State v. Allison
| Decision Date | 14 January 2021 |
| Docket Number | No. M2017-02367-SC-R11-CD,M2017-02367-SC-R11-CD |
| Parties | STATE of Tennessee v. Robert Jason ALLISON |
| Court | Tennessee Supreme Court |
Richard C. Strong, Nashville, Tennessee (on appeal), and Robert Jason Allison, Nashville, Tennessee, Pro Se (at trial) for the appellant, Robert Jason Allison.
Herbert H. Slatery III, Attorney General and Reporter; Andrée Blumstein, Solicitor General; David H. Findley, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Glenn R. Funk, District Attorney General; and Andrea Green, Assistant District Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.
We granted permission to appeal to the Defendant to examine the propriety of his convictions for money laundering based on his receipt of payment for drugs he "fronted" to a confidential informant. On separate occasions, the Defendant delivered a quantity of marijuana to the informant. At the time of delivery, the informant paid the Defendant for a portion of marijuana, but the Defendant also fronted additional marijuana to the informant, meaning the Defendant had an expectation that he would be paid later with proceeds from the informant's sale of the drugs. The Defendant subsequently received payment. Based on these actions, the Defendant was charged with and convicted of two counts of delivering marijuana and two counts of money laundering. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-14-903(c)(1) (2006); Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-417(a)(2) (2006 & Supp. 2008). The Defendant challenged whether the evidence supported his money laundering convictions, whether those convictions violated double jeopardy protections, and whether the money laundering statute was unconstitutionally vague. The trial court rejected the Defendant's challenges, and the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the trial court's judgments. We hold that the evidence supporting one of the money laundering convictions was legally sufficient, because the proof supported an inference that the Defendant purchased marijuana with the proceeds he had received with the intent to promote the carrying on of the sale of marijuana. With respect to the second money laundering conviction, we hold that the evidence was insufficient, because the proof showed only that the Defendant received payment for drugs he had fronted. We further hold that the Defendant's punishment for both delivery of marijuana and money laundering does not violate double jeopardy protections and that the money laundering statute is not unconstitutionally vague by virtue of its use of the undefined phrase "carrying on." Accordingly, we affirm in part and reverse in part the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeals.
In January 2009, law enforcement officers specializing in drug trafficking investigations honed in on Robert Jason Allison ("Defendant"). Officers previously had discovered several pounds of marijuana in a woman's residence. The woman revealed that she had obtained the marijuana from the Defendant and agreed to cooperate with officers as a confidential informant ("CI").
On January 9, 2009, the CI telephoned the Defendant to arrange a purchase of five pounds of marijuana at a price of $1,000 per pound. She was provided $5,000 in cash by the officers overseeing the buy.2 The CI agreed to wear a transmitter when she met with the Defendant that allowed officers to hear and record the conversations between her and the Defendant. When the CI met with the Defendant to buy the five pounds of marijuana, the Defendant revealed that he had ten pounds of marijuana in his possession and asked the CI if she would like more than five pounds. The CI stated that she had sufficient funds for only five pounds. The Defendant then asked the CI how long it would take her to pay him for three extra pounds. The CI responded that she could probably pay him in three or four days. As they discussed the matter, the Defendant told the CI that he believed the marijuana could be divided and sold for a total of $1,200 to $1,300 per pound, and he gave her tips on how best to market and sell it.3 Ultimately, the Defendant decided to "front" the CI three extra pounds of marijuana.4 The CI left with eight zip-lock bags of marijuana.5
True to her word, the CI met with the Defendant again four days later on January 13, this time for the sole purpose of paying the Defendant what he was owed. The CI gave the Defendant $3,000 in cash that had been provided to her by law enforcement officers. The Defendant mentioned that he was hoping to receive more marijuana in the near future, stating that he was "tryin’ to get [his] money together" because he wanted to "try to get somethin’ else." The CI asked the Defendant when he expected to have the additional marijuana. The Defendant—after a telephone call discussing timing with his supplier—responded that he believed he would have more marijuana the next night.
