State v. Allen
| Decision Date | 02 March 2006 |
| Citation | 892 A.2d 447,2006 ME 20 |
| Parties | STATE of Maine v. Sarah ALLEN. |
| Court | Maine Supreme Court |
G. Steven Rowe, Attorney General, Donald W. Macomber, Asst. Atty. Gen. (orally), Lisa P. Marchese, Asst. Atty. Gen., Augusta, for State.
Verne E. Paradie Jr. (orally), Trafton & Matzen, Auburn, for defendant.
Panel: SAUFLEY, C.J., and CLIFFORD, DANA, ALEXANDER, CALKINS, LEVY, and SILVER, JJ.
[¶ 1] Sarah Allen appeals from a judgment of conviction for manslaughter, 17-A M.R.S. § 203(1)(A) (2005), after a jury verdict entered in the Superior Court (Androscoggin County, Gorman, J.). Allen contends that the court erred in prohibiting an expert defense witness from testifying about recent test results as a discovery sanction, and in allowing the State to introduce evidence of a spanking that Allen's husband inflicted on their son the night before the son suffered injuries that ultimately led to his death.1 Allen also argues that the evidence was insufficient to convict. We disagree and affirm the judgment.2
[¶ 2] Viewed in a light most favorable to the State, the jury could have found the following facts. Sarah Allen was alone with her twenty-one month old son Nathaniel on February 14, 2003, while her husband was at a trade show. At approximately 10 P.M., Allen called 911, frantically telling the dispatcher that Nathaniel had fallen, broken his neck, was not breathing, and was unconscious. During discussions with emergency technicians and doctors that night, Allen maintained that Nathaniel had fallen in the bathtub and on his carpeted bedroom floor multiple times, hitting his head after each fall.
[¶ 3] At approximately midnight, Nathaniel was transported from Mid-Coast Memorial Hospital to Maine Medical Center, where a neurosurgeon subsequently examined Nathaniel's CT scans. The neurosurgeon believed that Nathaniel had suffered a significant head injury and the only hope for his survival was to relieve the pressure on his brain by evacuating the blood that had collected in his head. Following the procedure, and after noting the condition of the blood that came out of Nathaniel's head, the neurosurgeon opined that Nathaniel had suffered a "very, very recent injury, in other words, something that was unlikely to be days, weeks, or months of age."
[¶ 4] The pediatric intensive care specialist who first saw Nathaniel at approximately 2 A.M. concluded, after reading Nathaniel's CT scans, that Nathaniel had injuries consistent with child abuse. The doctor therefore consulted with a child abuse expert who, after examining the CT scans, also concluded that Nathaniel's head injuries were consistent with an inflicted, nonaccidental trauma. The expert concluded that a violent shaking caused Nathaniel's head injuries.
[¶ 5] Nathaniel was declared dead at approximately 6 P.M. on February 15. The radiologist at Maine Medical Center who later examined Nathaniel's CT scans opined that Nathaniel's injuries were consistent with an event having taken place hours prior to the taking of the scans, which were taken after Nathaniel arrived at Maine Medical Center. Additionally, the radiologist did not believe that Nathaniel's injuries could have resulted from a fall because the head injuries he presented with did not have a focal point reflecting an area of impact. He did, however, believe that "the pattern of injury is actually quite characteristic of a shaken baby or of an acceleration/deceleration type of injury." The medical examiner who conducted the autopsy of Nathaniel's body confirmed the radiologist's findings.
[¶ 6] Allen was subsequently charged with manslaughter for causing the injuries leading to Nathaniel's death. Her first trial ended in a mistrial. Prior to Allen's first trial, the court entered an order on motions in limine filed by both sides. The court decided that the State could introduce evidence that Allen and her husband had previously spanked Nathaniel and that Jeremy Allen, while in Allen's presence on February 13, spanked Nathaniel hard enough to leave bruises.
[¶ 7] Allen's retrial was originally scheduled to begin on October 19, 2004. Prior to the retrial, the court revisited its ruling on the admissibility of the spanking evidence. Although the court reaffirmed its earlier ruling, it restricted the scope of the evidence. Specifically, the court ordered that there be no reference to the method by which Jeremy Allen inflicted the spanking or the extent to which Nathaniel presented with bruises from the spanking.
[¶ 8] Allen also filed a motion to continue on October 8. Allen argued that her expert witness, a neuropathologist, needed additional time to run further tests on Nathaniel's brain samples. The court granted Allen's motion, setting November 12 as the deadline for a supplemental report from her expert.3 On November 17, the court extended the deadline to November 29, in response to Allen's untimely motion for an extension. The November 29 deadline also passed without a submission containing her expert's findings.
