorneys in preparing his defense.
¶7 Dr. King's expert opinion that Alegria's competency had been restored was based in part on her observation of him during the RTC program and was sufficient to remove the presumption of continuing incompetency, leaving the court free to weigh the evidence of competency just as though such presumption had never existed. See id. ¶ 14; cf. id. ¶¶ 16-24. King's testimony also constitutes reasonable evidence supporting the court's competency finding. See id. ¶ 8. We decline Alegria's invitation to reweigh the evidence. See id. The court did not abuse its discretion in finding Alegria competent to stand trial.
¶8 Alegria also argues the trial court erred by denying his October 2013 motion for a new competency evaluation primarily based on the conclusion of his insanity expert that Alegria was suffering from severe mental illness. A court must order a competency evaluation if it determines "reasonable grounds" for such an examination exist. Ariz. R. Crim. P. 11.3(a); see also State v. Amaya-Ruiz, 166 Ariz. 152, 162, 800 P.2d 1260, 1270 (1990) (), quoting State v. Borbon, 146 Ariz. 392, 395, 706 P.2d 718, 721 (1985). The trial court has broad discretion to determine whether reasonable grounds exist for a competency examination, and we will reverse its ruling only if it manifestly abused that discretion. Amaya-Ruiz, 166 Ariz. at 162, 800 P.2d at 1270.¶9 "The fact that a defendant suffers from a mental illness, defect, or disability is not, by itself," sufficient evidence to trigger a competency inquiry. See Lewis, 236 Ariz. 336, ¶ 9, 340 P.3d at 419, citing A.R.S. § 13-4501(2). Rather, such illness, defect, or disability must render the defendant "unable to understand the nature and object of the proceeding or to assist in the . . . defense." § 13-4051(2) (emphasis added); accord Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 401 n.12 (1993) ().
¶10 Alegria attached the report of Dr. Pablo Stewart to his motion for a new competency evaluation. Stewart described Alegria as a "profoundly psychotic individual who is suffering from Schizophrenia or Schizoaffective Disorder" and has "significant impairments in his cognitive functioning." However, Stewart did not opine that Alegria's mental illness prevented him from understanding the proceedings or assisting his attorneys. In another attached report, Dr. Denis Keyes suggested Alegria "may be somewhat confused . . . with the entire criminal justice proceedings against him," but Keyes did not opine Alegria was unable to understand those proceedings or assist counsel due to a mental illness, disability, or defect.
¶11 Defense counsel also had argued in their motion that, based on their observations and attorney-client interactions, Alegria was "unable to rationally assist counsel in his defense." In finding to the contrary, the trial court observed "there is a difference . . . between being unwilling and being unable." Dr. King testified at length about Alegria's decision-making process, both as it affected his legal options (e.g., whether to accept a plea bargain) and everyday life (e.g., purchases at the commissary and daily grooming). She found that his decision-making ability was fact-based and unaffected by his mental condition. Finally, King explained how Alegria's antisocial personality traits might affect his willingness to cooperate with others. We conclude there was reasonable evidence to support the court's ruling that Alegria's failure to cooperate with counsel was the result of unwillingness, not inability. Absent any showing that Alegria's mental illnessprevented him from understanding the proceedings or aiding in his defense, the court did not abuse its discretion in declining to order a Rule 11 examination.
¶12 Alegria argues the trial court erroneously precluded testimony from his former girlfriend, Y.F., about statements he made to her. He argues the court's rulings wrongfully prevented Y.F. from offering lay witness opinion on the issue of his sanity.1 "We review a trial court's evidentiary rulings . . . for an abuse of discretion." State v. McGill, 213 Ariz. 147, ¶ 40, 140 P.3d 930, 939 (2006). An error of law is an abuse of discretion. See State v. Cowles, 207 Ariz. 8, ¶ 3, 82 P.3d 369, 370 (App. 2004).
¶13 Alegria first contends the trial court erred in sustaining the state's hearsay objection to the following question:
Did [Alegria] tell...
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