State v. Almeda
| Decision Date | 15 February 1983 |
| Citation | 455 A.2d 1326,189 Conn. 303 |
| Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
| Parties | STATE of Connecticut v. John A. ALMEDA, Jr. |
C. Robert Satti, State's Atty., with whom was Stuart Schimelman, Asst. State's Atty., for appellant (state).
Chester Fairlie, Sp. Public Defender, for appellee (defendant).
Before SPEZIALE, C.J., and PETERS, ARTHUR H. HEALEY, PARSKEY and SHEA, JJ.
The defendant in this appeal was indicted by a grand jury for the crime of murder of one Ronald Wynn in violation of General Statutes § 53a-54a(a). The defendant was further charged by information with the crime of attempt to commit the murder of one Ricky Wynn by the use of a firearm in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-49(a)(2) and 53a-54a. 1 After a trial to the jury, the defendant was found guilty of murder as charged in the indictment and was found guilty of attempted manslaughter in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-55(a)(1) as a lesser offense included in the charge of attempted murder under the information.
After the verdicts the defendant, inter alia, filed a motion in arrest of judgment claiming that the court lacked jurisdiction over the charge of attempted manslaughter in the first degree as charged and a motion for arrest of judgment and new trial claiming material prejudice due to the impaneling of a juror who had failed to disclose certain information on voir dire. The court, acting on these motions, arrested the defendant's guilty verdict of attempted manslaughter in the first degree, set aside the murder verdict and ordered a new trial. The state, by leave of the trial court, has appealed these rulings.
On appeal, the state asserts that the trial court erred in setting aside the guilty verdict of attempted manslaughter in the first degree in violation of §§ 53a-49(a)(2) and 53a-55(a)(1) on the basis of the court's ruling that such an offense did not exist under Connecticut law. The state also claims as error the trial court's setting aside the jury verdicts and ordering a new trial on the basis of its finding that the defendant had been denied the right to a meaningful voir dire and the right to a fair and impartial trial because a juror had intentionally withheld information which, if disclosed, would have provided grounds for a challenge for cause.
The jury could reasonably have found the following facts: The defendant, John Almeda, and the decedent, Ronald Wynn, had engaged in a dispute over remarks addressed by the decedent to the defendant's girlfriend and had exchanged verbal threats. This encounter occurred at the train station in New Haven on the afternoon of September 18, 1979, as the victims prepared to board a commuter bus to the Electric Boat Company in Groton where they worked the 5 p.m. to 1:30 a.m. shift. Later, during the early morning hours of September 19, 1979, in front of the gate to the Electric Boat Company, the defendant and the decedent continued their dispute. A brief scuffle ensued, followed by a verbal argument between the defendant, the decedent and a friend of the decedent. The episode ended when the defendant shot the decedent once with a .22 caliber revolver which the defendant had purchased on the street in New Haven the previous day. Immediately after the decedent was shot, the decedent's brother, Ricky Wynn, entered upon the scene and was then shot twice by the defendant. One slug struck Ricky Wynn on the left eyebrow and lodged in front of his left ear, the other penetrated his neck and shattered upon impacting his spine. The decedent died soon after the shooting. Ricky Wynn recovered from his wounds but continues to have some residual problems.
The state first asserts as error the trial court's determination that the crime of attempted manslaughter in violation of General Statutes § 53a-55(a)(1) does not exist under Connecticut law.
In the shooting of Ricky Wynn the court charged the jury on the crime of attempted murder in violation of General Statutes § 53a-54a(a). The court charged as lesser included offenses the crimes of attempted manslaughter in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-55(a)(1) and attempted assault in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-59(a)(1).
After the defendant was found guilty of attempted manslaughter he filed a motion challenging the trial court's jurisdiction over that crime. The court found that the crime of attempted manslaughter in violation of § 53a-55(a)(1) did not exist under our law. We agree.
