State v. Allen
| Decision Date | 04 April 2006 |
| Docket Number | No. 31096.,No. 31098.,No. 31097.,31096.,31097.,31098. |
| Citation | 141 P.3d 1136,143 Idaho 267 |
| Parties | STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Timothy Lee ALLEN, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Idaho Court of Appeals |
Molly J. Huskey, State Appellate Public Defender; Jason C. Pintler, Deputy Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant.
Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Carol L. Chaffee, Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for respondent.
This appeal arises from three cases involving forgery and checks issued with insufficient funds. The defendant, Timothy Lee Allen, contends that the State breached the plea agreement for the first two cases, that the district court abused its discretion in imposing the sentences in those cases, and that the district court erred in denying a Rule 35 motion to reduce his sentences in all three cases.
This consolidated appeal involves three separate but related criminal proceedings. The first two, Docket Nos. 31096 and 31097, although not formally consolidated, were handled together. In the spring of 2003, Allen attempted to purchase a vehicle for $12,118.70. He wrote three checks for the purchase price, but all three checks bounced. Allen ultimately returned the car to the seller but on August 12, 2003, was charged with three counts of issuing an insufficient funds check greater than $250, Idaho Code § 18-3106. In September 2003, Allen forged a $507.15 cashier's check to pay overdue rent, and two days later was charged with this forgery, I.C. § 18-3601. On October 25, 2003, Allen accepted a settlement offer regarding these two cases. He agreed to plead guilty to the forgery charge and to one count of issuing an insufficient funds check, and waived his right to appeal the conviction and sentence. The State agreed to dismiss the other two counts of issuing insufficient funds checks and to recommend concurrent determinate sentences of eighteen months, leaving the indeterminate portion to the judge's discretion. However, the agreement also stated that the State's sentence recommendation was conditioned upon "no new criminal offense before date of sentencing." The district court accepted Allen's guilty pleas on November 14, 2003, and set the matter for sentencing in February 2004.
On November 17, 2003, three days after his guilty pleas in the earlier cases, the State charged Allen with twelve additional counts of issuing insufficient funds checks and three more counts of forgery for activities that took place between February and September 2003 (Docket No. 31098). These crimes were committed more or less contemporaneously with those in the previous two cases and before the initial plea agreement. Allen committed the offenses when he attempted to acquire a business. To appease the seller, he forged several documents supposedly showing his assets, and issued more than $73,000 in checks that never cleared. He also wrote eight payroll checks totaling more than $15,000 that were rejected for insufficient funds. On January 30, 2004, Allen accepted a settlement offer in this third case. He agreed to plead guilty to three counts of issuing an insufficient funds check and one count of forgery, as well as waive his right to appeal. The State agreed to dismiss the remaining charges and a persistent violator enhancement, and to recommend that the sentence on the four counts run concurrent with each other and with the sentence in the previous forgery case. The district court accepted the pleas and scheduled all three cases for a single sentencing hearing.
During sentencing, without objection from Allen, the State recommended unified twelve-year terms of imprisonment with six years determinate on both the forgery counts and three-year determinate sentences on each of the counts for insufficient funds checks, with the sentences to run concurrently. The district court ultimately imposed a ten-year unified sentence with three and one-half years determinate on both of the forgery charges. On each of the four counts for insufficient funds checks, the court imposed a three-year determinate term. The judge directed that all sentences run concurrently. Allen then filed Rule 35 motions to reduce his sentences in all three cases, which the court denied. Allen now contends that the State breached its plea agreement in Docket Nos. 31096 and 31097, that the court abused its discretion in imposing the sentences in the first two cases, and that the court erred in denying the motions to reduce the sentences in all the cases.
As a preliminary matter, before considering Allen's arguments that the State breached the first plea agreement, we must address the State's contention that neither this issue nor any of the other issues raised by Allen should be considered by this Court because, as a term of the plea agreements, he waived his right to appeal. A defendant's waiver of the right to appeal as a term of a plea bargain is generally valid and enforceable. Idaho Criminal 11(d)(1); State v. Murphy, 125 Idaho 456, 457, 872 P.2d 719, 720 (1994). Nevertheless, we must reject the State's waiver argument as to Docket Nos. 31096 and 31097 because if, as Allen contends, the State's sentence recommendations breached the plea agreement in those cases, the State would not be entitled to enforce its terms against Allen, including the appeal waiver. See J.P. Stravens Planning Assoc., Inc. v. City of Wallace, 129 Idaho 542, 545, 928 P.2d 46, 49 (Ct.App.1996) () Consequently, the question of the enforceability of the appeal waiver goes hand in hand with the question whether the State breached the plea agreement.
