State v. Alexander
Decision Date | 09 November 1983 |
Citation | 468 A.2d 713,191 N.J.Super. 573 |
Parties | STATE of New Jersey, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Jesus M. ALEXANDER, Defendant-Appellant. |
Court | New Jersey Superior Court — Appellate Division |
Susan T. Sinins, Asst. Deputy Public Defender, for defendant-appellant (Joseph H. Rodriguez, Public Defender, attorney; Susan T. Sinins of counsel and on the letter brief).
Deborah Collins, Deputy Atty. Gen., for plaintiff-respondent (Irwin I. Kimmelman, Atty. Gen., attorney; Deborah Collins of counsel and on the letter brief).
Before Judges FURMAN, TRAUTWEIN and BRODY.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
BRODY, J.A.D.
Defendant received an 18-month probation sentence after pleading guilty to possession of two tablets of LSD. He appeals the denial of his motion to suppress claiming that the police seized the drugs in the course of an unlawful stop. The judge found that after an officer had asked defendant to show proof of his identity, he observed the tablets when defendant opened his wallet. We affirm.
Officer Michael Karwacki and defendant were the only witnesses at the motion hearing. According to the officer, on the afternoon in question he and his partner were patrolling Hill's Place in a marked police car. He had not known the neighborhood prior to his assignment there about four months earlier. Although he was alerted by other officers that Hill's Place "is a rather high drug area," he had yet to make his first drug arrest there.
Hill's Place is a one-way street. At about 2:00 p.m., the officers were proceeding up that street in the wrong direction to avoid detection by anyone engaged in illegal activities. The street was lined with "row homes" on both sides and crossed by railroad tracks. As they approached the tracks Karwacki, who was in the front passenger seat, noticed three men standing to his left about 12 feet away. They were in an area between an "abandoned building" and the tracks. Defendant was On the basis of these observations the officers left their car and asked the men for proof of their identity. When defendant opened his wallet, Karwacki saw the drugs and arrested him. The officers let the other men go. Karwacki did not know any of these men before this encounter.
Defendant testified that he lived in the neighborhood and stopped to talk with the other men by the tracks. In the course of their conversation one of the men, who lived in the house Karwacki described as abandoned, returned to defendant $3 that he had borrowed. The police car then pulled up.
The judge found that before the incident the officers had been advised that the area they were patrolling was "a high crime area;" that the three men were standing "between an abandoned building and the railroad tracks and off the street or sidewalk...;" that the officers saw "an exchange of money, that is, between defendant and one of the other parties in the group of three;" and that when asked what they were doing, The judge found that defendant pulled out his wallet and opened it, thereby uncovering the tablets. We must accept these findings as they are supported by sufficient credible evidence, giving due regard to the judge's ability to assess the credibility of the witnesses. State v. Johnson, 42 N.J. 146, 162, 199 A.2d 809 (1964).
Without articulating his reasoning, the judge concluded that the stop was permissible because "the officer had an objective reasonable suspicion, which although it did not rise to the level of believing that there was probable cause to believe that a crime had been committed, or was being committed, it did rise to the level of requiring that he proceeded [sic] to make further investigation."
From a welter of authority concerning the constitutional lawfulness of encounters with the police in public places, three significantly different situations have emerged. The police may "arrest" only if they have probable cause; they may "stop" for brief investigatory questioning if they have an articulable, reasonable basis for suspicion; and they may make an "inquiry" without any grounds for suspicion. See Florida v. Royer, --- U.S. ----, ----, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 1324-1325, 75 L.Ed.2d 229, 236-237 (1983). Placing a particular encounter...
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