State v. Alexander

• Decision Date: 07 June 2022
• Docket Number: SC 20316
• Citation: 343 Conn. 495,275 A.3d 199
• Parties: STATE of Connecticut v. Joel ALEXANDER
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court

343 Conn. 495

275 A.3d 199

STATE of Connecticut

v.Joel ALEXANDER

SC 20316

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued January 20, 2022

Officially released June 7, 2022

Todd L. Bussert, with whom, on the brief, was Erica A. Barber, for the appellant (defendant).

Melissa L. Streeto, senior assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Patrick J. Griffin, chief state's attorney, and Lisa M. D'Angelo, supervisory assistant state's attorney, for the appellee (state).

Robinson, C. J., and McDonald, D'Auria, Mullins, Ecker and Keller, Js.

ECKER, J.

Following a bench trial in early 2019, the defendant, Joel Alexander, was convicted of felony murder in violation of General Statutes (Rev. to 2013) § 53a-54c,¹ attempt to commit robbery in the first degree in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-134 (a) (2) and 53a-49 (a) (2), conspiracy to commit robbery in the first degree in violation of § 53a-134 (a) (2) and General Statutes § 53a-48, and carrying a pistol without a permit in violation of General Statutes (Rev. to 2013) § 29-35 (a).² After the defendant was found guilty, but before sentencing, this court decided State v. Purcell , 331 Conn. 318, 203 A.3d 542 (2019), which held, under our state constitution, that "if a suspect makes an equivocal statement that arguably can be construed as a request for counsel, interrogation must cease except for narrow questions designed to clarify the earlier statement and the suspect's desire for counsel." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 362, 203 A.3d 542. The defendant sought a new trial based on our holding in Purcell , on the ground that the state's evidence at trial had included a video-recorded statement in which the defendant had made an equivocal request for counsel. The trial court agreed with the defendant's Purcell claim but, with the exception of a single count of conviction,³ concluded that the error was harmless. We affirm the judgment.

The trial court found the following facts. On January 20, 2014, at approximately 1 p.m., Damarquis Gray shot and killed the victim, Durell Law, in the parking lot of the Fairway Apartments complex in New Haven during the course of an attempted robbery.⁴ Earlier that day, the defendant was on the porch of Gray's home at 12 Bouchet Lane in New Haven with several others, including Gray, Thomaine Riddick, Arik Fraser, Anton Hall, and Delano Lawrence. Hall overheard the defendant suggest that the group should rob the victim, who apparently had an iPhone and money on him. The defendant indicated that he possessed a " ‘baby nine,’ " which Hall interpreted to mean a nine millimeter handgun. The defendant, Gray, Riddick, Fraser, Hall, and Lawrence eventually walked toward the apartment complex.

Sometime before the shooting took place, Ameia Cato, who knew the defendant, saw him on the Eastern Street side of the apartment complex in possession of a handgun. Cato observed the defendant pass the gun to Fraser, who was standing next to him, and overheard the defendant say to Fraser, " ‘[t]hat boy gonna get clapped.’ "

The victim entered the parking lot shortly before the shooting, accompanied by two companions. Others present at the scene included the defendant, Gray, Fraser, Riddick, Hall, Lawrence, and Ericka Gomez. The defendant passed a gun to Gray and asked, " ‘[a]re you ready,’ " to which Gray responded, " ‘[l]et's go ....’ " The defendant then pointed at the victim and exclaimed, " ‘[l]et's go do it.’ " The defendant told the victim to " ‘[r]un these sneakers,’ " an order meaning to take them off. After the victim responded that he was not going to take off his sneakers, the defendant, Gray, Riddick, and Fraser surrounded the victim, and at least one of them reached into the victim's pockets. Riddick punched the victim, the victim punched or pushed Gray, and, when the victim turned to run away, Gray fatally shot the victim in the back.

Approximately two hours later, the police brought the defendant to the police station for interrogation. The defendant was a suspect in the shooting and was placed in a holding cell. At about 2 a.m. the next day, the defendant was taken to an interview room, where he was advised of his Miranda⁵ rights at the outset of the interrogation, both orally and in writing. He then signed a written waiver of rights. During the course of the interrogation, which was video-recorded, the defendant denied any involvement in the robbery or murder of the victim but admitted that he was present at the scene of the shooting and that, shortly before the victim was shot, he briefly held a gun that belonged to Daryl Johnson.

