State v. Alexander, 607
| Decision Date | 07 December 1998 |
| Docket Number | No. 607,607 |
| Citation | 124 Md. App. 258,721 A.2d 275 |
| Parties | STATE of Maryland v. Carol Lynn ALEXANDER and James Carlon Alexander. |
| Court | Court of Special Appeals of Maryland |
Thomas K. Clancy, Asst. Atty. General (J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Atty. General, on the brief), Baltimore, for appellant.
Robert H. Harvey, Jr., Prince Frederick, for appellee, Carol Alexander.
Michael K. Manning, Prince Frederick, for appellee, James Carlon Alexander.
Submitted before MURPHY, C.J., and MOYLAN and WENNER, JJ.
The appellees, James Carlon Alexander and Carol Lynn Alexander, husband and wife, were charged by a Calvert County grand jury with 1) the possession of marijuana with intent to distribute and 2) simple possession. At a pretrial hearing, the circuit court granted the appellees' motion to suppress all physical evidence on the ground that a search warrant was tainted by an antecedent entry into appellees' home that had violated the Fourth Amendment. The State appealed that suppression ruling pursuant to Md.Code (1995), Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 12-302. On October 14, 1998, this Court reversed that ruling and remanded the case for further proceedings. We there announced that this opinion would follow.
Our decision that the physical evidence should not have been suppressed was easy to reach. Formulating and articulating the basis for that decision has been more difficult. Whichever of two Fourth Amendment standards might be deemed to apply—1) probable cause to believe that a burglary had been or was then being committed in the appellees' home or 2) the general reasonableness of the police response—the Fourth Amendment was not offended and the evidence should not have been suppressed. Because of the non-typical relationship between the appellees and the police in this case, however, it seems advisable to determine the proper framework of analysis for the police behavior and to decide which of those standards needs to be satisfied in circumstances such as these.
When the police initially entered the home of the appellees, the appellees were not the target of any police investigation nor were they believed to be harboring fugitives or concealing evidence of crime. There was, moreover, no remote hint of subterfuge; no narcotics officers were waiting, opportunistically, for an excuse to reconnoiter an otherwise protected asylum.
It is undisputed that the police were not pursuing the appellees but were attempting to come to their possible aid. Fourth Amendment justification for seizing the persons of the appellees or for searching their home for evidence of crime, therefore, was not in any way an issue. Probable cause to invade the Fourth Amendment rights of a suspect, as the basis for either a search warrant or for appropriate warrantless activity, was not in any way an issue. The appellees were not suspects but citizens in possible distress. From the police perspective at all times prior to the ultimate discovery of drugs in the appellees' home, the appellees were innocent homeowners who were the possible victims of a crime and who were deserving of prompt police intervention and protection. The question before us is the appropriate standard by which to assess the Fourth Amendment reasonableness of such intervention and protection. What is a reasonable basis for coming to the aid of a person who apparently needs help?
The underlying facts are not in dispute. On November 27, 1997, Thanksgiving Day, the Calvert County Sheriff's Department Control Center received a call at approximately 1:00 p.m. The caller, who wished to remain anonymous, nonetheless gave his address as 11626 Deadwood Drive. He informed the control center that his next-door neighbor's basement door was open and that he believed that the neighbor was away. The caller then gave the address of the neighbor's house as 11541 Deadwood Drive. On receiving this information, the control center notified Corporal Brian Koehn, who was on routine patrol, and ordered him to respond to the residence because of a "possible breaking and entering." Corporal Koehn was given the address of the residence along with a description of the house.
When Corporal Koehn arrived at the house, he noticed a neighbor across the street looking at him. He did not approach the neighbor because he did not want to leave the residence unsecured or to give anyone inside the opportunity to leave. He further explained that he did not attempt to speak with the neighbor because he had been informed by the control center that the caller wished to remain anonymous. Corporal Koehn did not know that the neighbor who watched him was necessarily the same person who had earlier phoned the control center.
Corporal Koehn walked around the house and checked all doors and windows. He noticed that the basement door was "wide open," but observed no signs of a forcible entry. At that point, he advised Deputy Sheriff Ronald Naughton via radio that the residence had an open door and that he was going to await Deputy Naughton's arrival before attempting to enter the residence. At the suppression hearing, he explained that he decided to wait for Naughton because he believed a breaking and entering was in progress and, for his own safety, he did not want to confront any potential burglars alone. When asked at the suppression hearing why he thought that a breaking and entering was in progress, he recited the following reasons: 1) he had been alerted to a possible breaking and entering by the original radio broadcast; 2) he had observed an open basement door; 3) he had been told the homeowners were away; 4) he observed no vehicles in the driveway; and 5) the house was in a residential area that had been the scene of a rash of recent breakings and enterings.
Deputy Naughton testified at the suppression hearing and confirmed Corporal Koehn's statement that that particular neighborhood had been the scene of many recent breakings and enterings. He further testified that the call he received in the instant case was similar to calls he had received in cases of other recent breakings and enterings and that it was unusual to see any signs of forcible entry into a residence other than an open door.
While still waiting for his back-up, Corporal Koehn "hollered in the house if anybody is home, Sheriff's Office." He received no reply. He then walked around to the front of the house, knocked on the door and rang the doorbell. He heard a dog barking inside but otherwise received no reply.
Shortly thereafter, Deputy Naughton arrived at the scene and also observed the open basement door. The two officers then entered the house through that door and began a sweep of the residence to determine if anyone was inside. They first noticed that the basement was in disarray. While still searching for possible intruders, they opened the door of a walk-in closet in the master bedroom. They there observed marijuana on a shelf in plain view.
The officers left the narcotics untouched on the shelf while they completed their search for intruders. They then secured the house and obtained a search warrant based on their observation of the marijuana. They subsequently executed the warrant and seized the marijuana, along with assorted drug paraphernalia and cash.
The residents of 11541 Deadwood Drive were the appellees. They were jointly indicted for possession of marijuana and for possession with intent to distribute. On April 16, 1998, a motion to suppress all physical evidence was heard before the circuit court. At the conclusion of the hearing, the judge explained his rationale for suppressing the evidence:
The first-level facts are undisputed and there is, therefore, no fact finding by the trial judge to which to give deference. At issue is simply the constitutional significance of those facts. With respect to such a conclusory fact or mixed question of law and fact, the appellate court makes its own independent appraisal. Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 116 S.Ct. 1657, 134 L.Ed.2d 911 (1996); Riddick v. State, 319 Md. 180, 183, 571 A.2d 1239 (1990).
To make that independent constitutional appraisal, however, we need first to identify the appropriate standard by which to measure the police behavior in question. The touchstone of Fourth Amendment compliance, of course, is reasonableness. Reasonableness, however, differs with its context. The reasonableness of police behavior is necessarily a function of what the police are doing and why they are doing it.
As the Supreme Court observed in New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 337, 105 S.Ct. 733, 740, 83 L.Ed.2d 720, 731 (1985):
Although the underlying command of the Fourth Amendment is always that searches and seizures be reasonable, what is reasonable depends on the context within which a search takes place.
(Emphasis supplied).
The flaw in the appellees' argument is that it fails to recognize that contexts may shift or, indeed, even...
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