State v. Allan

Decision Date28 January 2014
Docket NumberNo. 18879.,18879.
Citation83 A.3d 326,311 Conn. 1
CourtConnecticut Supreme Court
PartiesSTATE of Connecticut v. Nemiah ALLAN.

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Katherine C. Essington, assigned counsel, for the appellant (defendant).

Rita M. Shair, senior assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Michael Dearington, state's attorney, and James R. Dinnan, senior assistant state's attorney, for the appellee (state).

ROGERS, C.J., and NORCOTT, PALMER, ZARELLA and McDONALD, Js. *

McDONALD, J.

Today we consider what evidence is necessary to support a conviction for conspiracy to sell narcotics in the context of a buyer-seller relationship between the allegedcoconspirators. Following our grant of certification, the defendant, Nemiah Allan, appeals from the judgment of the Appellate Court affirming his judgment of conviction of conspiracy to sell narcotics by a person who is not drug-dependent in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a–48 and 21a–278 (b),1 and interfering with an officer in violation of General Statutes § 53a–167a. On appeal, the defendant claims that the Appellate Court improperly concluded that the evidence was sufficient to support his conspiracy conviction because: (1) the evidence established nothing more than his attempted purchase of narcotics on a single occasion from his alleged coconspirator; and (2) had the Appellate Court adopted the “buyer-seller exception” applied by the federal courts in evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence of conspiracy to sell narcotics, as he had requested, it would have concluded that the trial court improperly denied his motion for a judgment of acquittal on that charge. We conclude that the considerations embodied in this so-called exception are already reflected in our law. We further conclude that the evidence demonstrated more than a mere buyer-seller relationship on a single occasion to support the defendant's conspiracy conviction. Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the Appellate Court, although on different grounds from those articulated by that court.

In reaching its verdict, the jury reasonably could have found the following facts. On the evening of April 15, 2009, officers of the Meriden Police Department conducted surveillance at the corner of West Main Street and Randolph Avenue in Meriden after receiving complaints of drug activity in that area. From their unmarked vehicles, the surveillance team observed the defendant engaging in the following conduct that, in their experience, was consistent with drug dealing. The defendant walked back and forth near the corner of West Main Street and Randolph Avenue while talking on his cell phone. Police officers observed several vehicles periodically stop at this corner, at which point the defendant approached these vehicles, reached inside, and conducted “some sort of transaction” with the vehicles' occupants. Then, while the vehicles idled at this corner, the defendant walked a short distance away to a house located at 20 Maple Branch, just off Maple Street. That house was the subject of a separate police investigation due to neighbors' complaints about drug dealing occurring on its second floor. From the complaints and subsequent surveillance, the police suspected that this residence served as a “stash house,” as drug dealers commonly keep their drugs and money at a location near to where they conduct their drug transactions so as to avoid having any evidence of drug activity on their person in the event of a police stop. Shortly after entering the second floor of the house, the defendant exited the house and returned to the particular vehicle waiting at the street corner. Moments later, the driver of the vehicle would drive away, while the defendant remained at the corner.

During one of these interactions, the officers observed the defendant walk away from a van with money in his hand, which they did not see him possess when he initially approached it. In light of this additional information, once the van departed, the surveillance officers radioed officers in a police cruiser in an effort to stop the van. Upon stopping the van, the driver, Humberto Zarabozo, cooperated with the police and told them that he had just purchased crack cocaine from the defendant and that he had purchased narcotics from the defendant in the past.2 The officers recovered crack cocaine from the floor of Zarabozo's van. Subsequently, the officers returned to the surveillance area, where they continued to observe the defendant engaging in similar conduct with approaching vehicles, although the officers did not specifically observe any objects exchanged between the defendant and the occupants of these vehicles.

Soon thereafter, the officers observed the following incident. A tan Acura drove along West Main Street past the corner where the defendant had been meeting vehicles, turned onto Maple Street, and then turned again onto Maple Branch. As the Acura drove toward this location, the defendant crossed West Main Street and walked up Maple Street while talking on his cell phone. The Acura turned around and parked in close proximity to 20 Maple Branch, facing Maple Street. As the defendant approached Maple Branch, the driver of the Acura flashed the car's front lights and then turned off the driving lights while leaving the parking lights on. In response to these signals, the defendant approached the passenger side of the vehicle. He then opened the passenger door and leaned into the vehicle. Moments later, the defendant emerged from the Acura and returned to his corner as the Acura drove away. Following their unsuccessful pursuit of the Acura, the officers returned one to two hours after this incident to arrest the defendant.

