State v. Allen
| Decision Date | 09 December 1896 |
| Citation | 69 N.W. 274,100 Iowa 7 |
| Parties | STATE OF IOWA v. JOE ALLEN, Appellant |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
Appeal from Dickinson District Court.--HON. W. B. QUARTON, Judge.
THE defendant was indicted for the crime of seduction, was convicted, and sentenced to the penitentiary for the term of two years, and adjudged to pay the costs of prosecution, from which sentence and judgment this appeal is prosecuted.
Reversed.
Allen & Cullen and A. C. Parker for appellant.
Milton Remley, attorney general, for the state.
I.
We are confronted with a record of over four hundred pages, in which not a single assignment of errors is to be found. Under the statute, in such cases we are required to "examine the record, and, without regard to technical errors, or defects which do not affect the substantial rights of the parties render such judgment on the record as the law demands." Code, section 4538. We have held in criminal cases, where no argument or assignment of errors was filed, that we would not enter upon a discussion of the case; that in such cases all we were required to do was to examine the record, and, if no error was found, to announce that fact and the judgment of the court. State v. Quinn, 63 Iowa 396, 19 N.W. 256 (19 N.W. Rep 256); State v. Lundermilk 50 Iowa 695. In this case, however, extended arguments are filed by both sides, and we shall proceed to discuss the questions presented. The county attorney, in his opening statement to the jury, said he proposed to show that the defendant stated to the prosecutrix that if she would release him from all liability he would pay her a certain sum of money; that he endeavored to get her to dispose of the child in some way so as to relieve him from liability, and offered her money to do so. The statement was objected to before being made, as well as afterwards, as being incompetent irrelevant, and immaterial, and the objection was overruled, and an exception taken. It is earnestly contended, that such evidence was not only improper and inadmissible, but was known to be so by the county attorney when he made the statement, and hence was without warrant, and made in bad faith, and such misconduct as worked great prejudice to the defendant. We do not find it necessary to determine the question of the admissibility of such evidence. If, however, the prosecutor in good faith, and with reasonable grounds to believe the evidence admissible, states what he claims to be the substance of such evidence to the jury, it does not follow that his conduct in so doing, is censurable, because in the further progress of the trial, as in this case, the court rules out said evidence, when offered, as improper. There is much doubt as to whether the matter complained of is a part of the record, so as to require us to pass upon the question presented; but, in view of the doubt, we may say that, conceding it to be properly of record, we are not warranted, in view of the facts, in holding that the statement was misconduct. We see nothing to indicate bad faith or intentional wrong on the part of the prosecution in making the statement. The evidence, when offered, was ruled out, and it appears, that it worked no prejudice to the defendant.
II. Very many acts of the trial court are complained of as constituting such misconduct as, should work a reversal of this case. We cannot consider them all separately. Some of the remarks of the court were proper and timely; others were uncalled for, if not positively improper; and still other acts were, as it seems to us, highly improper, and certainly prejudicial. We discover no act of the court which prejudiced the defendant, save the matter we are about to refer to. In the course of the examination of the defendant's witness, O'Farrell, counsel for the defendant was attempting to show, by the witness, specific acts of unchastity on the part of the prosecutrix, prior to her alleged seduction. The witness was asked if he had sexual intercourse with the prosecutrix at a certain time and place, and failed to answer, whereupon the question was repeated, and the witness appealed to the court to know if he was compelled to answer the question, and was told that he must answer it. Thereafter the following occurred: The questions of the court were well calculated to impress the jury with the conviction that the court thought that the witness was avoiding and refusing to answer the question because he had been advised so to do by the defendant and his counsel. The effect of the inference to be properly drawn from the questions asked by the court was not other, or different, than it would have been had his honor directly charged the defendant and counsel with tampering with the witness, and advising him to refuse to answer, even, in obedience to the command of the court. Such a charge, if sustained might have merited severe punishment of both defendant and his counsel, possibly. Nothing had happened in the examination of the witness, or in the conduct of the defendant, or of his counsel, to warrant a suspicion, even, that any attempt had been made by either to influence the witness in any way, much less improperly. It was a very grave charge to make, or insinuate, and the effect of the court's questions must have been highly prejudicial to the defendant. Besides, they were calculated to shake the confidence of the jury in the testimony of this witness generally, as well as in the evidence of every witness, adduced on behalf of the defendant. If the defendant and his counsel were guilty of thus attempting to impede...
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