[¶ 9] Allen's second trial began on February 15, 2005. On the seventh day of trial, the day before the neuropathologist was scheduled to testify, defense counsel informed the court that the doctor sent him an e-mail the night before, in which she said that her subsequent testing revealed an abnormality in Nathaniel's brain, which was likely evidence of a seizure disorder. The court decided that the doctor would not be allowed to testify to these results, although she could still testify to the facts and opinions contained in her original report, because of the timing of the disclosure.
[¶ 10] Following her second trial, Allen was convicted of manslaughter. She was sentenced to eight years, with all but forty-two months suspended, and placed on three years probation. This appeal followed.
[¶ 11] Allen argues that the court erred in limiting the neuropathologist's testimony regarding her findings that Nathaniel had a seizure disorder because this evidence was exculpatory. Allen recognizes that exclusion is a permissible sanction for violation of a discovery order, see M.R.Crim. P. 16A(d), but she contends that the court should have imposed a less severe sanction, like granting the State additional time, or a continuance, to consider the new evidence.
[¶ 12] We have recognized that the trial court has the discretion to determine what, if any, sanction is appropriate for a discovery violation. State v. Landry, 459 A.2d 175, 177 (Me.1983). "The trial court has the authority not only to select a sanction but also to decide whether any sanction is required." Id. When the trial court does exercise its discretion and sanction a defendant for noncompliance with a Rule 16A(c) discovery order, we review that decision for an abuse of discretion. Cf. State v. Gallant, 595 A.2d 413, 415 (Me.1991) () (citing State v. Brewer, 505 A.2d 774, 777 n. 3 (Me.1985))
[¶ 13] Pursuant to M.R.Crim. P. 16A(c)(1), the trial court may order a criminal defendant to supply the State with a report containing, among other things, the subject matter of an expert's expected testimony. Should the defendant fail to comply with this order, or Rule 16A in general, the court "may take appropriate action," including sanctioning the defendant or taking no action. M.R.Crim. P. 16A(d). Among the permissible sanctions for a discovery violation, the court may prohibit the defendant from introducing the previously undisclosed evidence. Id. The court's discretion, pursuant to Rule 16A(d), is not unfettered, especially if the evidence is exculpatory, State v. Begin, 652 A.2d 102, 104 (Me.1995), but a criminal defendant does not possess "the right to present testimony free from the legitimate demands of the adversarial system," Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 413, 108 S. Ct. 646, 98 L.Ed.2d 798 (1988).
[¶ 14] The court's decision to exclude portions of the neuropathologist's testimony was well within its discretion. On the seventh day of trial, after the State had already rested and the day before the doctor was scheduled to testify, Allen brought to the court's attention that the doctor had found an abnormality during the course of subsequent tests of Nathaniel's brain samples that she believed was evidence of a seizure disorder. Offering this testimony on the seventh day of trial unfairly surprised the State because the doctor's proposed testimony went beyond what was presented in the report submitted prior to Allen's first trial, in which the doctor hypothesized that "an undetected seizure disorder" led to Nathaniel's death. The timing of the disclosure placed the State in a position where it had insufficient time to prepare a cross-examination of the doctor concerning her recent findings, the new methods she used in arriving at them, or to find and prepare witnesses to rebut this late evidence. See State v. Thurlow, 414 A.2d 1241, 1244 (Me.1980) (). Given the circumstances under which Allen sought to introduce the neuropathologist's testimony, the trial court did not exceed its discretion in deciding that exclusion was an appropriate sanction. See DeJesus v. State, 655 A.2d 1180, 1206-07 (Del.1995) (...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
State v. Carrillo
...that she had reviewed evidence that suggested that Carrillo's confessions to law enforcement officers were not false. See State v. Allen , 2006 ME 20, ¶ 24, 892 A.2d 447 ; In re Soriah B. , 2010 ME 130, ¶ 18, 8 A.3d 1256 ; M.R. Evid. 703. Whatever the prosecutor's motive or understanding in......
-
State v. Keene
...the cumulative effect of allegedly prejudicial circumstances occurring before and during trial, see State v. Allen, 2006 ME 20, ¶ 22, 892 A.2d 447, 454 (denial of a motion for mistrial); (2) admitting an autopsy photograph in evidence over Keene's objection pursuant to M.R. Evid. 403, see S......
-
In re Jeremy A.
...2003, the parents' 21–month–old son, Nathaniel, died. The mother was convicted of manslaughter for Nathaniel's death, see State v. Allen , 2006 ME 20, 892 A.2d 447, and the father was convicted of assaulting him the night before he died, see State v. Allen , 2006 ME 21, 892 A.2d 456. Ten ye......
- In re Angeles