The officers took the defendant into custody despite his efforts to resist arrest, gave him Miranda3 warnings, and conducted a search of his person, which yielded no drug related materials. When the officers asked the defendant about the driver of the Acura, he informed them that the driver's name was “Fleet” and that Fleet was a drug supplier from Waterbury. The officers knew the name Fleet as a street level drug supplier, but did not know his real name. The defendant further told them that Fleet had driven to Maple Branch to “resupply” him with crack cocaine. Despite this plan, the defendant told the police that Fleet had not delivered the narcotics when they met earlier that evening. The defendant then opened his cell phone and gave the police Fleet's cell phone number, which was the last outgoing call made from the defendant's cell phone.

When the defendant overheard a police radio transmission indicating that the owner of the Acura was Brandy Clayton, the defendant identified her as Fleet's girlfriend.The officers drove the defendant to a gas station where Clayton was located and from which she reported her vehicle was stolen. The defendant positively identified Clayton as Fleet's girlfriend. Around this time, the police learned that Fleet's actual name is Kareem Thomas. When the police subsequently found Thomas hiding in the house of Clayton's sister, they confirmed that the phone number of the cell phone found on Thomas' person was the number that the defendant had last dialed.

Thereafter, while the defendant was being processed at the police station, he asked the booking officer what had happened to “the big fat white guy.” When the booking officer asked the defendant to whom he was referring, the defendant replied “the one that I sold drugs to,” presumably referring to Zarabozo, who matched the defendant's description. One or two weeks after the defendant's arrest, the police executed a search warrant for the second floor apartment at 20 Maple Branch, where they seized crack cocaine packaged for street sale and arrested another individual in connection with that seizure.

The state charged the defendant with sale of narcotics by a person who is not drug-dependent in violation of § 21a–278 (b), sale of narcotics within 1500 feet of a school in violation of General Statutes § 21a–278a (b), possession of narcotics in violation of General Statutes § 21a–279, conspiracy to sell narcotics by a person who is not drug-dependent in violation of §§ 53a–48 and 21a–278 (b), and interfering with a police officer in violation of § 53a–167a (a). At the conclusion of the state's case, the defendant moved for a judgment of acquittal, which the trial court denied. The jury returned a verdict finding the defendant guilty of conspiracy to sell narcotics by a person who is not drug-dependent and interfering with a police officer and finding him not guilty of the other charges. The court rendered judgment in accordance with the jury's verdict, and sentenced the defendant to a total effective term of twelve years imprisonment followed by five years special parole.

The defendant appealed from the trial court's judgment to the Appellate Court, and claimed that there was insufficient evidence to allow the jury to find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crime of conspiracy to sell narcotics in violation of his right to due process. State v. Allan, 131 Conn.App. 433, 435, 437–38, 27 A.3d 19 (2011). The Appellate Court rejected the defendant's argument that the state had the burden of proving that the defendant and his coconspirator, Thomas, had entered into an agreement “in the past to distribute narcotics or to distribute narcotics in the future,” concluding that the defendant misunderstood the required elements of the crime charged under Connecticut law. Id., at 439–40, 27 A.3d 19. The Appellate Court further declined the defendant's invitation to apply what he called the “buyer-seller exception” applied by the federal courts in evaluating the sufficiency of evidence to support a conviction of conspiracy to sell narcotics, noting that the defendant had not provided the court with a single Connecticut case endorsing such an exception. Id., at 441, 27 A.3d 19. After concluding that the evidence...

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36 cases
  • State v. Vandeusen
    • United States
    • Appellate Court of Connecticut
    • November 3, 2015
    ...that of the jury if there is sufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Allan, 311 Conn. 1, 25, 83 A.3d 326 (2014). "[T]he jury must find every element proven beyond a reasonable doubt in order to find the defendant guilty of the charged......
  • State v. Hughes
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Connecticut
    • November 23, 2021
    ...... evidence established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt . . . ." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. . Allan , 311 Conn. 1, 25, 83 A.3d 326 (2014). In doing. so, we are mindful that "the trier of fact is not. required to accept as dispositive ......
  • State v. Leniart
    • United States
    • Appellate Court of Connecticut
    • June 14, 2016
    ...that of the jury if there is sufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Allan, 311 Conn. 1, 25, 83 A.3d 326 (2014). "[T]he jury must find every element proven beyond a reasonable doubt in order to find the defendant guilty of the charged ......
  • State v. Hughes
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Connecticut
    • November 23, 2021
    ...cumulative force of the evidence established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt ...." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Allan , 311 Conn. 1, 25, 83 A.3d 326 (2014). In doing so, we are mindful that "the trier of fact is not required to accept as dispositive those inferences that are......
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