State v. Anderson
| Decision Date | 06 April 1978 |
| Citation | 385 A.2d 738 |
| Parties | The STATE of Delaware v. Mark D. ANDERSON, Timothy Anderson, Kevin Epperson, Anthony Scales, Elwood Scales, Daun Nole Weeks, Edward G. Wright, Jacob G. Wright and Maylon Jerome Trotter. |
| Court | Delaware Superior Court |
Motion for Transfer to Family Court. Granted.
Charles K. Meuse and John T. Gandolfo, Deputy Attys. Gen., Dept. of Justice, Wilmington, for the State of Delaware.
Richard Allen Paul of Paul, Lukoff & Hurley, Wilmington, for defendant Mark D. Anderson.
Kenneth F. Carmine, of Potter & Carmine, Wilmington, for defendant Timothy Anderson.
Martin A. Schagrin of Knecht, Greenstein & Berkowitz, Wilmington, for defendant Daun Nole Weeks.
Bernard J. Gartland, Wilmington, for defendant Edward G. Wright.
Richard M. Baumeister, Asst. Public Defender, Wilmington, for defendant Jacob G. Wright.
Paul H. Spiller, of Kimmel & Spiller, Wilmington, for defendant Maylon Jerome Trotter.
Nine defendants, ranging in age from fifteen to seventeen, have each been charged with two counts of Rape First Degree, allegedly occurring on October 28, 1977. After a preliminary hearing in the Family Court, at which probable cause was determined to exist, the defendants were bound over for Grand Jury action since Family Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. 1 Following indictment, five of the defendants, Jacob G. Wright, Edward G. Wright, Daun Nole Weeks, Timothy Anderson and Maylon Jerome Trotter filed motions to transfer their cases to the Family Court for trial and disposition under the provisions of 10 Del.C. § 939(b). 2 The State opposes transfer.
The four non-moving defendants have all apparently entered into agreements with the State under which the indicted charges will be nolle prossed in exchange for pleas to lesser charges and testimony against other co-defendants. One of these defendants, Mark D. Anderson, although having agreed to enter a guilty plea to a misdemeanor charge, also belatedly moves for transfer of his case to Family Court.
Each of the defendants argues that their individual backgrounds, together with the unusual nature of the offenses charged, strongly suggests a Family Court disposition of this matter. To the contrary, the State maintains that, despite their ages, the defendants, as participants in a crime which is uniquely adult in character, have forfeited the right to juvenile treatment.
Delaware, like most states which employ a two-tiered system of adjudication for juvenile offenders, proceeds on the assumption that, in most instances, the age of the offender should determine the place of adjudication. Brooks v. Taylor, Del.Supr., 2 Storey 138, 154 A.2d 386 (1959); Whitebread & Batey, Transfer Between Courts, 63 Va.L.Rev. 221 (1977). Thus, the Family Court will ordinarily exercise jurisdiction over those under the age of eighteen charged with crimes, regardless of whether the offenses are classified as misdemeanors or felonies. Two areas of behavior permit disposition of the juvenile as an adult, at least for adjudication purposes: non-amenability and certain felony charges. In the former, the Family Court has discretion to transfer the case of a juvenile over sixteen years of age to the Superior Court for trial as an adult where the juvenile has been deemed "not amenable to the rehabilitative processes" of the Family Court. 10 Del.C. § 938. Where the charges involve three designated felonies: first degree murder, rape and kidnapping, Section 938(a)(1) preempts discretion and requires adjudication at the Superior Court level. But, the transfer is not absolute. Under § 939(a), the Attorney General, without leave of Court, may transfer to Family Court cases arising under a non-amenability finding, as well as the designated felony cases. The sole standard which guides the allocation authority of the Attorney General is the course which best serves "the interests of justice".
The same general standard governs the Court's authority under § 939(b), but the Court is authorized to consider specific as well as relevant factors. In the final analysis, the Superior Court is required to make a reverse amenability determination which focuses on the nature of the alleged offense as much as on the character of the defendant. In other jurisdictions this procedure is referred to as "reverse waiver". King v. State, Ct.Spec.App.Md., 36 Md.App. 124, 373 A.2d 292 (1977).
Since a juvenile charged with a designated felony in the Superior Court has lost the benefit of Family Court adjudication by statutory pronouncement, there is presumption that a need exists for adult discipline and legal restraint. Hence, the burden is upon the juvenile to demonstrate the contrary. Commonwealth v. Pyle, Pa.Supr., 462 Pa. 613, 342 A.2d 101 (1975). The moving defendants have sought to discharge this burden through the presentation of evidence in three areas: (1) their family and educational backgrounds; (2) the alternative rehabilitative processes available to them under the auspices of the Delaware Bureau of Juvenile Corrections resulting from Family Court dispositions and (3) certain mitigating factors involved in the offenses charged.
The State concedes that none of the moving defendants has had previous contact with the Family Court by reason of unlawful activity. There is thus no past "rehabilitative effort" against which to gauge the defendants' response. The defendants are, accordingly, entitled to at least an inference that such efforts would not be ineffective. To that end, the defendants presented the testimony of the Director of the Youth Development Center who outlined the custodial facilities and programs available to the defendants should they be committed to the Bureau of Juvenile Corrections. Each of the defendants is a high school student in good scholastic standing, although the oldest defendant...
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Marine v. State
...the outcome of an amenability proceeding, neither arbitrary nor irrational and not a denial of equal protection. Id. In State v. Anderson, Del.Super., 385 A.2d 738 (1978), the Superior Court conducted a "reverse amenability" proceeding under 10 Del. C. § 939(b) involving juveniles charged w......
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State v. Buelow, 89-346
...to transfer the proceeding out of criminal court has the burden of showing that the case does not belong there. State v. Anderson, 385 A.2d 738, 740 (Del.Super.Ct.1978); Carter v. State, 382 So.2d 871, 872 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1980); State v. Woodward, 737 P.2d 569, 571 (Okla.Crim.App.1987); Co......
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Hughes v. State
...determination of amenability which is premised upon the nature of the offense as well as the character of the child. State v. Anderson, Del.Super., 385 A.2d 738, 741 (1978). This Court explicitly upheld the constitutionality of the reverse amenability process in Marine v. State, Del.Supr., ......
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State v. Verhagen, 94-2823-CR
...because the statutes require the juvenile to bring a motion or to seek application for a transfer. See, e.g., State v. Anderson, 385 A.2d 738, 739 n. 2 (Del.Super.Ct.1978) (the court may transfer the case to family court upon application of the defendant); Carter v. State, 382 So.2d 871, 87......