It is plain from a reading of General Statutes § 53a-49(a) that the intent required for attempt liability is the intent required for the commission of the substantive crime. 2 The criminal result must be the conscious object of the actor's conduct. A person is guilty of manslaughter in violation of § 53a-55(a)(1) when "[w]ith [the] intent to cause serious physical injury to another person, he causes the death of such person or of a third person ...." General Statutes § 53a-3(4) defines "serious physical injury" as "physical injury which creates a substantial risk of death, or which causes serious disfigurement, serious impairment of health or serious loss or impairment of the function of any bodily organ ...." Thus, the requisite intent for manslaughter under § 53a-55(a)(1) is the intent to cause serious physical injury rather than the "intent to cause the death of another person" required for the crimes of murder under § 53a-54a 3 or manslaughter under section 53a-55(a)(2). 4
Manslaughter committed without an intent to cause the death of another; § 53a-55(a)(1); is analogous to the concept of involuntary manslaughter, whereas manslaughter committed with an intent to cause death; § 53a-55(a)(2); is analogous to the concept of voluntary manslaughter. 5 The type of manslaughter charged in this case contemplates death resulting from the intent to cause serious bodily harm and, hence is properly characterized as involuntary manslaughter. No intent to cause death is required.
The illogic of attempted involuntary manslaughter is easily demonstrated. Manslaughter, as herein involved, requires that an individual having the intent to cause serious physical injury to another person causes the death of such person. Involuntary manslaughter is a homicide unintentionally caused. Commonwealth v. Hebert, 373 Mass. 535, 537, 368 N.E.2d 1204 (1977). Attempt liability requires that the defendant entertain the intent required for the substantive crime. General Statutes § 53a-49(a). Unless death results there can be no crime of involuntary manslaughter. Thus, the crime of attempted involuntary manslaughter requires a logical impossibility, 6 namely, that the actor in his attempt intend that an unintended death result. Such an anomaly the legislature could scarcely have intended. Accordingly, we hold that attempted manslaughter in violation of § 53a-55(a)(1) is not a crime cognizable under our law. 7
Because it may arise at retrial, we allude to the double jeopardy aspects of the present case. The defendant's conviction of the charge of attempted manslaughter, even though erroneous, implicitly acquitted the defendant of the crime of attempted murder. By returning a guilty verdict on the charge of attempted manslaughter which required only the intent to do "serious physical injury," the jury necessarily had to determine that the defendant did not possess the "intent to cause death" required for the charge of attempted murder. Therefore, double jeopardy bars a retrial on the offense of attempted murder. Price v. Georgia, 398 U.S. 323, 90 S.Ct. 1757, 26 L.Ed.2d 300 (1970); Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 78 S.Ct. 221, 2 L.Ed.2d 199 (1957); State v. Troynack, 174 Conn. 89, 99, 384 A.2d 326 (1977). This, coupled with our holding today, mandates that the defendant may only be retried for those crimes which are lesser included offenses of manslaughter as defined in General Statutes § 53a-55(a)(1) or for those crimes not requiring an intent to cause death, such as assault in the first degree; General Statutes § 53a-59(a)(1).
After the verdicts were accepted, the court, acting on the defendant's motion for arrest of judgment and new trial, held hearings and found that a juror had intentionally withheld information which, if disclosed, would have provided the basis for a challenge for cause. The court, finding that this nondisclosure deprived the defendant of the opportunity to conduct a meaningful voir dire and of his constitutional right to a fair and impartial jury, set aside the murder verdict, arrested the manslaughter verdict and ordered a new trial. The state contends that the court's action was in error.
The juror, Anthony Carboni, had been first selectman of the town of Franklin from 1959 to 1975. Prior to voir dire examination, Carboni completed a juror information form. On the form he was instructed to indicate with an "X" whether certain items applied to "[him] or to any member of [his] family or household." On the form Carboni indicated that he had held public office. He, however, left blank the item on the form which inquired about previous connections with "any police department, court or other law enforcement agency."
During individual voir dire examination, the defense counsel, inter alia, asked Carboni whether he or any member of his family had ever been the victim of a crime. Carboni responded in the negative. Defense counsel also inquired whether Carboni or any member of his family had been involved in law enforcement activities. Again, Carboni responded in the negative. After further questioning Carboni was selected as a juror and subsequently became foreman of the jury.
After the verdicts, defense counsel learned that the position of first selectman of the town of Franklin carries with it the title of chief of police. The defendant thereupon filed a motion for arrest of judgment and new trial, claiming that...
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