State v. Alladin, C8-86-1734

Decision Date23 June 1987
Docket NumberNo. C8-86-1734,C8-86-1734
Citation408 N.W.2d 642
PartiesSTATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Cashim ALLADIN, Appellant.
CourtMinnesota Court of Appeals

Syllabus by the Court

1. Minn.Stat. Sec. 609.25 (1984) allows the State the right to charge a parent for kidnapping his own child. Depending on the facts, the State is not restricted to charging under Minn.Stat. Sec. 609.26 (1984), Depriving Another of Custodial or Parental Rights.

2. The conditions of probation imposed by the trial court were not an abuse of discretion.

3. The evidence was sufficient to support the conviction.

4. The trial court did not err by not granting appellant's motion for a change in venue.

5. The trial court did not err by denying appellant's challenges for cause of four potential jurors.

Hubert H. Humphrey, III, Atty. Gen., Robert A. Stanich, Spec. Asst. Atty. Gen., St. Paul, for respondent.

C. Paul Jones, State Public Defender, Marie L. Wolf, Asst. Public Defender, Minneapolis, for appellant.

Considered and decided by LANSING, P.J., and HUSPENI, and RANDALL, JJ.

OPINION

RANDALL, Judge.

A jury convicted appellant Cashim Alladin of attempted murder in the second degree, Minn.Stat. Secs. 609.19 (1984) and 609.17 (1984); assault in the first degree, Minn.Stat. Sec. 609.221 (1984); and kidnapping, Minn.Stat. Sec. 609.25, subd. 1(1) (1984). Appellant was sentenced to the presumptive sentence of 62 months for attempted second degree murder and to a consecutive 21-month term, execution stayed, with up to ten years probation for the kidnapping. We affirm.

FACTS

Appellant and Diana Alladin were married in 1968. They have four children: Omar, age 17; Chad, age 11; Andre, age 8; and Desiree, age 5.

Diana first discussed a dissolution with appellant in 1984. Appellant told Diana that he would kill her before he would let her out of their marriage. In 1985, Diana commenced a dissolution action and had a protection order drawn up, but she dropped the proceedings when appellant assured her that things would be different.

In April 1986, Diana commenced another dissolution action. On April 4, the trial court issued an order pursuant to Minn.Stat. Sec. 518.131 (1984) which: (1) granted Diana temporary primary physical and legal custody and control of the children; (2) granted Diana temporary and exclusive occupancy of the homestead; (3) restrained appellant from annoying or harming Diana or the children; and (4) restrained appellant from entering the homestead at any time.

On April 5, 1986, the order was served on appellant while he was at the Alladin home. Appellant gathered some belongings, but before leaving, he took the three younger children in the bedroom, locked the door and told them that they were going to have to change their mother's mind or he would never see them again. Appellant phoned Diana several times that day and evening, until she finally had to take the phone off the hook.

The next day appellant's brother, Usmen, flew in from New York to try to talk Diana into giving appellant another chance, but Diana refused. Shortly thereafter appellant arrived at the Alladin home, and the whole family had supper together. After supper, Usmen took the children outside. While appellant and Diana were alone, appellant again tried to persuade Diana not to go through with the dissolution. Diana told appellant that she would not change her mind.

At approximately 10:00 p.m., everyone retired for the evening. Appellant and Diana continued to discuss the dissolution until an argument ensued. Diana went downstairs to sleep on the couch, but appellant followed her. They continued to argue. Diana claims appellant kicked her in the face. Diana threatened to call the police and ordered appellant out of the house. Appellant grabbed Diana and told her she was not calling anyone. Diana screamed for Omar, who came up from his bedroom and restrained appellant. Diana went into the kitchen to call the police, but appellant grabbed the telephone from Diana, disconnected it and threw it at Omar. Diana ran upstairs, woke up Usmen and ran into the master bedroom to use that phone. Appellant followed Diana and yanked the bedroom phone out of the wall.

Diana then went into the bathroom. Omar placed himself in the bathroom doorway, between appellant and Diana. Usmen was behind appellant. Appellant and Diana continued to argue. Diana and Omar claim that during the argument, appellant said:

You won't live. If I don't kill you today, maybe tomorrow; not this week, maybe next; not this year, maybe three years from now. You won't live a day of peace in your life.

