State v. Alexander
| Decision Date | 31 March 1874 |
| Citation | 56 Mo. 131 |
| Parties | THE STATE OF MISSOURI, Respondent, v. GEORGE ALEXANDER, alias MEMPHIS BILL, Appellant. |
| Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
Appeal from St. Louis Criminal Court.
Colcord & Drewer, for Appellant.
Normile, for Respondent.
It is contended, by the defendant in this case, that the judgment is erroneous because the indictment was for burglary in the first degree, and the evidence all tended to show that he was guilty of that offense, if any, but that the conviction was for burglary in the second degree and also for larceny. The indictment charged, that the defendant “with force and arms, about the hour of one of the clock in the night of the same day, the dwelling house of one Clemens Harig, there situate and being, and in which there was at the time a human being, feloniously and burglariously, did forcibly break and enter, with the intent the goods and chattels in the said dwelling house * * * to steal, take and carry away,” etc.
The 10th section of the statute which defines burglary in the first degree, declares, that “every person who shall be convicted of breaking into and entering the dwelling house of another, in which there shall be, at the time, some human being, with intent to commit some felony or any larceny therein, either, first, by forcibly bursting or breaking the wall or outer door, window, or shutter of a window of such house, or the lock or bolt of such door, or the fastening of such window or shutter; or, second, by breaking in, in any other manner, being armed with some dangerous weapon, or with the assistance and aid of one or more confederates then actually present aiding and assisting; or, third, by unlocking an outer door by means of false keys, or by picking the lock thereof, shall be adjudged guilty of burglary in the first degree.” (Wagn. Stat., 454.)
The next succeeding section (11th) provides that every person who shall be convicted of breaking into a dwelling house with intent to commit a felony or any larceny, but under such circumstances as shall not constitute the offense of burglary in the first degree shall be deemed guilty of burglary in the second degree. It will be observed that the indictment sets forth all the facts which constitute the crime of burglary in the first degree under the tenth section. It was drawn upon that section and no other. Moreover, that is the only section in the statute upon the subject, that will sustain its averments. The proof...
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...at common law and certainly not under the code. 3 Bac. Abr. 386; Hopkins v. Organ, 15 Ind. 188; Wescott v. Bridewell, 40 Mo. 146; State v. Alexander, 56 Mo. 131; Morgan v. Railroad, 76 Mo. 161; Thorpe v. Johnson, 76 Mo. 662; Ricketson v. Richardson, 26 Cal. 149; Safford v. Navarro, 15 Tex. ......
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...be permitted to stand. State v. Johnston, 119 N.C. 883, 26 S.E. 163; State v. Flemming, supra; State v. Alston, supra. See, also, State v. Alexander, 56 Mo. 131. evidence offered by the prisoner is to the effect that he was in a drunken condition during the night in question, and did not kn......
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...while ownership is an essential element in a charge of larceny, it is not in a charge of burglary. [State v. Kelsoe, 76 Mo. 505; State v. Alexander, 56 Mo. 131.] It settled law that the ownership of the property stolen is an essential element in a charge of larceny and must be properly alle......
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...while ownership is an essential element in a charge of larceny, it is not in a charge of burglary. State v. Kelsoe, 76 Mo. 505; State v. Alexander, 56 Mo. 131. It is settled law that the ownership of the property stolen is an essential element in a charge of larceny and must be properly all......