State v. Alley

• Decision Date: 15 November 1910
• Citation: 149 Iowa 196,128 N.W. 343
• Parties: STATE v. ALLEY.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

149 Iowa 196

128 N.W. 343

STATE

v.ALLEY.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Nov. 15, 1910.

Appeal from District Court, Polk County; Lawrence De Graff, Judge.

The defendant and one Roy Friel were jointly indicted upon a charge of larceny of domestic fowls in the nighttime. He elected to have a separate trial, and was found guilty. From the judgment entered on the verdict, he appeals. Affirmed.E. S. Schuetz, for appellant.

H. W. Byers, Atty. Gen., and Chas. W. Lyon, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.

WEAVER, J.

1. The first and principal point made on behalf of appellant is that the evidence is insufficient to support the verdict. That some person or persons stole a large number of chickens from the premises of the complaining witness, Snow, on the night of December 23, 1909, is shown without dispute. Appellant was familiar with Snow's premises, and presumably knew where his chickens roosted. There is evidence tending to show that he and Friel were in that neighborhood on the night in question, where they could have committed the theft if so disposed; that late in the night they returned to the home of Friel, where a chicken supper was indulged in; and that on the following day the accused was peddling chickens in a mining camp in another part of the county. The vehicle used by appellant and Friel on the night in question was borrowed or hired from another person. On its return an examination of the box disclosed a bag or sack, on the inside of which there were a few stray feathers. There was no such article in the vehicle when the accused took it. Appellant sought to prove an alibi, but the showing was neither strong nor convincing. There was also some confusion in the testimony whether the person peddling the chickens, and identified by the witness as being the appellant, did or did not wear a mustache. It should also be said that within a day or two after the alleged offense appellant left the state, and remained away until he was returned under arrest. While the testimony relied upon to sustain the conviction was purely circumstantial, we cannot say that it was insufficient to sustain the charge. Crimes of that nature are not often established by direct and positive evidence, and the state is usually compelled to rely upon collateral facts and circumstances to make its case. If these are of such character as to convince the jury beyond a reasonable doubt of the truth of the charge, no more is required to sustain the verdict. In our judgment,...