Usmen remembers only the argument, he does not recall hearing any threatening language. Appellant admitted grabbing Diana, but denied hitting, kicking or threatening her. Eventually, everyone went back to bed. Appellant and Usmen left early the next morning.

Appellant spent most of the following week at his apartment in Hopkins, but called Diana several times. He finally seemed to accept the dissolution. They discussed visitation and division of their assets. Appellant hired an attorney. Appellant's attorney contacted Diana about allowing appellant to visit with the children on Saturday, April 12. Appellant had seemed rational and realistic on the phone, so Diana agreed to the visitation.

On Saturday morning, Diana and the three younger children met appellant at a parking lot. When appellant arrived at the parking lot, he got into Diana's car and again tried to persuade her to change her mind about the dissolution. After they had been arguing for about a half hour, the parking lot attendant asked them to leave. When appellant drove off with the children, Diana did not know where he would be taking them. He was to return the children to his sister-in-law's that evening.

Appellant and the children arrived at the Alladin home before Diana. The house was locked, so appellant told Chad to pound on Omar's bedroom window to let them in to get their swimming suits. Omar opened the door and went back downstairs to his bedroom.

When Diana arrived, she was angry that appellant was in the house violating the family court order. Appellant and Diana got into a heated argument. At one point, appellant said he wanted his VCR. Omar went downstairs to get it. When they were alone, appellant grabbed a meat cleaver and struck Diana on the side of the head with it.

Appellant testified that he just "snapped" and that he could not recall how many times he hit Diana. Diana testified that she felt blood running down her face, that appellant struck her again on the top of the head, and that she screamed for Omar. Omar dropped the VCR, ran upstairs, and grabbed appellant from behind. All three of them fell to the floor. As they fell down, Diana was struck with the meat cleaver two more times.

Appellant was on top of Diana, still holding the meat cleaver when Omar grabbed the handle and pried the meat cleaver from appellant's hand. Diana testified that when she was able to get free, she started toward the front door and told Omar to go to the neighbors and call the police. Omar ran outside, threw the meat cleaver on the front lawn, and ran to the neighbor's for help.

Inside, appellant grabbed Diana again and they fell to the floor in the hallway. Straddling Diana, appellant put his hands around her throat and tried to strangle her. Diana testified that she was unable to breathe or call out and that she believed she was about to die. Diana recalls trying to pry appellant's hands loose, having a hold of him by his hair, and that she had his finger in her mouth "biting it for all it was worth." Appellant denies ever having any intent to hurt or kill his wife.

The three younger children, after hearing their mother scream and seeing Omar come outside with the meat cleaver in his hand and blood all over his clothes, got out of the car and ran into the house. Desiree sat down on the stairs and cried. Omar, Chad and Andre went into the hallway to see appellant on top of their mother with his hands around her throat. Omar pulled appellant off Diana, and then both he and Diana ran outside screaming for help. A neighbor helped Diana into his house and called an ambulance.

Appellant grabbed Desiree and took her up to the master bedroom, barricaded the door and pulled down all the shades. When the police arrived, the officer called out for appellant to release Desiree and come out with his hands raised. Appellant told the officer that he had a gun and that he would kill Desiree. The officers told appellant that if he stopped talking to them, they would forcibly enter the bedroom. Officers negotiated with appellant for approximately five hours. During this time, appellant told the officers approximately 50 to 60 times, "Don't push me or I will harm the girl. Any injury to the girl will fall on your heads."

At approximately 4:00 p.m., police officers broke down the door and entered the bedroom. Desiree was huddled on the floor next to the bed crying, but was unharmed. She was looking into the closet saying, "Daddy." Police found appellant with a bathrobe belt around his throat, hanging from the clothes rod in the closet. When the paramedics checked appellant they found no injuries and no visible marks on appellant's neck. At trial, appellant stipulated that he took Desiree to the bedroom and kept her there against her will as a hostage.

Diana was taken to the emergency room. She had lost about two units of blood and was in shock. Diana had sustained three deep lacerations of her scalp, all of which caused chip fractures of her skull. She also sustained a deep laceration to the back of her neck, lacerations on both hands, which resulted in disfunction of both forefingers, and a laceration to her left knee. The lacerations to the left temporal area of her head severed a nerve, resulting in permanent paralysis of the muscles of her forehead and eyebrow. The laceration on the top of her head went...

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