Allen contends that the State was required, by the terms of the plea agreement in Docket Nos. 31096 and 31097, to recommend no more than one and one-half years determinate regarding the initial counts of forgery and insufficient funds. He argues that the State's general recommendation of six years fixed on both of the forgery counts and three years fixed on all four of the insufficient funds counts constituted a breach of the plea agreement. The State responds that the third set of charges, filed on November 17, was a "new criminal offense before the date of sentencing," and thus the State was relieved of the sentence recommendation obligation in the initial plea agreement.
When a guilty plea "rests in any significant degree on a promise or agreement of the prosecutor, so that it can be said to be part of the inducement or consideration, such promise must be fulfilled." Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262, 92 S.Ct. 495, 499, 30 L.Ed.2d 427, 433 (1971). If the prosecution breaches its obligation under a plea agreement, "the defendant pleads guilty on a false premise, and hence his conviction cannot stand." Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, 509, 104 S.Ct. 2543, 2547, 81 L.Ed.2d 437, 444 (1984); State v. Rutherford, 107 Idaho 910, 913, 693 P.2d 1112, 1115 (Ct.App.1985). See also State v. Kellis, 129 Idaho 730, 733, 932 P.2d 358, 361 (Ct.App.1997); State v. Banuelos, 124 Idaho 569, 575, 861 P.2d 1234, 1240 (Ct.App.1993). Because plea agreements are contractual in nature, they generally are examined by courts in accordance with contract law standards. State v. Jafek, 141 Idaho 71, 73, 106 P.3d 397, 399 (2005); State v. Doe, 138 Idaho 409, 410-11, 64 P.3d 335, 336-37 (Ct.App.2003); State v. Fuhriman, 137 Idaho 741, 744, 52 P.3d 886, 889 (Ct.App.2002). As with other types of contracts, the interpretation of unambiguous terms and the legal effect of the plea agreement are questions of law to be decided by the Court. Doe, 138 Idaho at 410-11, 64 P.3d at 336-37.
The State's argument that it was relieved of its obligation under the agreement because of a new criminal offense is not so much a claim that Allen breached the plea agreement as an assertion that a condition to the State's promised performance failed. As the Idaho Supreme Court has said, "[i]f the condition upon which the prosecution's promised sentencing recommendation was based fails, the prosecution is not obligated to perform the agreement." Berg v. State, 131 Idaho 517, 519, 960 P.2d 738, 740 (1998). Such failures can occur when the State learns that the circumstances relevant to the agreement are not as they appeared to be. For example, in Mata v. State, 124 Idaho 588, 861 P.2d 1253 (Ct.App.1993) and in State v. Litz, 122 Idaho 387, 389, 834 P.2d 904, 906 (Ct. App.1992), the State's promise of a particular sentencing recommendation was made in reliance upon the defendant's representation that he did not have a criminal record. We held that it was not a breach of the plea agreement for the prosecutor to recommend a harsher sentence upon learning that the defendant in fact had a history of criminal conduct "[b]ecause the condition upon which the state's promised sentencing recommendation was based failed." Mata, 124 Idaho at 595-96, 861 P.2d at 1260-61.
The failure of a condition also may be caused by the defendant's actions after the plea agreement was made. For example, in State v. Tyler, 139 Idaho 631, 84 P.3d 567 (Ct.App.2003), after entering into a plea agreement, but before sentencing, the defendant committed another crime. We held that there was an implied term that the circumstances under which the bargain was made would remain substantially the same, and that the commission of a subsequent crime was a change in circumstances sufficient to excuse the State from fulfilling its promise. Id., 139 Idaho at 634, 84 P.3d at 570. Similarly, in Jafek, 141 Idaho at 74, 106 P.3d at 400, Berg, 131 Idaho at 519-20, 960 P.2d at 740-41, and State v. Ballard, 114 Idaho 799, 761 P.2d 1151 (1988), the State was relieved of its contractual obligations when the defendant failed to appear at the sentencing hearing, for the defendant's...
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