The CI met with the Defendant three days later on January 16, this time to make another purchase of marijuana. She once again carried with her $5,000 in cash provided by law enforcement officers. The Defendant told the CI he had twenty-five bags of marijuana, stating that he had received the marijuana the prior night and complaining that it had taken him "forever" to "break up" the product. The Defendant offered the CI a better price on this occasion—$850 per pound—telling her that anytime he acquired the product more cheaply, he would pass along some of the savings to her. At $850 per pound, the CI could afford to purchase six pounds with the $5,000 she had been provided, owing the Defendant $100. As before, however, the Defendant asked the CI if she wanted more, inquiring whether she wanted to take ten pounds. The Defendant also confirmed that he had already paid his supplier, and thus he was not in a rush to be paid for the fronted marijuana and would accept payment "whenever [the CI was] ready." During this meeting, the Defendant offered the CI still more tips on selling the drugs. The CI left with ten zip-lock bags of marijuana.6 As a result, the CI owed the Defendant $3,400 for the four fronted pounds of marijuana (at $850 per pound) and $100 as the remainder of the price due for the six pounds she purchased on January 16.
The CI next met the Defendant four days later on January 20, this time to pay for the marijuana that had been fronted to her on January 16. She was provided $3,000 by law enforcement officers, even though she owed the Defendant $3,500. The CI paid the Defendant $3,000 and acknowledged that she still owed him $500. On this occasion, the Defendant showed the CI a sample he had of new marijuana that had "just come off the truck" and told her that he would be getting "fifty." The Defendant remarked that his supplier was charging him $800 and stated that he would be content to sell this marijuana to the CI for only $850. Ultimately, the CI took a small portion of the marijuana sample with her and told the Defendant that she would let him know what she thought of it.
During this January 20 meeting, the Defendant made comments indicating that his supplier was removing marijuana from the containers it had been transported in and that he was planning to obtain marijuana from his supplier. Based on these comments and the Defendant's prior drug transactions, law enforcement officers conducted surveillance of the two residences the Defendant frequented and obtained search warrants.
On January 21, officers observed the Defendant arrive at one of the residences and unload a green plastic tub from his truck into the garage behind the residence. Officers then converged on both residences, executed the search warrants, and took the Defendant into custody.
Officers discovered fourteen bricks7 of marijuana in the green plastic tub, along with a separate bag of marijuana.8 The Defendant agreed to speak to officers at the scene and admitted knowing that the green tub contained marijuana. He attempted to deflect responsibility away from other individuals and onto himself.
Officers discovered $2,780 in cash on the Defendant. Of that amount, $2,460 were bills that the CI had paid to the Defendant on January 20. When asked what he did for a living, the Defendant told officers that he was unemployed. The Defendant also told officers that he had obtained the marijuana in the green tub "on credit," meaning that he had been fronted the drugs by his supplier.
Based on these facts, the Defendant was indicted for two counts of delivery of marijuana weighing one-half ounce to ten pounds, see Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-417(a)(2), (g)(1), one count of possession with intent to deliver between ten pounds, one gram and seventy pounds of marijuana,9 see Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-417(a)(4), (g)(2), and two counts of money laundering, see Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-14-903(c)(1).10 In the indictment, each of the offenses was alleged to have occurred on a specific date. The marijuana delivery offenses—counts one and two of the indictment—corresponded to the January 9 and 16 meetings between the Defendant and the CI, when the Defendant gave the CI bags of marijuana. The possession with intent to deliver offense—count three—corresponded to the January 21 date, when the Defendant was arrested with the green tub of marijuana. The money laundering offenses—counts five and six—corresponded to the January 13 and 20 meetings between the Defendant and the CI, when the Defendant received cash from the CI as payment for fronted marijuana.
With respect to money laundering, Tennessee law provides, in part, that:
It is an offense to knowingly conduct ... a financial transaction or make other disposition involving property or proceeds represented by ... another at the direction of a law enforcement officer, to be the property or proceeds derived from a specified unlawful activity with the...
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