The defendant thereafter was arrested and charged with felony murder, attempt to commit robbery in the first degree, conspiracy to commit robbery in the first degree, and carrying a pistol without a permit. Prior to trial, the defendant filed a motion to suppress the video-recorded statement that he had made to the police.

The defendant claimed, in relevant part, that "the statements made during his police interview should be suppressed because the police failed to immediately cease their questioning when he made an unambiguous request for the assistance of an attorney."⁶ The precise words used by the defendant to invoke his right to counsel are difficult to hear on the recording. According to the transcript produced for trial, the defendant stated, after a period of preliminary questioning, "[y]ou got me ... stop talking right now so I can get a lawyer, ‘cause I'm telling you the truth." Although the parties agreed that the transcript was not completely accurate, they disagreed about what the defendant actually said. The defendant asserted that he said, " ‘[y]ou got me wanting to stop talking right now so I can get a lawyer, ‘cause I'm telling you the truth,’ " whereas the state contended that the defendant stated, " ‘[y]ou got me wanting to stop talking right now trying to get a lawyer, ‘cause I'm telling you the truth.’ " The trial court—at least at this pretrial stage—declared that it was unable to understand the defendant's exact words. It explained that it had "carefully listened to the disputed portion of the defendant's interview multiple times. [The court has] listened to it with and without headphones. [It] find[s] that the transcript of that segment of the interview is not accurate. Rather, the defendant's statement regarding a lawyer is unintelligible. [The interrogating detective] speaks at the same time as the defendant, and [the court is] unable to discern precisely what the defendant said." Because the defendant had not "made an unambiguous request for the assistance of an attorney" under Davis v. United States , 512 U.S. 452, 459, 114 S. Ct. 2350, 129 L. Ed. 2d 362 (1994), the trial court denied the defendant's motion to suppress. Accordingly, the video recording of the defendant's interview with the police was admitted into evidence at trial.

After the completion of the trial, the panel issued a written memorandum of decision finding the defendant guilty of felony murder. The presiding judge also issued a written decision finding the defendant guilty of criminal attempt to commit robbery in the first degree, conspiracy to commit robbery in the first degree, and carrying a pistol without a permit.

After the defendant was found guilty, but before he was sentenced, this court issued its decision in State v. Purcell , supra, 331 Conn. 318, 203 A.3d 542, in which we held for the first time that the Connecticut constitution provides greater protection for a criminal defendant's Miranda rights than the federal constitution. See id., at 359, 203 A.3d 542. Pursuant to Purcell , "if a suspect makes an equivocal statement that arguably can be construed as a request for counsel, interrogation must cease except for narrow questions designed to clarify the earlier statement and the suspect's desire for counsel." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 362, 203 A.3d 542. The trial court sua sponte ordered the parties to file supplemental briefs "addressing the issue of what effect, if any ... Purcell has on [its] decision ... denying the defendant's motion to suppress his [video-recorded] statement to the police."

Following the submission of the parties’ supplemental briefs and oral argument, the trial court issued a memorandum of decision addressing the Purcell issue. The trial court explained that the judges had "again listened to the relevant portion of the defendant's [video-recorded] statement, this time on a different computer." After listening to the recording again, the trial court was "able to ascertain the content of the defendant's statement concerning his request for a lawyer." Specifically, the trial court found "that the defendant said, ‘[y]ou got me ... stop talking right now, I'm trying to get a lawyer ....’ " The trial court concluded that, "[a]t the very least, this statement by the defendant is an equivocal statement that arguably can be construed as a request for counsel, and, pursuant to ... Purcell , the interrogation should have ceased. ... [Because] the police continued to interrogate the defendant, his further statements should have been suppressed." (Citation omitted.) Because the defendant's video-recorded statement improperly was admitted into evidence, the trial court considered whether the defendant was entitled to a new trial.⁷

With respect to the defendant's felony murder conviction, the panel determined that "[t]he record of the trial fairly and with reasonable certainty establishe[d] that the defendant was not harmed by the erroneous admission of his [video-recorded] statement." The panel explained that it "did not consider any of the statements made by the defendant during his interview with the police ... in determining the defendant's guilt on the felony murder charge." Instead, the panel explicitly relied on "the testimony of ... Hall and ... Gomez and the statements of ... Cato as support for the conviction." Additionally, the panel concluded that ...